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ABSTRACT 
Drawing upon the work of McAdams (1988) and Breakwell (1986) on 
identity, gay identity can be conceptualised as a personal 
narrative that individuals construct in an attempt to impart 
meaning, coherence and purpose to the experiences they have had in 
relation to their same-sex sexual preference, and to boost their 
self-esteem and sense of personal continuity by forging connections 
between these experiences and imposing causality on them. 
With the aim of accessing the gay identity narratives of a sample 
of gay men, a structured multiple-choice-type questionnaire which 
examined experiences relating to the formation of a gay identity 
was distributed to 204 self-defined gay men in Greater London. The 
146 completed questionnaires that were returned were first 
subjected to frequency analysis. One of the main findings to 
emerge was that respondents reported having constructed their gay 
identity formation narratives against a background of internalised 
negative societal ideas about homosexuals and homosexuality, which 
rendered problematic the admission of a gay identity to their over- 
arching identity and the attribution of a positive evaluation to 
this gay identity. Data were also subjected to multiple regression 
analysis, the major outcome of which was that contact with the gay 
subculture appeared to have facilitated the development of a gay 
identity that individuals could regard as personally advantageous 
by challenging the negative images of homosexuals and homosexuality 
internalised during socialisation and by allowing individuals 
access to a subcultural narrative in which the development of a gay 
identity is construed as a worthwhile task. 
Respondents' accounts of their gay identity formation experiences 
were generally interpreted on two levels, i. e., as reflecting the 
actualities of the events they described and, importing concepts 
from work on autobiographical memory, as reconstructions of those 
events within gay identity formation narratives designed to boost 
the narrator's self-esteem and sense of personal continuity. 
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PREFACE 
A thorough consideration of the construction of gay identity 
requires the examination of a number of related literatures. As 
one might suppose that gay identity is but a specific domain of 
more global identity, and that insights into the nature and 
development of gay identity may be gleaned from a consideration of 
the development of identity in general, it is intended to begin 
with an investigation of the meanings that have been ascribed to 
the concept of identity and of some of the ways in which identity 
development has been conceived, noting en route any 
conceptualisations that might profitably be applied to the topic 
of gay identity. The identity literature will then be compared and 
contrasted with the literature on gay identity, which will be 
treated in depth in order to elaborate the sorts of issues and 
tasks that have been considered most pertinent to the development 
of a gay identity. 
Although the present study strongly echoes existing studies of gay 
identity and is ostensibly concerned with examining the sorts of 
experiences that gay men encounter in the formation of their gay 
identities, the ways in which they negotiate these experiences, and 
the most commonly reported developmental patterns of identity, in 
the present study the implications that the retrospective nature 
of the data on which the study is based hold for the interpretation 
of the data are fully recognised and elaborated. Much 
1 
consideration is therefore given to the sorts of bias and 
distortion that may characterise retrospective accounts of past 
events. In accordance with this, it is recognised that what is 
being examined are gay men's present constructions of their past 
gay identity formation experiences, together with the possible 
sources, both individual and collective, of these constructions and 
the functions that they serve. 
with these insights in mind, the aims, intentions and hypotheses 
of the present study are then outlined, and introduce ä discussion 
of the design and development of the questionnaire that was 
employed to access the ways in which gay men construct their gay 
identity formation experiences. After a brief consideration of the 
sampling procedure that was adopted in order to recruit a broad 
cross-section of gay men for the study, basic frequency analyses 
of the data that were obtained are presented and interpreted. 
These are followed by more informative multiple regression analyses 
of selected major variables in the constructed accounts that 
respondents provided of their gay identity formation experiences. 
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CHAPTER ONE 
IDENTITY: A CONCEPT IN CRISIS 
"Identity has become a catch-all term that 
promises much, yet disappoints profoundly. It 
seems an appealing term, imbued with the 
quintessence of human subtlety, so that, when 
its underlying deficiencies are exposed, the 
embarrassment of having been seduced by its 
surface attractiveness makes one wish to 
protest all the more that it really is 
attractive or turn away in displeasure in 
having been so fooled. " 
- Weinreich (1983) 
1.1 Introduction 
According to Slugoski and Ginsburg (1989), the Oxford English 
Dictionary dates the noun "self" from 1595 and around 1638 the word 
"identity" came to refer to personality and individuality. The 
semantic history of the term "identity" thenceforth has been a 
tortuous one, and anyone who has ever engaged in even a cursory 
examination of the literature on identity will be able to relate 
to and sympathise with Weinreich's evident frustration at the 
ambiguous and unilluminative nature of the concept. It is 
necessary at the outset of the present study to make explicit the 
view of identity that informs the project, as this will influence 
the way in which the project is approached, the sorts of questions 
that are asked, and the ways in which the data are interpreted. 
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On this basic issue of definition, there is a plethora of 
alternative and competing interpretations from which to choose. 
Some all-embracing definitions have been provided by Cooley (1902) 
who defines the self -a term frequently used interchangeably with 
identity - as "that which is designated in common speech by the 
pronouns of the first person singular, 'I', 'me', 'mine' and 
'myself"' (p 136) and by Klapp (1969), who believes that identity 
encompasses everything that a person may legitimately and reliably 
say about themselves, which virtually equates the concept with 
personality. McAdams (1988) on the other hand, insists that 
identity refers to a part of personality, but not its totality. 
Even the father of modern identity theory, Erik Erikson, seems 
uncertain. He defines identity as a "subjective sense of an 
invigorating sameness and continuity" (1968, p 19) but has been 
criticised for not being more precise and for being inconsistent 
about whether identity refers to a structure or configuration or 
a process (Kroger, 1989). Kegan holds that identity is concerned 
with "the way the organism and the environment in which it is 
embedded keep reconstructing their relationship ..... [identity 
involves] a series of qualitative reconstructions of the relation 
between the subject and the object of experience" (Kegan, Noam and 
Rogers, 1982, p 107). Loevinger's related conceptualisation of 
the ego covers "among other things, the person's striving for 
meaning and self-consistency" (1979, pp 4-5) and, in a similar 
vein, for Jung the ego carried a continuing sense of personal 
identity (Stevens, 1990). 
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The idea of identity as a life story or personal narrative has been 
developed by Glover (1988) and McAdams (1988). The latter regards 
identity as existing in the personal narrative that we begin to 
construct in late adolescence or early adulthood in an attempt to 
answer the questions of "who am I? " and "how do I fit into an adult 
world? ". Rogers (1981) speaks of a "prototype" which "contains a 
collection of features the person sees as describing him or 
her ...... such as traits, values, and possibly even memories of 
specific behaviors and events" (p 196). Markus and Sentis (1982) 
talk of "self-schemata" which are "generalizations about the self 
derived from the repeated categorizations and evaluations of 
behaviour by oneself and by others" which integrate "all the 
information known about the self in a given behavioural domain into 
a systematic framework used during processing" (p 45). 
The existence of universal realities underlying all concepts of 
identity has also been questioned. The Western conception of the 
person has been summarised by Geertz (1979) as the view that the 
person is "a bounded, unique, more or less integrated motivational 
and cognitive universe, a dynamic center of awareness, emotion, 
judgment and action, organized into a distinctive whole and set 
contrastively against other such wholes and against a social and 
natural background" (p 229). Glover (1988) too traces the history 
of the concept of the individual as unique and unified, 
hypothesising that it originates from the religious belief in the 
soul. Taking insights such as these as his starting point, Sampson 
5 
(1989) proceeds to outline various ways in which the universal 
applicability of this concept of the person has been challenged. 
For example, he cites cross-cultural studies which have uncovered 
less individuated views of the person; the social constructionist 
belief in the facticity and the social and historical relativity 
of the identity concept; and critical theory which attributes the 
prevailing concept of the person to capitalist ideology. 
The multiplicity of identity is stressed at length in Rowan's 
(1990) treatment of "subpersonalities", which enlists in service 
of his argument the myriad concepts of identity used in 
psychotherapies as diverse as psychosynthesis, psychodrama, Gestalt 
therapy, transactional analysis and neuro-linguistic programming. 
He points to Cantor and Kihlstrom (1987) who emphasise that there 
exists within any one person "a family of selves", some of which 
are more central or more representative of "who you are" than are 
others. These selves are held to overlap, with the unitary sense 
of self being located at their interstices at any one time; the 
various selves across time and the relationships between them are 
seen as linked by the person's life story, which marks an 
elaboration of the concept propounded by Glover (1988) and by 
McAdams (1988). In his exhaustive treatment of the topic, Rowan 
lists no less than 27 different ways in which various writers have 
talked of different aspects of identity. 
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Weeks (1985) believes that the identity emperor has no clothes: he 
posits that the search for identity is fruitless as it involves the 
attempt to recapture the sense of wholeness or integration 
experienced by the infant at the time when it failed to recognise 
that there existed a distinction between itself and its world, and 
hence the wholeness that is sought is mythical and unattainable. 
One could go on interminably listing the many and varied ways in 
which different writers have conceived of identity and related 
concepts but in the end, one is forced to agree with Burns (1979) 
who, in his thorough consideration of the manifold 
conceptualisations of the self-concept and related ideas, concludes 
that "it is obvious that conceptions of the self system are often 
considerably vague, occasionally mutually contradictory (especially 
with regard to terminology) and lacking any definitive or complete 
statement" (p 28). 
Breakwell (1987) points out that the attempt to define the concept 
of identity has not been helped by its being confounded with 
related terms such as the self, self-concept and self-conception, 
although she elsewhere (1986) states that often those who use such 
terms are seeking to understand the same fundamental phenomena and 
processes. She also notes that the definition of identity is 
determined by the role that the concept plays within an author's 
general theoretical orientation. In the domain of philosophy, for 
example, Baillie (1990) helpfully explains that the philosophical 
concept of identity, which derives from logic, is very different 
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from the meanings attributed to the concept in psychology. 
Breakwell's outlook accords with that of Maslow (1968) who notes 
that "partly identity is what we say it is ...... It means something 
different for various therapists, for sociologists, for self- 
psychologists, for child psychologists, etc., even though for all 
these people there is also some similarity or overlap of meaning" 
(p 103). Yet, even if one were to reject definitions propounded 
by psychologists or sociologists as biased in terms of their 
underlying theoretical orientations and seek a neutral dictionary 
definition, the precise meaning remains unclear. According to the 
Pocket Oxford Dictionary, "identity" means "absolute sameness; 
individuality". It therefore appears to connote two opposing 
ideas. Although one may interpret these seemingly contradictory 
definitions as being meaningful on different levels, with 
individuality referring to individual, personal identity and 
sameness referring to the commonalities among those individuals who 
constitute a group, as Jacobson-Widding (1983) notes, this cannot 
be a simple and absolute bifurcation: individuality may be found 
within a group in terms of how that group views itself with regard 
to other groups, while Erikson describes "personal identity" in 
terms of "sameness within a person"; he refers to this subjective 
sense of continuity within a person as "selfsameness" (Erikson, 
1959), and regards its essence as being a continuity in the 
development of one's identity between what one was in the past, 
what one currently is, and what one aspires to be in the future. 
Other writers too have focussed upon the importance of continuity 
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for identity. Breakwell (1986) adopted the continuity concept as 
one of her three principles which are said to guide the identity 
processes by defining desirable endstates for these processes. 
Back (1989) characterises modern self theory as being concerned 
with charting the individual's attempts to maintain the continuity 
of the self, "to preserve the essential 'me' throughout the 
vicissitudes of social life" (p 223). And Jacobson-Widding (1983) 
emphasises the importance of a temporal continuity in the person's 
consciousness of their identity, centred around an awareness that 
he/she is essentially one and the same person - even if only in the 
physical bodily sense - who has lived through all his/her past 
experiences. 
1.2 Models of Identity: Erikson, Regan, Breakwell and McAdams 
Attempts to describe the development of identity have been just as 
varied as the attempts to define the concept. In order to provide 
some insight into the ways in which identity development has been 
described and in order to trace the history of some of the concepts 
that will be used when considering the development of gay identity 
- which will be treated as a "special case" of identity development 
rather than an unrelated phenomenon - we shall briefly consider the 
concepts and systems proposed by a number of modern identity 
theorists together with some particularly insightful ideas drawn 
from a number of other writers in the field. The models of 
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identity that have been selected for particular consideration have 
not been chosen because they best represent the extensive identity 
literature or because they most completely encompass the most 
salient and frequently-used concepts in the area. Rather, they 
each offer to the general topic of identity, and potentially to the 
specific domain of gay identity, frameworks and insights that have 
been and may be profitably applied and elaborated. 
One cannot examine the concept of identity without considering the 
theory of Erik Erikson, whose eight stage model of identity as a 
psychosocial concept remains the most widely-known contribution to 
the literature on the topic and provides an historical context in 
which the development of other ideas of identity can be located. 
His model has been described as being that of "a changing 
individual operating in a changing society" (Sugarman, 1986, p 84), 
emphasising the developmental dialectic that exists between the 
person and the environment in which they are located. The spur for 
development is said to be provided by the social context which 
makes a series of demands upon the individual, each of which 
provokes an internal crisis, the successful resolution of which 
requires the individual to make certain choices and decisions 
leading to the development of a new "ego quality" which facilitates 
enduring commitments to a more defined sense of self. Success in 
dealing with each crisis is heavily dependent upon the interactions 
that take place between the individual and significant others in 
his/her interpersonal environment, again highlighting the 
10 
underlying reciprocal-influence model of person-environment 
relations. Each developmental stage is described in terms of its 
ascendant task, couched in bipolar terms which describe the 
outcomes of successful and unsuccessful efforts at resolving the 
task (see Table 1.1). 
AGE (APPROX. ) 
o-i 
1-6 
6- 10 
10 - 14 
14 - 20 
20 - 35 
35 - 65 
65 + 
STAGE 
Infancy 
Early childhood 
Play age 
School age 
Adolescence 
Young adulthood 
Maturity 
Old age 
CRISIS 
Basic trust vs. basic 
mistrust 
Autonomy vs. shame and 
doubt 
Initiative vs. guilt 
Industry vs. inferiority 
Identity vs. role confusion 
Intimacy vs. isolation 
Generativity vs. stagnation 
Ego integrity vs. despair 
and disgust 
Table 1.1: Erikson's stages of psychosocial development. 
Although each task has its period of ascendancy, all the tasks are 
seen as persisting in some form throughout the lifespan and so may 
require attention outside their time of primacy, either because 
they were originally never resolved satisfactorily or because as 
development proceeds earlier resolutions may be questioned. Stage 
five of Erikson's scheme (identity versus role confusion) concerns 
tasks which are most traditionally connected with identity 
formation and encapsulates what has become known as the adolescent 
"identity crisis". The fundamental task of this stage is for the 
individual concerned to develop "a conviction that one is learning 
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effective steps toward a tangible future, that one is developing 
a defined personality within a social reality which one 
understands" (Erikson, 1959, p 95). This is said to involve the 
reworking of the attainments of earlier stages into a coherent set 
of values and beliefs, forming an ideological world to which one 
can become committed. It might, however, be argued, that Erikson 
here describes a process of identity change and tasks associated 
with such change that may arise at points in the life cycle other 
than during the adolescent years. Any threat to an established 
identity which challenges the blueprint for future action within 
that identity or which is associated with change in the social 
context in which the person functions may similarly be said to 
demand the re-establishment of a realistic prospective component 
to identity. It may also require a coming to terms with the 
implications that changes in the social context may hold for one's 
identity, together with a reworking of or indeed the jettisoning 
and replacement of previous identity attainments, with a view to 
forming a new and coherent set of values and beliefs that are 
suited to one's new identity structure and level of functioning. 
For Erikson, the essence of the various identity tasks is the 
resynthesis in adolescence of the identifications one has made in 
childhood. Weinreich (1983) specifies that basically the 
resynthesis task necessitates the resolution of conflicting 
identifications made with significant others, by which he means the 
resolution of the situation where one empathically identifies with 
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a person or group, i. e., one recognises that one shares certain 
characteristics with them, while simultaneously contra-identifying 
with that same person or group, i. e., wishing to dissociate from 
them and from that which they represent. Failure to achieve such 
a resynthesis is said to result in the development of a state of 
identity diffusion, while failure to embark on an attempt at 
resynthesis leads to the occurrence of identity foreclosure, where 
the person holds a static conception of who they are. The ease 
with which the resynthesis task may be achieved is said to depend 
upon how compatible the childhood identifications are with each 
other, but it might be contended that other factors are equally 
important, such as the individual's previous experiences of dealing 
effectively with conflicting cognitions. The nature of the 
resynthesis that is required may also be questioned. If it is a 
subjective resynthesis that must be achieved rather than a 
resynthesis that can be recognised by people other than the 
identity constructor, then the individual may employ synthesising 
strategies with aims ranging from the complete resynthesis of past 
and present identifications to the facilitation of their peaceful 
coexistence. In the latter case, to an outside observer, 
resynthesis may not have taken place at all according to any 
objective criteria for the completion of the process, but to the 
identity constructor, apparently conflicting identifications, 
having been reinterpreted, may have been rendered compatible and 
robbed of their capacity for causing identity diffusion. 
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Erikson's scheme of things has been heavily criticised on many 
fronts. For example, it has been attacked for assuming that 
psychological growth and health are only possible if the individual 
conforms to societal demands (Buss, 1979) and for being applicable 
only to "Western males living in a surplus economy" (Slugoski and 
Ginsburg, 1989, p 38). Various reasons have been postulated as to 
why the model is inappropriate for other groups. It is 
inappropriate for women because Erikson regarded a woman's role as 
essentially that of child-rearing, which leaves little time and 
space for them to make the occupational and ideological choices 
deemed necessary for the maximisation of identity potential. His 
scheme is inappropriate for those who are not desirable both 
socially and in the market place in that they may have a less 
appealing or narrower range of occupational and ideological 
alternatives to choose from, compared with those who are socially 
and educationally advantaged, and so the basis of the resolution 
of the essential identity crisis is undermined. Indeed, for some, 
there may be no alternatives at all, no identity crisis in the 
Eriksonian sense, and hence no possibility of identity achievement. 
Nevertheless, his model has been most influential and has 
bequeathed to the field certain themes and concepts which have been 
adopted and developed by others. It is worth examining Erikson's 
legacy. 
One of the major features of Erikson's model which is also found 
in the models of identity theorists such as Loevinger (1976) and 
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Kegan (1982) is its use of stages to structure the development of 
identity, a framework which, according to Stevens (1990), is so 
ancient and so widespread in the conceptualisation of the 
development of the life span that it is most likely archetypally 
determined. Unfortunately - as is all too often the case - the 
rationale underlying this choice of structure is not alluded to, 
although the choice of a stage model is hardly surprising, given 
Erikson's background in the psychoanalytic field and the way in 
which his psychosocial model has been described as having evolved 
as a response to Freud's psychosexual stages of development. Nor 
is there much discussion about what exactly constitutes a stage, 
unlike in Piagetian developmental psychology which has been 
characterised by detailed argument and counterargument about the 
exact meaning of the Piagetian idea of a stage (cf Pinard and 
Laurendeau, 1969). 
The concept of stage adopted by Erikson and by other stage 
theorists appears to share certain features with the concept of 
stage prevalent in cognitive psychology. For example, cognitive 
stages are believed to reflect qualitative changes in competence 
which are assumed to result from changes in cognitive structure. 
Erikson's stages could be similarly characterised, with changes in 
ego qualities resulting from changes in the ways in which earlier 
identifications are resynthesised. Erikson's model of development 
rests, like cognitive-structural models, on the epigenetic 
principle, with later stages of development integrating into their 
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structure earlier stages. Certain aspects of the cognitive- 
structural model which have been criticised as constituting an 
intellectual straitjacket and being inimical to the array of 
aspirations and orientations encountered in the study of a broad 
lifelong project such as identity development (Sugarman, 1986) are 
echoed to some extent in stage theories of identity, most notably 
in the idea that development is sequential, unidirectional, 
universal, irreversible and end-state or goal oriented. Applying 
these characteristics to Erikson's model of identity development, 
it could be said that although he saw the process in'these terms 
at least to some extent, his view that the major tasks of identity 
development are present at all junctures in the identity project, 
although only at certain times do they constitute what McAdams 
(1988) calls "front-page news", means that he did not regard 
identity development as wholly and inevitably sequential and 
irreversible. Furthermore, his belief that "identity is never 
established as an achievement in the form of a personality armour, 
or of anything static and unchangeable" (1968, p 24) suggests that 
his model does not propose a definite, unchanging developmental 
goal, again distinguishing it from the cognitive-structural 
approach. 
Research conducted on the stage model of another identity theorist 
highlights the way in which stage models of identity development 
may impose artificial structure and order upon what is a much more 
random and chaotic process. In a study of 24 young people, Kroger 
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(1989) attempted to locate her subjects within the models of 
various identity theorists, including Loevinger's (1976) eight- 
stage model of ego identity. She found that while the various 
authors had detailed distinct stages in the formation of identity, 
the profiles that she obtained frequently reflected more than one 
stage within a single model. So, for example, one subject's 
responses led to the subject being classified at the impulsive, 
self-protective and conformist stages of ego development. Also, 
expected relationships between subjects' stages of development on 
the various models failed to materialise. Kroger explained her 
results by suggesting that the boundaries between stages of 
development may be fuzzier than models suggest and that individuals 
who are in transition from one stage to another may have been 
artificially squeezed into discrete stages. Such an "enforced 
classification" approach is adopted in Cass's (1984a) attempt to 
test her stage model of gay identity formation: she asked her 
subjects to study ideal profiles of people in each stage of her 
model and to classify themselves according to how closely their 
experiences corresponded to those described in the profiles. 
However, she did not permit subjects to classify themselves as 
being between stages, although a number of respondents ignored this 
and insisted on their transitional status. Little wonder then that 
her study appears to provide evidence which supports her typology. 
One identity theorist who makes explicit his interest in the 
transition between stages is Robert Kegan (1982). Perhaps more 
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than any other, his constructive-developmental model points the way 
forward in the development of stage models of identity - or, 
alternatively, provides a rationale the elaboration of which may 
lead to their abandonment - through its emphasis on transitional 
identity states and through the equal prominence it accords to 
process and structure in identity formation. Kegan's emphasis is 
on identity as meaning-making, on how individuals make their world 
cohere. Kroger (1989) characterises his approach to identity 
development as being founded on the view of "(a) self struggling 
to organize and make sense of its experience" (p 140). Identity 
formation for him essentially is an ongoing process whereby the 
boundaries between what is self and what is other are continually 
structured, lost and reformed across six identifiable stages. 
Kegan regards the self or subject as being the intrapsychic 
framework in which the individual is embedded and from which he/she 
cannot distance himself/herself, whereas the object is that which 
was once part of the self, i. e., its framework of embeddedness, 
which is relinquished and then becomes an object of the self. His 
interest lies in the continuous process whereby the balance between 
people's conceptions of self and of object are upset, causing them 
to relinquish part of the self and make it the object of a new 
restructured self in a new equilibrium. To take an example, in 
stage four of Kegan's model, the person defines themselves in terms 
of their institutional affiliations, so for instance one is one's 
career or one's religion or one's nationality. The person is 
forced into transition when the institution in terms of which they 
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define themselves fails for whatever reason to provide the 
recognition they seek and the person turns to other people to help 
with their self-definition, thus becoming embedded in a new 
framework of interindividuality. One now has one's career, 
religion or nationality rather than being it. 
Kegan's model is attractive for several reasons. Firstly, he 
believes that we spend much of our lives developmentally out of 
balance, so he attends as much to transitional identity states as 
to the identity stages themselves. Secondly, he emphasises that 
integration in the form of a self-other balance occurs repeatedly 
over the life cycle rather than being the highest achievement in 
identity formation as it is in Loevinger's (1976) model, for 
example. Such an approach echoes the view of Erikson, who, in 
emphasising the resyntheses of earlier identifications required at 
the various stages of his model, also regards integration not as 
a once-and-for-all attainment but as a goal that is consistently 
lost and regained. Thirdly, Kegan specifies the dynamics which 
impel development, i. e., the individual's "culture of embeddedness" 
- whether this be the family, the peer group, the work setting or 
the love relationship - first acknowledges his/her present level 
of development and participates in his/her meaning-making endeavour 
and then provides the person with an appropriate contradiction 
which they can integrate into their self-other balance only by 
reworking that balance at a different level. As in Erikson's 
model, identity development is thus seen as a product of a person- 
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environment dynamic, with the person's social context making 
demands upon him/her that cannot be met while he/she remains at 
his/her existing level of identity functioning. Such process-based 
dynamics are not always elucidated in models of identity formation 
which prefer to emphasise structure, as in Loevinger's (1976) 
model. She has been accused of describing ideal type 
characterological portraits rather than meaningful developmental 
stages (Kroger, 1989), and Hauser (1976) has pointed to her 
omission of mechanisms of inter-stage movement and of intra-stage 
organisational principles. 
Some writers have disowned the concepts of stage and structure 
entirely. Pine (1985) holds that the idea of psychological stages 
is misleading and that it is preferable to think only in terms of 
key psychological moments or incidents in people's lives. Although 
not rejecting structure totally, Breakwell (1986) compensates for 
the over-emphasis of others upon structure by conceiving of 
identity as "a set of processes operating in a principled manner" 
(p 23). The two processes which she pinpoints as being common to 
most models of identity are those of assimilation-accommodation and 
evaluation. Assimilation refers to the absorption of new 
components into the identity structure; accommodation refers to 
changes which occur in the existing structure in order to house the 
new components; evaluation involves the allocation of meaning and 
value to identity components. The structure of identity she 
characterises in terms of its content and value dimensions. The 
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content dimension of identity is said to comprise "the 
characteristics which the individual concerned considers actually 
to describe himself or herself and which, taken together as a 
syndrome, mark him or her as a unique person, different in 
psychological profile from all others" (1986, p 12). Identity 
contents are open to change, as is their organisation, which is 
considered in terms of the salience and centrality of identity 
components and their levels of connectedness. The value dimension 
of identity refers to the positive or negative evaluations 
attributed to identity components on the basis of' social and 
personal value systems. The values attached to identity components 
also remain open to change. 
Breakwell (1986) parts company with the cognitive psychological 
view of identity development in refusing to accept that identity 
maturation necessarily entails movement towards increased 
complexity or differentiation among identity components, which she 
believes is simply a function of the range of life experiences that 
a person encounters. Instead, she posits that the identity 
processes of assimilation-accommodation and evaluation interact 
over time to create and change the content and value of identity, 
not in a haphazard way but in line with certain principles which 
define desirable endstates for identity and which do not relate 
directly to complexity or differentiation. Breakwell outlines 
three such principles: the self-esteem principle; the continuity 
principle; and the distinctiveness principle. The identity 
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processes are thus said to operate with the goal of promoting 
within the person a feeling of personal worth or social value, a 
sense of personal continuity across time and situations, and a 
sense of uniqueness. Her model may be seen as according with 
Kegan's basic notion of an individual engaged in a meaning-making 
endeavour, attempting to make sense of his/her world and 
experiences, although Breakwell, in describing the operation of 
macro-level mechanisms of change that transcend the exigencies of 
specific developmental tasks or stages, is more specific in 
defining how the meaning-making task proceeds and - in rejecting 
outright the artificialities of stage models that Kegan's model 
skirts around - is perhaps more forthright and adventurous than 
Kegan. 
In her consideration of the evidence for the existence of each 
principle as a guiding force in identity, Breakwell (1986) notes 
that the self-esteem principle appears to operate universally and 
that almost every theory of identity posits some variant of it. 
The evidence for the operation of the continuity principle is more 
ambiguous and this principle tends to be confused with the related 
concept of consistency: the two may co-occur but continuity does 
not necessarily imply consistency, which may be associated with 
growth and change involving inconsistencies between past and 
present components of identity. The evidence for the operation of 
the distinctiveness principle, she concludes, is the least 
convincing of all and it may only guide the identity processes in 
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those cases where it supports the prime principle of self-esteem. 
It is difficult to imagine the distinctiveness principle playing 
a major role in the development of gay identity. Rather, one of 
the major tasks in gay identity formation may be to cope with the 
unwanted distinctiveness conferred upon the person by an identity 
that is based on same-sex sexual attraction and is socially 
devalued. Only when a gay identity has been established and when 
the individual has succeeded in attributing a positive evaluation 
to it may the distinctiveness which it brings be valued and 
regarded as desirable. 
Although reminders of the prime importance of identity processes 
are most necessary in an area apparently over-concerned with 
structure, the use of familiar structural images when describing 
identity can render an account more accessible to the reader and 
they should not be discarded lightly. Unfortunately, images and 
metaphors have not always been wisely chosen in writings on 
identity. For example, Cooley (1902) introduced the concept of the 
"looking-glass self", reasoning that an individual's self-concept 
is significantly influenced by what the individual believes others 
think of him/her, information obtained by studying how others react 
to him/her. Breakwell (1986) notes how the metaphor of the 
"looking-glass self" is nonsensical if taken literally: the 
situation where everyone acts as a mirror for others involves an 
infinite regress of mirrors, besides which, two mirrors facing one 
another produce no image. She warns that "(m)etaphors all too 
23 
frequently entrap the theorist rather than clarify. It would not 
harm psychology if the use of metaphor were banned" (p 15). 
One of the most striking metaphors that has been applied to the 
subject of identity in recent years is that of identity as an inner 
story or life story, developed by Glover (1988) and McAdams (1988). 
In a broader consideration of the possibilities of self-creation, 
Glover posits that we each have an inner story, which he defines 
simply as the story we tell ourselves about ourselves. These 
stories, he claims, are our truth but not the truth, i. 'e., they are 
subject to omission and distortion through forgetting and bias. 
We can edit our inner stories through wishful thinking, fantasy and 
self-deception or through identifying with some aspects of the 
story and not with others. Glover's inner story is a psychosocial 
construct; it is not just an inner monologue, but is partly created 
when people talk to each other through the exchange of ideas. The 
verbalisation of the inner story may also serve to crystallise it 
and clarify it. 
The concept of the life story in relation to identity is elaborated 
more systematically by McAdams (1988), working within the 
personological tradition, which is chiefly concerned with the study 
of the whole person in his/her sociohistorical context, using 
biographical approaches and focussing upon fundamental human 
motives. He takes as his starting point the belief that " (s) o that 
we may understand who we are and how we fit into our ever-so- 
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complex world, we begin in late adolescence and early adulthood to 
construct a dynamic narrative of self ...... Like stories in 
literature, our life stories embody settings, scenes, characters, 
plots, and recurrent themes. And like stories in literature, the 
stories we tell ourselves in order to live bring together diverse 
elements into an integrated whole, organizing the multiple and 
conflicting facets of our lives within a narrative framework which 
connects past, present, and an anticipated future and confers upon 
our lives a sense of sameness and continuity - indeed, an identity" 
(p ix). The underlying purpose in the construction of a personal 
narrative is further explained by Myerhoff (1986) who states that 
"(o)ne of the most persistent but elusive ways that people make 
sense of themselves is to show themselves to themselves... by 
telling themselves stories... More than merely self-recognition, 
self-definition is made possible by means of such showings, for 
their content may state not only what people think they are but 
what they should have been or may yet be" (p 261). The 
construction of personal narratives thus permitsthe person to make 
sense of his/her life and to impart to it definition, unity, 
purpose and a prospective component. 
McAdams' concept of the life story as identity incorporates two 
important ideas from other writers, i. e., Kegan's notion of 
identity as a meaning-making endeavour, and Erikson's belief that 
identity connotes a persistent sense of sameness within oneself, 
an idea akin to Breakwell's continuity principle of identity. This 
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is not to say that everyone achieves this sense of continuity, 
unity and purpose. Like stories in literature, the life stories 
that people create may lack narrative coherence and consistency, 
be replete with cul-de-sacs and loose ends and lack relevance to 
the circumstances of their lives. For example, in the film "A 
Private Function", the wife of a small-town chiropodist who is 
frustrated by her lack of social standing expresses her unfulfilled 
desire for continuity of identity when she laments "I want a future 
that'll live up to my past. But when's it going to start, that's 
what I want to know". 
Identity formation refers to the task of creating a life story that 
makes sense for the person, i. e., provides unity and purpose. This 
is a psychosocial task as the person must create their own life 
story within the larger context of societal stories or myths, which 
according to Levi-Strauss (1969), serve to integrate the various 
ideas of society's collective understanding of itself and which 
encapsulate the most salient issues with which a society is 
preoccupied. Echoing the personal-social dialectic in the models 
that have been reviewed, McAdams regards a person's world as 
setting the parameters for his/her life story and determining the 
amount of flexibility the person is permitted in their creation of 
a personal narrative. Identity change is couched in terms of the 
editing of the life story, which may range from minor revision to 
a rewriting of the entire text. Like the other theorists outlined, 
McAdams eschews the idea that identity is ever achieved in any 
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final sense, as he sees the life story as constantly evolving and 
continually open to revision, "a lifelong and dynamic process 
which, beginning in late adolescence, may undergo alternating 
periods of relative stability and marked change" (pp 47-8). 
Stability arises when the individual lives out commitments 
previously made and change occurs when the individual reevaluates 
past commitments and experiments with the possibilities of new 
ones. 
The creation of a life story can begin only in late' adolescence 
with the arrival of the Piagetian stage of formal operations 
(Inhelder and Piaget, 1958). Before that point, the child's 
cognitions are embedded in the present reality; he/she is bound to 
the concrete world of what is, and oblivious to the world of what 
might be. But with the onset of formal operations, the adolescent 
becomes able to conceive of the world in abstract terms and to 
reason about what might be. Around this time, adolescents may 
construct what Elkind (1981) terms a "personal fable", an heroic 
scenario about themselves which is centred on their greatness and 
uniqueness. The gay comedian and broadcaster, Simon Fanshawe, 
provided an appropriate illustration of his personal fable when he 
revealed in an interview that "At 16 I lived a rich fantasy life. 
In my fantasy I was a star, a great name, a talent to respect. or 
I was a Brazilian cha-cha dancer with six kids and a husband who 
looked like James Dean" ("The Guardian", August 29th 1990). This 
personal fable is later cast aside as reality begins to set 
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limitations on the fable's limitless possibilities and it is 
replaced by the creation of a life story. 
McAdams developed his concept of the life story in several ways, 
some of them plausible, others not. He believed that the life 
story could be divided into four major components, i. e, its nuclear 
episodes, ideological setting, imagoes and generativity script. 
Nuclear episodes are "specific autobiographical events which have 
been reinterpreted over time to assume privileged status in the 
story" (p 63), perhaps as turning points in the narrative, similar 
to Pine's (1985) notion of key psychological moments or incidents 
in people's lives. Every story requires an ideological setting as 
a backdrop, which consists of the person's beliefs about how the 
world is and about how it should be. These beliefs are established 
early in life during socialisation and may be seen as enshrining 
Levi-Strauss's (1969) idea of societal myths. They are quite 
resistant to change, perhaps because change in the beliefs that 
form the basis of a person's belief system would affect the entire 
system. McAdams hypothesises that the questioning of and change 
in the ideological setting of a person's life story, which Erikson 
saw as an identity task that is especially salient in the 
adolescent years, leads to the most tumultuous form of identity 
crisis. Within McAdams' scheme, imagoes refer to diverse 
personifications of the self that act as characters in the life 
story. And finally, the story's generativity script refers to a 
person's vision of what they hope to put into life and what they 
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want to get out of it: the sense of "who I am" is said to be 
bolstered by there being a sense of what the person is going to do 
in order to fulfil the demand posited in Erikson's model that one 
must be generative, i. e., leave a legacy for the future, in order 
to achieve ego integrity. McAdams also includes in his model two 
"second-order" variables: thematic lines and narrative complexity. 
Thematic lines are described as recurrent content clusters in the 
life story and narrative complexity refers to how differentiated 
and integrated individual life stories are, i. e., the extent to 
which stories on one hand incorporate many elements and make many 
distinctions and on the other make many connections among the 
various elements and synthesise them within hierarchical patterns 
of organisation. 
Most of these elaborations have an intuitive appeal and one can 
imagine how a personal narrative could be descriptively analysed 
in these terms. But McAdams goes on to extend his vision in ways 
that are unnecessary and that illustrate the wisdom of Breakwell's 
(1986) warning against the use of metaphor in psychology. For 
example, he undermines the simplicity of his idea by introducing 
Bakan's (1966) concepts of agency and communion as dominant 
thematic lines in most people's life stories, where they appear as 
themes of intimacy and power. On what he bases this assertion is 
never made clear. Furthermore, he attempts to classify life 
stories according to whether they exhibit the characteristics of 
classic comedy, romance, tragedy or irony and whether their 
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thematic content can be construed in terms of one or more of the 
five "generic plots" found in narratives as outlined by Elsbree 
(1982). This, together with the taxonomy of imagoes that McAdams 
constructs based on Greek gods and goddesses, leads Rowan (1990) 
to describe the treatise as "a mish-mash which I for one cannot 
take seriously. This is a great pity, because up to that point 
McAdams was making a good deal of sense and exhibiting a very 
encouraging sense of connections and meaningful networks" (p 165). 
It appears to be the case that McAdams takes his literary metaphor 
for identity a little too literally and overextends it, attempting 
to force the broad diversity that may be found in personal 
narratives into restrictive structure and content-based categories. 
And even if the categorisation were legitimate, the purpose of such 
a taxonomical enterprise is unclear. It would simply undermine the 
potential for emphasising process inherent in his use of such a 
broad and all-embracing concept of identity as the life story, and 
instead stress structural and content-related concerns. Then 
again, that he should seek to concentrate on structure is not 
surprising, given that one of the major questions to which he seeks 
an answer is "what is the content and structure of the identity 
configuration which binds together a particular person's past, 
present, and future and provides his or her life with unity and 
purpose? " (p 17). In order to answer this question, he needed to 
address structural issues, but at the expense of a satisfactory 
treatment of the process-linked questions of why life stories are 
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developed and what the processes are that shape their development. 
He outlines in very general terms the functions that stories 
perform on a social and an individual level but fails to distil 
from these the essential functions that life stories perform and 
which motivate individuals to construct life stories in the first 
place. Amassing insights from sources as diverse as Plato, 
Aristotle, Dryden, the Romantic poets, Freud, and Bettelheim, he 
notes that stories have been described as distorted representations 
of the material world; as lessons on how the world and the 
relations between its inhabitants ought to be, on how we should 
live, on what values we should hold, on what is right and what is 
wrong; and as sources of psychological truth and of social and 
individual integration and synthesis, part of which entails the 
integration of disconnected elements and segments of information 
into a more cohesive representation. Impressive though this review 
is, it is not clear which function he believes best applies to the 
life stories that individuals construct. Nor is sufficient 
consideration given to the processes whereby life stories are 
constructed and changed. By ignoring these concerns, McAdams fails 
to realise the potential that his conceiving of identity in terms 
of a life story might have to unite into one framework some of the 
most insightful ideas from other conceptualisations of identity and 
to contexualise identity processes that other authors have 
investigated. 
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1.3 Personal and Social Identity 
Before attempting to synthesise within one framework the major 
elements in existing identity literature, it is necessary first to 
consider some remaining concepts and controversies that have not 
yet been examined. There is a tendency in much writing on identity 
to dichotomise the concept into personal and social or collective 
identity (Weinreich, 1983; Zavalloni, 1983). In the study of gay 
identity, such concepts have particular relevance in that, because 
of the societal censure which a gay identity may attract, the gay 
person when operating in many spheres of the heterosexual world 
may be forced to conceal his gay personal identity and assume a 
heterosexual social identity. An individual's disclosure of a gay 
identity to heterosexual others may be viewed as a process whereby 
he brings his social identity into line with his personal identity 
before increasing proportions of his social world. 
The interpenetration of self and society has long been recognised, 
has already been stressed in the conceptualisations of identity 
outlined, and has been used as the cornerstone of theories of self 
by such seminal writers as Cooley and Mead. Cooley (1902) 
explicitly states that "self and society are twin born" (p 5), 
mutually defining each other and acting as points of reference for 
one another. It was he who first pointed out the importance of 
subjectively interpreted feedback about the self from others as a 
main source of data about the self. In his very similar theory, 
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Mead (1934) argues that the self-concept arises out of the 
individual's concern about how others react to him/her. A 
composite idea of how others respond to the self is distilled from 
the person's history of interpersonal experiences in the form of 
a "generalized other", which acts as an internal regulator of 
behaviour. Thus the individual comes to respond to himself/herself 
and to develop self-attitudes consistent with the responses and 
attitudes that others in his/her world have towards him/her. Burns 
(1979) interprets Mead's writings as suggesting that the self is 
composed of numerous "elementary selves" which reflect aspects of 
the social process. Modern writers would refer to these elementary 
selves as "social identities" which link the self and society, as 
opposed to personal identity, which is regarded as that which is 
independent of social determination, "a creative product of 
purposive action and intentional judgement" (Breakwell, 1987, p 
98). Tajfel (1978) defines social identity as "that part of an 
individual's self-concept which derives from his knowledge of his 
membership of a social group (or groups) together with the value 
and the emotional significance attached to that membership. " For 
Turner and Giles (1981), social identity represents "the sum total 
of a person's social identifications, where the latter represent 
specific social categorizations internalized to become a cognitive 
component of the self-concept". Dashefsky and Shapiro (1974) 
regard the term as referring to "how others identify the person in 
terms of broad social categories of attributes, such as age, 
occupation or ethnicity"; this definition treats social identity 
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as an externally designated phenomenon in contrast to the other two 
which view it as an aspect of identity that is subjectively 
recognised by the individual. Although the concept of social 
identity is therefore not unitary in terms of definition, the 
Dashefsky and Shapiro viewpoint is not the one which is most 
commonly adopted as, if the individual is not aware of the social 
categories in terms of which others identify him/her, this will not 
influence the way in which he/she regards or thinks about 
himself/herself. 
Weinreich (1983) incorporates this dimension into his bipartite 
concept of social identity which he views as encompassing what he 
terms "alter-ascribed social identity", i. e., the categorisation 
of the person as a member of a social group or category by another 
and the evaluative connotations which this ascription holds, and 
"ego-recognized social identity", i. e., the person's own 
recognition of their membership of a social group or category. He 
outlines the possibility of identity problems arising where a 
mismatch occurs between an alter-ascribed social identity and an 
ego-recognized one, i. e., where the person does not recognise or 
denies membership of a group or category. This may result from 
incorrect categorisation by another person or from the individual's 
desire to "pass" or adopt a different social identity from that 
which he/she usually holds, a possibility that is most pertinent 
to the study of the management of a socially devalued identity such 
as gay identity. 
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The concepts of personal and social identity cannot be treated as 
if they were unrelated and many writers point to the necessity of 
recognising that "society constitutes and inhabits the very core 
of whatever passses for personhood: each is interpenetrated by the 
other" (Sampson, 1989), i. e., there exists a systematic 
interrelationship between the two. In Eriksonian terms, an 
interaction between the needs and capacities of the individual and 
the demands and rewards of society is required for identity 
formation to occur. Back (1989) holds that the modernist movement 
emphasises the social aspect of identity formation in regarding the 
self as "created and maintained through social interaction" (p 
224), but acknowledges that throughout this process, a personal 
"individual self is subjectively preserved" (ibid. ). Harre (1984) 
also subscribes to this position, but believes the tasks involved 
in constructing a social and personal identity to be a potential 
cause of conflict, in that the development of a social identity 
requires the individual to carve a place in the established order, 
while personal identity demands that one differentiate oneself in 
some way from the established order and create a sense of 
uniqueness. Jacobson-Widding (1983) believes that an 
interrelationship between personal and social identity is vital to 
the experiencing of Eriksonian selfsameness. She singles out a 
definition of identity by Erikson as encompassing both dimensions, 
i. e., "(t)he term 'identity' expresses such a mutual relation in 
that it connotes both a persistent sameness within oneself 
(selfsameness) and a persistent sharing of some kind of essential 
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character with others" (Erikson, 1959). In her view, this 
definition denotes "culture", i. e., commonly held values and their 
expression, which plays a major role in the construction of an 
image of the self in that it attempts to guide self-other 
relations. She points out that the sort of face-to-face 
interaction experiences that one would regard as the building 
blocks of personal identity must be interpreted by the person in 
the light of prevailing cultural values, and herein locates the 
core of the interrelationship between personal and social 
identities. The Eriksonian term which she employs to connote both 
the selfsameness of personal identity and the sharing of some 
essential character with others involved in social identity, is 
"inner identity", which is essentially a psychosocial construct, 
comprised of personal experiences of face-to-face interaction, the 
values inherent in these experiences and the retrospective feeling 
of "fit" between these dimensions. 
The personal versus social bifurcation is also postulated and 
examined by Zavalloni (1983) who sees it as mirroring the 
relationship between the internal and external world and hence 
requiring an examination of intrapsychic and interpsychic processes 
for its investigation. She nominates a wide variety of domains as 
necessary areas of study in the understanding of the interaction 
between personal and social identity, e. g., "thought and language, 
cognition and affect, personal motivation and world view" (p 206). 
The relationship between the two is not wholly unidirectional in 
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that a social identity helps generate an individual system of 
beliefs and feelings about the self, others and the social world, 
i. e., it influences the formation of a personal identity while 
providing the means for its own development. 
The distinction between personal and social identity and the 
attempt to integrate the two are regarded by Breakwell (1987) as 
artificialities, the result of modelling identity at only one 
moment in time, by which she presumably means when either the 
personal or social aspects are in the ascendant, and ignoring the 
processes involved in identity formation. She likens the 
distinction drawn between personal and social identity by social 
psychologists to the distinction between conceptualisations of 
identity made by processual interactionists and structural 
interactionists. 
The former hold that identity results from a dialectic between the 
individual and society which is reified in the process of 
socialisation (Denzin, 1977; Openshaw, Thomas and Rollins, 1983). 
Identity is also variously construed as the result of labelling 
processes (Ball, 1983) and constituted by attributions made by and 
about a person in line with the behaviours he/she exhibits in 
particular situations. The processual interactionist view of 
identity could therefore be summarised as the belief that it is 
situated, emergent, reciprocal and negotiated: there is a focus 
upon the active construction of identity within each spatial, 
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temporal and social context. 
For the structural interactionists, on the other hand, identities 
are internalised roles or sets of expectations associated with 
certain social positions (Stryker, 1979). The self-concept is 
viewed as being given structure by the hierarchical organisation 
of these numerous roles (McCall and Simmons, 1978). This hierarchy 
can be described in terms of the salience of or degree of 
commitment to certain roles (Turner, 1978) and the extent to which 
certain roles are connected with others (Stryker, 1980). The same 
criticisms may be levelled at this approach as may be levelled at 
all role theory. In considering the concept of identity as role- 
playing, one is bound to wonder whether somewhere behind the roles 
lies the real person who is distinct from them just as the actor 
is distinct from any of his/her parts. It is doubtful whether the 
pressure placed upon people to conform to certain roles is so great 
that it does not permit them to bring to their roles something that 
is distinctively their own. Even the most constricting roles 
usually permit personal embellishments. This quality that the 
person brings to their roles may be regarded as a distillation of 
qualities from their having played other roles but it is 
nonetheless distinctive to that person: no one else will have 
played the same combination of roles, distilled the same 
combination of qualities, or applied them in the same way to other 
roles. Breakwell's (1986) own conception of the relationship 
between personal and social identity involves a very similar line 
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of reasoning: she proposes that as the individual moves through 
various social roles, adopting appropriate social identities, what 
remains when the demands of the social contexts which necessitate 
the assumption of the social identities diminish and disappear 
constitutes personal identity. In short, personal identity is seen 
as "the relatively permanent residue of each assimilation to and 
accommodation of a social identity" (p 17). It is unlikely that 
there exists a priori roles which the person simply assumes: each 
person brings their own past, present, hopes and expectations - 
their own personal identity in the Eriksonian sense - to their 
roles and recasts them anew (Radford and Kirby, 1975). 
One final contentious question that is relevant in determining the 
parameters of any attempt to devise a unifying framework within 
which to conceptualise identity is that of the difference between 
self-concept and identity. The assumption that a difference exists 
is viewed by Breakwell (1986) as based on two questionable 
premises. Firstly, there exists the belief that there are many 
identities within a person, but only one self-concept, which 
ignores the work of those theorists who postulate the existence of 
numerous selves, e. g., Turner's (1976) real and unreal selves, the 
former producing actions which feel authentic and the latter 
associated with actions that are constrained by situations or 
involuntary responses; Fenigstein, Scheier and Buss's (1975) idea 
of public and private selves; and Zurcher's (1977) belief that 
nowadays the self-concept should be viewed as serially changing to 
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reconcile the person with the rapid social change of the modern 
era. The theme of what Goffman (1974) terms "multiple selfing" 
appears to characterise much of the recent innovative work on 
identity and the self. Back (1989) locates the rejection of the 
assumption of unity of the self within the modernist movement in 
art and literature. He regards it as a reaction to modern social 
conditions, specifically to changes in family structure, 
inconsistent child-rearing experiences, the elevation of 
flexibility and the ability to tolerate change and the realisation 
of the facticity of social norms because of the heterogeneity of 
modern lifestyles. He traces the origin and rise of the concept 
of the multiple self back to William James' idea of the self as 
consisting of potentially inconsistent layers and to Freud's 
normalisation of the multiple self in his distinctions between the 
id, ego and superego. All recent work on identity stresses its 
multidimensional nature in that an identity is said to be composed 
of many interrelated pieces of information about an individual, a 
position carried to its extreme in Rowan's (1990) treatment of 
"subpersonalities". Secondly, there exists the notion that the 
self-concept involves an evaluative dimension whereas identities 
do not. Breakwell (1986) asserts that on the contrary, identities 
are subject to both subjective and social evaluation, with the 
evaluative component of an identity being an intrinsic element in 
that identity. She concludes that as models of identity become 
more complex and all-encompassing, the value of maintaining a 
distinction between identity and the self-concept becomes 
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questionable. 
These writers are not alone in considering this distinction. 
Dashefsky and Shapiro (1974) uphold it in their belief that while 
identity is concerned with defining who the individual is, 
self-concept refers to the individual's reflections on their 
identity. For them, identity appears to be something akin to 
Weinreich's (1983) "alter-ascribed social identity" where the 
individual is simply the object of the attributions of others. 
Weinreich regards this as but one aspect of identity whereas in 
Dashefsky and Shapiro's definition it is possible to remove the 
active identity-constructing person from the identity equation 
altogether. If anything is clear from the examinations of identity 
previously considered, it is that identity results chiefly from the 
person's own psychological processes: everything acquires meaning 
within an identity context by being filtered through the 
individual, by his/her reflecting on experiences. It is this 
component which transforms attitudes, attributions, feelings, 
perceptions, etc. into an identity. To distinguish between the 
self-concept and identity in terms of the presence of "reflection" 
in the former and presumably its absence in the latter is therefore 
untenable. 
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1.4 Identity: Ordering the Chaos 
Having examined a broad range of viewpoints on the nature of 
identity, one might say that identity appears to be a concept which 
is all things to all theorists, and it is tempting to agree with 
Breakwell (1986) when she concludes that "(s)uch diversity in 
definition means that attempts at direct comparison across theories 
have nightmare qualities, and meaning is masked by its cloak of 
words" (p 11). To be confronted by such an array of divergent 
interpretations should not be a cause for despair, as this outcome 
has been entirely in accordance with what could be predicted from 
Moscovici and Paicheler's (1978) summary of the area: "The concept 
of identity is as indispensable as it is unclear. This is why no 
attempt will be made to define it and we shall keep it in a zone 
of shaded obscurity, but the phenomena of identity, mysterious 
though they may be, underly certain realities which can be defined 
and circumscribed. " 
While the abandonment of the definitional endeavour is entirely 
understandable, given the vast diversity of approaches to identity 
which has only been partly covered in the foregoing discussion, 
such a tactic is unsatisfactory in a study which focusses upon the 
development of a specific domain of identity. In sifting through 
the many conceptualisations of identity outlined in an attempt to 
construct an outlook appropriate for this study, several criteria 
were borne in mind. Ideas were sought which incorporated or which 
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could incorporate the most salient concepts and recurrent themes 
identified in the writings of the major identity theorists and 
which could do so in an integrated and parsimonious way. These 
concepts and themes were defined as the view of identity in terms 
of processes as well as structures; identity as an active meaning- 
making endeavour, capable of integrating and making sense of a wide 
diversity of past experiences, imparting a sense of continuity to 
the chaos; identity as a psychosocial construct created by the 
dynamic interaction of the individual, his/her interpersonal matrix 
and the wider social context, to produce an identity that is both 
unique to the individual but which displays features common to the 
identities of others, rendering possible continuous mutual self- 
creation through the comparison of common identity-constructing 
experiences; identity as a multiform concept, operating on more 
than one level; and identity as an attainment of integration, 
meaningfulness and stability that is never achieved irrevocably but 
which may dissolve and be attained repeatedly. 
The conception of identity which could most completely embrace 
these concerns was felt to be McAdams' basic concept of identity 
as a life story, and one stresses that it is his basic concept that 
has been selected, unencumbered by the burdens of hypothesised 
intimacy and power themes, imagoes of Zeus, Hermes, Hera et al., 
classic story forms or generic plots that only serve to restrict 
and complicate his simple and illuminating metaphor. It is 
proposed in this study to view identity in its most superordinate 
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sense as a personal narrative or biography that each person 
constructs in an attempt to impart meaning and coherence to their 
disparate life experiences by forging connections, imposing 
causality and making it appear as if their life has unfolded or is 
unfolding in a purposeful way. The term "personal narrative" 
(Cohler, 1982) is preferred to "life story" as it stresses the role 
of the person in constructing their own personal account of their 
experiences. Besides, this study is not concerned with accounts 
of entire life courses but focusses upon one aspect of the life 
course - albeit one which may pervade many other aspects - so to 
use the term "life story" to refer to these accounts would be a 
misnomer. 
The metaphor of identity as a personal narrative embraces Glover's 
conception of the individual as actively engaged in a project of 
self-creation through the writing of an inner story which acts as 
a framework that renders meaningful and understandable the person's 
life experiences. The originator of the term saw the personal 
narrative as a story which an individual weaves from disparate 
experiences in order to maintain a coherent and consistent sense 
of identity (Cohler, 1982). It takes account of Gergen and 
Gergen's (1983) belief that a sense of self is something that 
individuals construct from a fragmentary series of relevant 
experiences. The personal narrative concept also incorporates 
Kegan's idea of identity formation as a meaning-making and 
coherence-creating process and accommodates Loevinger's notion of 
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the meaning-oriented ego. By forging links between events in a 
personal narrative, one can create a sense of continuity in one's 
story. One individual may choose to make his story appear smoothly 
continuous with one stage or event following from another so that 
the narrative flows as a unit. Another person, perhaps because her 
history is characterised by a series of discrete events or abrupt 
changes, may not attempt to impose a framework of smooth 
progression upon her narrative but may instead achieve her sense 
of continuity by interpreting the junctures of change as turning 
points in one twisting and complex narrative that is divisible into 
identifiable chapters. Either way, the conceptualisation of 
identity as a personal narrative can be seen to admit the notion 
of continuity or selfsameness that is so central to many models of 
identity. With the idea of continuity as a goal in the creation 
of the personal narrative, we move into the realm of the principles 
which motivate the production of the story and which specify the 
endstates sought. Employing Breakwell's proposition, it can be 
hypothesised that as well as aiming to promote continuity, the 
construction of a personal narrative may also serve to boost self- 
esteem and engender a feeling of distinctiveness, although these 
attainments are never immutable as self-relevant material which may 
threaten continuity, self-esteem and distinctiveness may at any 
time demand to be assimilated in some way into the personal 
narrative. 
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Increased self-esteem may be viewed as a by-product of the sense 
of unity and purpose promoted by the identity-formation project 
itself but it may also be construed as an independent outcome of 
being permitted to reinterpret events and experiences which may 
have been detrimental to self-esteem in such a way that their 
deleterious effect is minimised. This reinterpretation of 
problematic events has been recognised by Pearlin and Schooler 
(1978) as an effective strategy for coping with life exigencies. 
Clearly, the extent to which the application of this strategy is 
possible depends on factors such as the nature of the event and the 
support that one can elicit from credible others for one's 
reinterpretation. 
A feeling of distinctiveness may be achieved through the creation 
of a personal narrative because, as McAdams points out, the 
resultant story will be like no other story, like some other 
stories and like all other stories. Each story will offer 
something unique that will not be found in an identical form in any 
other story; stories will however feature recurrent patterns and 
marked similarities; and all stories will share a superordinate 
form which allows them to be classified as stories. Translating 
this in terms of life experiences, it could be said that any 
personal narrative is like all others because there are certain 
life experiences which all people encounter in some form and which 
may feature as a common element in all stories. A personal 
narrative is like some others because certain groups of people will 
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have experiences that are specific to their group and which may 
inform the stories which they weave about themselves, or because 
certain experiences, although available to all people, are more 
important to some than to others and so may feature in the stories 
of some people and not in the stories of all people. And finally, 
each person may encounter unusual events specific to them or may 
place idiosyncratic interpretations upon common events or may have 
a unique combination of experiences which renders their personal 
narrative distinct and makes it specifically theirs. 
The emphasis placed upon Breakwell's principles of identity within 
the expanded conceptualisation of the life story begs the question 
of why her model of identity is not used solely but is instead 
allied to the concept of identity as a personal narrative. The 
answer lies in what the narrative concept adds to her model. In 
her attempt to redress the imbalance between structure and process 
in previous models of identity, she meticulously elaborates her 
identity processes but rather neglects identity structure. 
Eschewing the use of the stage formula that characterises the 
writings of many identity theorists, she replaces this structural 
device with a concentration upon identity components, organised 
within the identity structure in terms of their salience and 
centrality within identity, which are largely determined by the 
extent to which they further the aims of the identity principles. 
The major advantage of positing a non-specific identity structure 
is that the processes that govern its nature and form can be 
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applied to identity components of any sort, thus permitting the 
model both to transcend and to outlive the concerns of stage models 
that are linked to specific events and experiences. But structural 
metaphors have long acted as aids to the understanding of identity, 
and their ability to illuminate the treatment of a potentially 
complex concept should not be ignored. Certainly, some structural 
metaphors have not been particularly well-chosen but that is not 
a sufficient reason for shunning their use entirely. The advantage 
of allying the narrative concept with Breakwell's model is that it 
makes specific and easily understandable the framework within which 
are organised the components that lie at the heart of identity, 
while remaining compatible with the valuable process-based emphases 
within her model, and with the endeavour to develop a model of 
identity that can transcend specific identity components. Viewing 
the alliance from the other side, the application of Breakwell's 
identity principles and processes to McAdams' concept of identity 
as a life story expands the latter's concept into a proper model. 
Even before it was decided to denude the notion of identity as a 
life story of its elaborations and to retain only the essential 
metaphor, it is debatable whether it could properly be considered 
a model at all, as it is difficult to discern within it any 
coherent, credible and specific accounts of how life stories 
develop and are directed, without which its predictive capacities 
are severely diminished. With its incorporation into Breakwell's 
model, these shortcomings are rectified. 
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The previously-outlined descriptions of the relevance and operation 
of the principles of identity to and within the context of the 
personal narrative may be seen as impinging upon the areas of 
personal identity, which may be viewed as related to individual- 
specific experiences or interpretations of experiences, and social 
identity, seen in terms of experiences encountered on a group or 
societal level, but the position adopted in this study accords with 
Breakwell's (1983) belief that a strict division between personal 
and social identity represents an artificial dichotomy. It is held 
that identity depends upon the dynamic interaction of both personal 
and social factors. Kelly's (1955) model of the individual as a 
scientist helps to illuminate the nature of the personal-social 
dialectic: the person may be regarded as framing hypotheses about 
the self and about the relationship between the self and others and 
then testing these hypotheses through behaviour in a social 
context. The outcomes of these identity experiments then influence 
what is incorporated into the identity structure and in what form. 
In another example of the interplay of personal and social factors, 
individuals who are confronting similar identity threats or 
problems may engage in mutual self-creation by sharing their 
personal narratives, which gives them an opportunity to learn from 
each others' experiences, to be made aware of the options open to 
them, to predict what the future might hold, and to be reassured 
that they are not alone in facing their identity dilemmas and that 
others have successfully faced similar problems. 
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For the purposes of the present study, it is proposed that the 
distinction between personal and social identity is primarily a 
taxonomical artefact: these two aspects of identity often act in 
concert and, as Breakwell (1986) points out, it is only when they 
are in conflict that people become aware of the existence of the 
two components. Because the strict division of identity into 
personal and social components is rejected, this is not to say that 
the possibility of identity division per se is rejected. Rowan 
(1990) posits a continuum of dissociation ranging from mood 
fluctuations to psychiatric states of dissociated personality 
marked by fugue and amnesia, but his chief concern is with 
dissociative phenomena which lie within the range of experience of 
most people, such as "the roles and ego states and subpersonalities 
within which individuals perform state-specific tasks and life 
activities" (p 9). Such entities may be regarded as divisions of 
identity but they cannot be described as either purely personal or 
purely social; they contain elements of both to a greater or lesser 
degree. 
In some contexts, people may feel that the self-presentations in 
which they engage contain only minimal elements of the people they 
essentially feel themselves to be, their "real selves", while in 
other contexts they may feel that they can be more truly 
themselves. Using mental algebraic Venn diagrams to illustrate 
these structural components of identity, a personal identity or the 
"real me" may be viewed a circle with which other circles 
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designating situation-specific identities overlap to differing 
degrees. In such a consideration of situation-specific identities, 
we have in essence returned to the concept of roles and to the 
arguments advanced earlier to counteract the notion that a person 
is divisible without remainder into the roles that he/she plays. 
Some situation-specific identities will admit more of the personal 
identity than will others, but seldom will a situation be so 
restrictive that no aspect of the personal identity can feature in 
the self-presentations made in that situation. Even when the 
person compartmentalises their life and creates separate life 
spaces in which they engage in very different self-presentations, 
this does not necessarily mean that they experience their identity 
as deeply split. The 1987 film "Mayflower Madam" tells the story 
of Sydney Biddle Barrows, a woman of high social standing who could 
trace her ancestry to the Pilgrim Fathers and who, largely unknown 
to her friends, ran a very successful escort agency in New York. 
When one friend who did know asked "Aren't you leading a sort of 
double life here? ", Ms Barrows replied "Well if I am, they're both 
mine". Returning to our Venn diagram, the different identities 
held in the different situations here may be seen as overlapping 
with or even being contained within the personal identity but they 
themselves do not overlap. On those rare occasions when personal 
identity and situation-specific identities are not contiguous, this 
is more likely to represent a short-term coping strategy rather 
than a long-term adaptation - except in the case of dissociative 
psychoses - as the person moves towards the creation of what they 
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experience as a more integrated, coherent sense of self. 
Of course, the nature of the personal identity, the situation- 
specific identities and the relationships between them does not 
remain static over the life course: these entities are in a 
constant state of flow and flux, changing as different self- 
relevant events are encountered and attempts are made to interpret 
and make sense of them by fitting them into the superordinate 
context of the personal narrative. Such a conceptualisation 
contains strong overtones of Cantor and Kihlstrom's (1987) belief 
in a multiplicity of overlapping selves linked across time by the 
life story, with the unitary concept of self or the essential sense 
of "who you are" located at the intersections of the various selves 
which reflect the essential self to differing degrees. Having 
already invoked Breakwell's principles of identity to specify the 
motivation underlying the creation of a personal narrative and the 
goals for which it strives, we may now turn to her identity 
processes to explain how the narrative may change in its movement 
towards those goals. The processes of assimilation-accommodation 
and evaluation can easily be applied to the life course. When a 
person encounters a new situation which has implications for their 
identity, there may be a desire to assimilate it in some form into 
the personal narrative because it is considered so highly self- 
relevant that a place must be found for it within the personal 
narrative, because it may enhance self-esteem or distinctiveness, 
or because it forms a logical continuation of the existing 
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narrative, can thus be comfortably assimilated and will promote a 
sense of continuity. Depending upon the nature of the evaluation, 
the identity-relevant situation may be discarded; it may be grafted 
onto the existing narrative either as it stands or after being 
interpreted in such a way as to render it more easily assimilable 
or more likely to promote continuity, self-esteem and/or 
distinctiveness; and/or the existing narrative may first be 
reworked so that the new identity component may be more readily 
assimilated, i. e., the accommodation process may be activated. 
Together with the consideration of whether or not it promotes 
continuity, self-esteem or distinctiveness, ease of assimilation 
is hypothesised to be an important factor in determining whether 
or not new material is incorporated into the personal narrative. 
If major changes are required in the personal narrative before 
assimilation can take place, particularly if they involve the 
story's ideological setting, the material to be assimilated will 
have to be so self-relevant that it cannot be ignored or else the 
person will need to feel that its incorporation will move them 
significantly closer to the desired endstates of identity 
formation. 
The conceptualisation of identity or aspects of identity in terms 
of a narrative is not a novel approach per se. Murray (1989), 
Tololyan (1989), Wetherell and Potter (1989) and Young (1989), for 
example, have all viewed, described and analysed identity at least 
partly in narrative terms. The innovation in the approach adopted 
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in the present study lies in the elaboration of the construal of 
identity as a narrative into a tenable model of identity by allying 
it with valuable concepts derived from Breakwell's (1986) model. 
Together, these permit answers to the questions of why narratives 
are formed, how they change, and to what ends, thus enabling the 
narrative concept to be employed not simply as a macro-level 
descriptor of identity - as it is used by the quintet of writers 
on identity named above - but as a thorough explicator of the 
structure and processes observed in any given identity in any given 
domain. 
1.5 Gay Identity 
Thus far the topic of identity has been considered in a general 
way, but the present study is concerned with a specific aspect of 
identity, i. e., gay identity. The ways in which identity can be 
analysed into its component parts have already been outlined, and 
some of the concepts examined therein could be applied to gay 
identity. For example, it could be conceived of as a social 
identity, arising from membership of a social group, namely the gay 
community or subculture. Yet, the effects upon a person's identity 
of having to attend to, assimilate and accommodate to the demands 
made by their same-sex sexual attractions and the revision that may 
be required in their personal narratives mean that gay identity 
cannot be conceived of in such a narrow way. Let us examine some 
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other ways in which gay identity has been conceptualised. 
Firstly, it is important to acknowledge those writers who have been 
deeply critical of the concept of gay identity or more specifically 
of the concept of "the homosexual". Most studies which examine 
homosexuality assume that there exists such people as "homosexuals" 
who are open to description and categorisation. However, there are 
those who regard this assumption as fundamentally flawed, most 
notably Foucault (1981) and those who have enlarged upon his ideas 
(Hart and Richardson, 1981; McIntosh, 1981; Plummer, 1981; Weeks, 
1981,1985,1987a). Their basic contention is that "the 
homosexual" is not something that exists out there in the real 
world, open to description or explanation, and that a 
gay/homosexual identity is not based upon a gay/homosexual essence 
that exists in people who engage in same-sex sexual behaviour. 
Rather, they contend, both the homosexual and a gay/homosexual 
identity are socially constructed concepts which originate in 
medical discourses of the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries 
and which were designed to obscure sexual diversity and to control 
those who engaged in same-sex sexual behaviour. From that time, 
if a person engaged in such behaviour, this was held to have 
certain implications for the sort of person they were. 
A concise account of the deconstructivists' argument is outlined 
by Weeks (1987a) but he himself draws attention to the fact that 
although such analysis may be plausible, to those who have 
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categorised themselves as gay/homosexual or who have adopted a 
gay/homosexual identity, their self-definition is no less real and 
valuable simply because it is based upon a social and historical 
construction. He notes that the adoption of a sexual identity 
offers "a sense of personal unity, social location, and even at 
times a political commitment" (p 31) and recognises its utility in 
structuring a person's social world and in establishing 
relationships. His conclusion is one upon which the approach 
adopted in the present study is based: "(Gay/homosexual) Identity 
may well be a historical fiction, a controlling myth, a limiting 
burden. But it is at the same time a necessary means of weaving 
our way through a hazard-strewn world and a complex web of social 
relations" (p 49). 
While one may acknowledge the arguments of the deconstructivists, 
it seems that the force of their analysis has not filtered down to 
those who are still categorising themselves as gay/homosexual. 
Such people appear to be unaware of the facticity of their self- 
definition, unaware that it is a means by which others have 
attempted to control the flux and flow of their sexual feelings and 
to limit their sexual horizons. Or it may be that people are blind 
to such concerns because of the benefits such as the simplification 
of life choices and social relationships associated with eschewing 
polymorphous perversity (who feels polymorphously perverse anyway? ) 
and opting instead for a sexual identity based upon the most 
widely-known socially constructed sexual preference categories, 
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i. e., heterosexual, gay/homosexual and bisexual. Such a choice may 
be seen as part of a more general preference for order rather than 
entropy, for group support rather than isolation. A range of 
scores may be obtained across the Kinsey continua of sexual 
feelings and behaviour (Kinsey, Pomeroy and Martin, 1948) for a 
given population both across individuals and over time within 
individuals, yet people tend to make use of only a small number of 
sexual preference categories, forcing the possible breadth of their 
sexual potential and experience into a narrow range of socially 
constructed categories. Murray (1984) professes a lack of 
understanding as to why the deconstructivists decry these limited 
options, noting that "all social categories (folk and scientific) 
force the flux of reality into schemata. Just as every language 
uses only a few of the many contrasts of sounds humans can produce, 
so in any society there are a limited number of recognized roles" 
(p 19) . 
It is with the nature of the processes involved in self-definition 
in terms of the "gay/homosexual" category, together with the 
antecedents and consequences of such self-definition, that the 
present study concerns itself. While admitting that gay/homosexual 
identities are self-creations "on ground not freely chosen but laid 
out by history" (Weeks, 1987a, p 47), our interests do not lie with 
the socially constructed nature of the gay/homosexual category or 
with the question of why people generally do not create their own 
categories or spurn the concept of sexual self-definition 
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altogether. Gay/homosexual identity is a subjectively real and 
organisationally viable concept for many of those who define 
themselves as gay/homosexual. It cannot be wished away. 
Turning to those who have accepted the phenomenological reality of 
gay/homosexual identity, Troiden (1984) is one of the few writers 
on gay identity (or as he terms it, "homosexual identity") to make 
explicit exactly what it is he is studying. He holds that 
homosexual identity is a cognitive construct and a subset of the 
self-concept. He defines it as "a perception of self as homosexual 
in relation to a social setting (imagined or real). A perception 
of self as homosexual assumes the form of an attitude, a potential 
line of action toward self, that is mobilized in relation to social 
settings, especially those defined as romantic or sexual" (p 103). 
For him, the essence of acquiring a homosexual identity lies in the 
individual placing the self in the social category "homosexual", 
rendering it essentially a social identity. Cass (1984b) holds 
that homosexual identity "evolves out of a clustering of self- 
images which are linked together by the individual's idiosyncratic 
understanding of what characterizes someone as a 'homosexual'. 
This understanding develops out of an integration of the 
individual's unique interpretation of socially prescribed notions 
and self-developed formulations" (pp 110-111). Although this may 
appear to locate the evolution of homosexual identity within the 
person, she makes clear that if a homosexual identity that is fully 
integrated with other aspects of identity is to develop, 
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interaction and communication with others is required, of which an 
essential part is "the presentation of a homosexual self-image to 
both homosexual and heterosexual others" (ibid., p 111). This 
permits the development of an accord between how the individual 
sees himself and how he believes all others in his social 
environment see him, which Cass sees as essential for the evolution 
of aa fully developed sense of self as homosexual. The social 
aspect is stressed further in her hypothesis that gay/homosexual 
identity can be regarded in the context of the gay subculture as 
a group identity, i. e., in terms of "the perception a person has 
about self as sharing certain attributes with a particular 
community of others" (ibid., p 119). Therefore, while in her 
differentiation between identity, self-concept and related terms, 
her conception of identity is close to the ideas of social identity 
outlined previously, her elaboration of the concept of homosexual 
identity makes clear that it involves the dynamic interaction of 
personal and social factors, emphasising the artificiality of 
dividing identity into personal and social components for anything 
other than taxonomical purposes. 
In her review of the ways in which gay/homosexual identity has been 
conceptualised, Cass (1984b) summarises the most salient 
interpretations as: defining oneself as gay; a sense of self as 
gay; image of self as homosexual; the way a homosexual person is; 
and consistent same-sex sexual behaviour. Although she highlights 
the diversity of meaning ascribed to the term, she believes that 
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most authors subscribe to the idea that identity is "the answer to 
the questions Who am I? and where do I belong? " (Warren, 1974, p 
145). In one sense this commonality is not very meaningful for 
anyone attempting to make sense of the range of meanings ascribed 
to gay/homosexual identity as it is so superordinate, non-specific 
and nebulous: this may be a common idea of identity in most 
studies, but the ways in which the idea is translated into specific 
processes are manifold. However, the commonality identified by 
Cass encompasses precisely the same questions that McAdams (1988) 
believes to be the essence of the search for identity and the 
principal motivators in the construction of a personal narrative, 
and therefore the most superordinate conceptualisation of identity 
adopted in most studies of gay/homosexual identity accords with the 
conceptualisation of identity adopted in the present study. 
One of the problems with a concept such as gay/homosexual identity 
is that it exists in a field which is replete with terms which are 
undefined, which lack definitional consensus or which are used 
interchangeably. Shively and De Cecco (1977) attempt to ameliorate 
this situation and they usefully distinguish between gender 
identity, social-sex role and sexual orientation, all of which they 
regard as psychological components of sexual identity, which also 
includes biological sex. De Cecco (1981) provides an insightful 
critique of the term "sexual orientation", pointing out the 
flexibility and mutability of the entity to which it refers. To 
these characteristics could be added the impossibility of arriving 
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at an agreement about what it actually means. In a survey of 
research on sexual orientation, Shively, Jones and De Cecco (1984) 
report that sexual orientation is usually defined operationally 
rather than conceptually. De Cecco and Shively (1984) note the 
biological implications of the term "sexual orientation", which 
"suggests the presence of a directional sex drive that 'steers' or 
'orients' the individual either to sexual partners of exclusively 
one or the other sex or of both sexes" (p 22). In order to avoid 
such connotations and to stress the fluidity of sexual object 
choice, the term used to describe it in the present study is 
"sexual preference". 
Unfortunately, Shively and De Cecco (1977) do not define sexual 
identity itself, but for Larson (1981) the term connotes "the set 
of self-referential attitudes, thoughts, and feelings about 
sexuality that, taken together, is a subset of the overall self- 
concept" (p 15). Sexual identity he sees as being composed of 
gender identity, social sex roles and sexual orientation. 
McConaghy and Armstrong (1983), on the other hand, equate sexual 
identity with gender identity. Marshall (1981) posits five 
components in sexual identity, while Klein, Sepekoff and Wolf 
(1985) identify seven elements, subsumed under three over-arching 
components. Marshall and Shively and De Cecco (1977) share 
terminology and meaning on two concepts (biological sex and gender 
identity), yet ascribe different terms but identical meanings to 
a third concept, that which Marshall labels "gender role" and which 
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Shively and De Cecco call "social sex-role", i. e., the 
characteristics and expectations associated with the masculine or 
feminine role. Shively and De Cecco's concept of sexual 
orientation appears as one of Klein, Sepekoff and Wolf's 
overarching components, comprising emotional and social preferences 
and a heterosexual or homosexual lifestyle. The latter omit 
physical preference which, along with affectional/emotional 
preference, constitutes sexual orientation for Shively and De 
Cecco. Klein, Sepekoff and Wolf and Marshall have the sexual 
behaviour component in common, but the latter includes the factor 
of sexual meaning, which refers to the individual's interpretation 
of his/her sexual activity and identity and which constitutes 
sexual orientation when allied with sexual behaviour: this is 
exclusive to Marshall's conception of sexual identity. The 
components of sexual identity exclusive to Klein, Sepekoff and 
Wolf's framework are the superordinate components of the sexual 
self, which includes sexual attraction and fantasy as well as 
behaviour, and self-identification. That the only element common 
to the taxonomies of sexual identity outlined should be the basic 
concept of sexual orientation and that this should be defined in 
three distinct ways is a sad reflection of the conceptual confusion 
with which the whole area of research on homosexuality in general 
and gay/homosexual identity in particular is riven. It is notable 
that, in their endeavour to define sexual identity, none of these 
writers make explicit its relationship to gay/homosexual identity, 
or to a more overarching sense of identity. Cass (1984b) mentions 
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how gay/homosexual identity and sexual identity have been treated 
as synonymous but argues that a differentiation is necessary as a 
gay/homosexual identity is not entirely composed of sexual elements 
but in recent years has expanded to include, for example, political 
and social elements. She proposes that sexual identity be 
considered as "the individual's overall conception of self as a 
sexual being" (p 116) while gay/homosexual identity refers to non- 
sexual areas too. Although this point is an important one, 
gay/homosexual identity will be referred to in the present study 
as a sexual identity as to do so need not imply that the identity 
relates only to sexual elements but rather that it is founded upon 
the nature of the person's sexual attractions, feelings and 
preferences. A homosexual identity can exist without non-sexual 
elements but not without the sexual aspect. 
One of the problems in defining what constitutes a gay/homosexual 
identity is that it may potentially cover such a large proportion 
of the person's life space, up to and including the totality of 
their identity. Potentially, the awareness of same-sex sexual 
attractions and the attempts to acknowledge them as self-relevant 
and personally meaningful and to fit them into one's existing 
identity may impinge upon all aspects of a person's world. Gay 
identity may thus be conceived of as the individual's construal of 
their sexual preference, their reactions to it and the changes that 
they have wrought in their personal narratives and in their 
relationships with their social world because of it, either 
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directly or indirectly. The adoption of such a definition points 
to a further advantage of conceiving of identity as a personal 
narrative, as identities or aspects of identity which relate to 
specific domains - in this case, gay identity or, more broadly, 
sexual identity - can be easily conceptualised in the same way as 
more global identity both in terms of structure and process. The 
link between global identity and gay identity is thus made explicit 
in a way that the treatment of gay identity as an isolated and 
singular phenomenon fails to do. The approach generally adopted 
in the past by those who studied gay identity appears to have been 
that gay identity was what they uncovered in their studies and that 
its components were enshrined in the questions they asked and in 
the issues they addressed. Seldom are the concepts and ideas that 
are elaborated in writing on general identity imported and applied 
to the study of gay identity in any systematic fashion. In the 
gathering of evidence for this assertion, the most obvious port of 
call is an examination of these studies of gay identity. 
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CHAPTER TWO 
A REVIEW OF THE LITERATURE ON GAY IDENTITY FORMATION 
2.1 A Word about Words: Gay, Homosexual, Coming Out and Gay 
Identity Formation 
As every specialised field is characterised by its own specific 
language, it may be useful to explain and clarify some of the terms 
that are commonly employed in relation to gay identity formation 
before embarking upon a consideration of the ways in which this 
particular domain of identity development has been modelled. 
Perhaps the most important word to begin with is the term "gay", 
the transferred semantic origins of which are unclear. 
For some, the term is coterminous with or is simply a more modern 
or less formal label than "homosexual", but for others it carries 
different or distinct connotations. The infusion of sociological 
theory into the area of homosexuality in the 1970s highlighted the 
operation of social labelling processes and the social construction 
of homosexual identity through such media as social intolerance, 
legal persecution and the homosexual subculture (De Cecco and 
Shively, 1984). This led the then burgeoning Gay Liberation 
Movement to attempt to subvert the labelling process by engaging 
in self-labelling: thus "gay" was born as a concept distinct from 
"homosexual" (Paul, 1985). The "gay" label was conceived as 
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denoting a personal acceptance of one's sexuality, coupled with a 
dismissal of negative social stereotypes and attitudes. The term 
"homosexual" was rejected as a label externally imposed by 
clinicians and contaminated by association with the longstanding 
clinical concern with psychopathology and etiology. This 
differentiation is recognised in Rodgers' (1972) definition of gay 
as a term which is "(s)ometimes used of only the active member of 
the homosexual community, ie one who speaks the slang, buys 
homophile literature, is homosexually sociable, etc" (p 93). 
These possible distinctions between the terms "gay" and 
"homosexual" have been examined in recent years by various 
researchers who have taken account of the rise of gay politics or 
who have simply wished to describe their subjects in their own 
words and who have not simply used the terms interchangeably or 
treated them as synonymous (e. g., Chesebro, 1981; Harry and De 
Vall, 1978; Humphrey and Miller, 1980; Kimmel, 1979; Morin, 1977; 
Morin and Schultz, 1978; Taylor, 1977; Warren, 1974; Weinberg, 
1976). A "homosexual identity" is regarded as focussing on "an 
explicit act and then on its coincidental behaviour" (Chesebro, 
1981, p 186), while a "gay identity" "identifies those who have 
adopted a particular world view or perspective of reality which is 
self-imposed and a self-defined determinant of the attitudes, 
beliefs, actions and even the vocabulary affecting human 
interactions" (ibid. ). Thus, in Dank's (1971) model of gay 
identity formation which was formulated when the gay political 
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movement was nascent, there is no essential semantic distinction 
made between the terms: "gay" is simply regarded as an example of 
"homosexual" argot and may perhaps have been used by the writer as 
an indication of the degree to which he had achieved an "inside" 
view of the gay identity formation process. 
Troiden (1977) differentiates between gay and homosexual identities 
and claims that not all men with homosexual identities develop gay 
identities, for a variety of reasons. For example, they may have 
neither the desire nor the opportunity to become involved in the 
gay community, or they may be unwilling or unable to become both 
sexually and emotionally involved with someone of the same gender. 
It is the fusion of gay sexuality and emotionality within a 
relationship context that he believes differentiates a gay identity 
from a homosexual identity. Woodman and Lenna (1980) state that 
many gay people regard the term "homosexual" as overly restrictive 
in that it focusses only on the sexual aspect of being gay and 
excludes the emotional aspect. These differentiating themes of 
active involvement in the gay subculture and the ability and wish 
to establish gay love relationships were repeated by Weinberg's 
(1976) respondents, but some also drew a distinction in terms of 
the connotations of an accepted and positively evaluated identity 
which the word "gay" was held to embody. One man, for example, 
stated that "'Gay' usually means a person who's accepted the fact 
that he's homosexual, feels comfortable with it, is somewhat open 
about it to other people and feels good about it" (p 349). 
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Likewise, Clark (1977) and Woodman and Lenna (1980) regard the term 
"gay" not as one which limits or restricts, i. e., its essence does 
not lie in the inability to love and relate to the opposite sex, 
but as one which emphasises a special affinity and feeling for and 
a capacity to love fully people of the same sex "emotionally, 
sexually, spiritually and intellectually" (Clark, 1977, p 73). 
"Gay" is therefore regarded by some as a term which legitimises 
homosexuality in that it presents it as an acceptable, rewarding 
alternative lifestyle and rejects the negative societal stereotype 
of homosexuality. 
The positively evaluated identity which the word "gay" connotes is 
incorporated by some writers into their identity formation models 
as an element which holds certain implications for psychological 
well-being and development. For example, Morin and Schultz (1978) 
regard a gay identity as healthier than a homosexual identity which 
is seen as incorporating internalised negative societal 
stereotypes. 
Cass (1984b) objects that the gay/homosexual dichotomy reflects the 
political stance of researchers rather than the subjective reality 
of individuals, despite the fact that the "gay" label can be seen 
as emphasising that the person's totality is not encompassed in 
their sexuality, which is the argument she proposes for not 
treating "sexual identity" and "homosexual identity" as 
coterminous. Although support for the gay versus homosexual 
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distinction is reported by McDonald (1982) among his group of 199 
self-defined gay men, only a minority of respondents recognised it 
in the pilot study for the present investigation. The utility of 
the differentiation as an experiential organising principle for the 
group in this study is therefore questionable. 
Taking into account the foregoing considerations, it was decided 
to use the term "gay" in the present study when referring to a 
sexual identity that results when an individual has had the 
opportunity to develop a, personal acceptance of and a positive 
evaluation of his sexual identity, and to broaden the scope of what 
was initially purely a sexual identity, assimilating into it 
elements that are other than sexual. It was decided to reserve the 
term "homosexual" for references to the initial stages of identity 
formation when the individual is less likely to have encountered 
experiences, such as involvement in the gay subculture and in same- 
sex relationships, which may permit him to develop such an 
acceptance and evaluation. When referring to those junctures at 
which the individual's degree of self-acceptance and the nature of 
his evaluation of his sexual identity is unclear, the compound term 
"gay/homosexual" is used. In discussing the various 
conceptualisations of gay/homosexual identity formation, the terms 
used by the writers under consideration are retained. 
Another term that is frequently encountered in the literature on 
gay identity formation is the phrase "coming out of the closet" or 
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simply "coming out", which is used in reference to the process of 
gay identity formation itself. An examination of the ways in which 
this term has been employed reveals certain themes. For De 
Monteflores and Schultz (1978), coming out refers to "the process 
through which gay women and men recognize their sexual preferences 
and choose to integrate this knowledge into their personal and 
social lives" (p 60), which implies that it is regarded as 
coterminous with gay identity formation. The term has been applied 
to specific events within this process as well as to the process 
itself, with earlier writers exhibiting the former tendency. 
Hooker (1967), Lee (1977) and Sawchuk (1974) regard coming out as 
a type of social gay "debut" whereby an individual publicly 
identifies himself as gay for the first time, e. g., by going to a 
gay bar. Steinman and Maclean (1975) echo the theme of social 
revelation in their definition of coming out, but do so in terms 
of the voluntary disclosure of sexual preference by the individual 
to "some persons they believe to be primarily heterosexual" (p 1). 
For Dank (1971), coming out is synonymous with "identifying oneself 
as being homosexual" (p 181), a definition distilled from his 
respondents' attributions of meaning which centred around the 
behavioural and self-definitional ideas of meeting other gay people 
and deciding that one is definitely gay/homosexual. Gagnon and 
Simon's (1967) definition of coming out also focusses upon similar 
concerns of self-recognition and social exploration. Troiden 
(1977) too includes discrete events such as initial involvement in 
the gay subculture in his concept of coming out but also cites 
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events that mark the culmination of a process of cognitive 
restructuring about one's identity, e. g., the decision to label 
one's feelings as definitely homosexual and self-definition as 
homosexual, while other events which he notes, such as the 
redefinition of homosexuality as a positive and viable alternative 
lifestyle, are clearly process-based in nature. 
Others have adopted a more explicitly process-based view 
of coming out and have formulated models which trace an 
individual's progression through milestone experiences. The 
boundaries of the process remain arbitrary and nebulous, with Morin 
and Miller (1978) claiming that it commences "even before there is 
a realization that one is homosexual and continues long after that 
realization of difference becomes integrated into the personality 
and is gradually shared with significant others". De Monteflores 
and Schultz (1978) observe that many models of coming out order 
milestone experiences along a covert-overt dimension, i. e., there 
is an assumption that private coming out experiences occur before 
more public experiences. For example, in the model of O'Dowd and 
Hencken (1975), an individual progresses from a private cognitive 
awareness of homosexuality to behavioural acceptance and thence to 
public identification; in that of Richardson (1981), the process 
commences with the questioning of the personal relevance of a 
heterosexual identity and/or self-identification as homosexual and 
may progress to the disclosure of sexual preference to selected 
others. Not all processual approaches to coming out are so 
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explicitly formulated. For example, Hencken and O'Dowd (1977) 
choose to subsume their ideas on coming out within the concept of 
"self-acceptance" which inherently suggests process rather than 
instantaneousness. 
Other writers have viewed coming out as an occurrence which may be 
either gradual or sudden. Crites (1976) fails to state explicitly 
what he means by the term, adding to the obfuscating terminological 
Tower of Babel that characterises much writing on gay identity. 
Clinicians appear particularly at fault in this respect: for 
example, the only attempt at definition made by Gershman (1983) is 
his vague statement that coming out "includes ...... the capacity to 
face honestly and openly the emotional problems that an individual 
harbors" (p 130). Crites, however, appears to equate the term with 
gay identity formation and states that it represents "a search for 
self-identity and a sense of community" (p 142). Because he 
regards the meaning of coming out as something which may vary 
across individuals but which is essentially located on either a 
self-realisation or a social level, the coming out experience may 
be reported as being abrupt and the result of a specific event 
(usually a sexual encounter) or gradual and not traceable to any 
specific incident. 
One of the most inclusive definitions of coming out in the academic 
literature on gay identity formation is that of McDonald (1982) who 
quotes De Monteflores and Schultz's (1978) definition and their 
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translation of this definition into cognitive, affective and 
behavioural terms by stating that coming out "involves adopting a 
non-traditional identity, restructuring one's self-concept, 
reorganizing one's personal sense of history, and altering one's 
relations with others and with society" (p 49). The reorganisation 
of one's personal sense of history is a notion very close to the 
idea employed in this study of a personal narrative which changes 
in response to demands made by same-sex attractions. McDonald also 
summarises the most salient aspects of the coming out process which 
have been identified by various researchers, i. e., "Awareness of 
same-sex feelings and attractions, initial homosexual encounters, 
participation in the gay subculture, labelling oneself as gay and 
disclosing that identity to significant others" (pp 47-48). 
However his assertion that "(v)arious models have been formulated 
in order to organize and interpret these coming out experiences in 
relation to homosexual identity formation" (p 48) suggests that he 
recognises a difference between coming out and gay/homosexual 
identity formation. Such an implicit differentiation is curious 
in that many of the theorists whom he quotes appear to regard the 
two concepts as wholly interchangeable, e. g., Crites (1976). 
Other writers have, however, upheld this distinction. In Lee's 
(1977) three-stage model of the process of "resolving and 
announcing one's sexual orientation as 'homosexual'', (p 49), coming 
out refers both to initial social interaction with other gay people 
and to disclosure of sexual preference, and constitutes one stage 
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rather than the entire process. For Plummer (1975) and Troiden 
(1977), coming out is one stage of a four-stage model, while for 
Ponse (1978) it is one of an atemporal series of five elements 
which she terms the "gay trajectory" which leads to the assumption 
of a lesbian identity. For these theorists, coming out is a part 
but not the whole. Coleman (1982) formulates a five-stage model 
of what he terms "same-sex sexual identity development" and "the 
coming-out process", which appears to indicate that he regards the 
two as being synonymous. Yet, coming out is also the name given 
to one stage within the model, specifically relating to self- 
admission, self-disclosure and self-acceptance. Coming out for 
Coleman is therefore simultaneously the whole and the part. 
McDonald and these other differentiating theorists may be 
legitimately implying that "homosexual identity formation" is 
simply the vernacular concept of "coming out" organised and 
interpreted in terms of the theoretical predilections of those who 
study it and dressed in academic garb. The differences between the 
academic's and the layperson's meanings of coming out are referred 
to by Lee (1977) who lays the blame for the conceptual confusion 
over the term squarely on the shoulders of the gay community on 
account of their allegedly inconsistent use of the term. The 
possibility that the academic use of the term is not sufficiently 
inclusive is not acknowledged. Lee seems to wish to impose his 
definitions upon those he studies rather than to reflect their 
definitions, which raises the issue of the degree of convergence 
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that exists between the academic use of the coming out/gay identity 
formation concept and the layperson's use of the same concept. 
Rodgers (1972), whose gay lexicon was collated through interviews 
with hundreds of informants at gay social and sexual venues, 
defines coming out as becoming aware of one's own homosexuality. 
This definition, which may be regarded as a reflection of the 
concept for "the gay man in the street", differs substantially in 
scope from the definition outlined by McDonald in that it includes 
only one of the five elements which he mentions. The definitions 
of coming out obtained from the 20 gay men who acted as respondents 
in a pilot study for the present investigation are more specific 
than that of Rodgers. Two definitions predominated and were 
sometimes mentioned in tandem. In the order of their frequency of 
occurrence, these were the disclosure of one's sexual preference 
to others - which alone constitutes Sanderson's (1986) definition 
of coming out - and the acceptance of and development of a feeling 
of comfort with one's homosexuality. The definition is therefore 
in line with the content of the coming out stage of Coleman's 
(1982) model of gay identity formation. The awareness element 
which solely constitutes Rodgers' definition was only implicitly 
employed by two men who referred to the admittance of one's 
homosexuality to oneself in their definitions. 
The two aspects of coming out which were most frequently mentioned 
are noticeable in the extent to which they seem to differ. One 
would imagine that disclosure of sexual preference is linked to a 
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specific behavioural event, whereas acceptance of one's 
homosexuality is presumably more process-based and cognitive in 
nature. A similar definitional bifurcation is hypothesised by 
Harry and De Vall (1978) who note that definitions of coming out 
used in the gay identity formation literature tend to be 
behavioural or to refer to the defining of the self as gay or both. 
Examples of behavioural and self-definitional definitions include 
those of Plummer (1975) for whom coming out *involves the arrival 
at a homosexual self-definition and the entrance into the gay 
community, and Ponse (1978) and Woodman and Lenna (1980) for whom 
it involves self-recognition and self-acceptance as gay and the 
disclosure of this to others. Lee (1977) holds that coming out is 
an entirely behavioural phenomenon which many writers have confused 
with what he terms "signification", i. e., self-recognition and 
self-definition as homosexual. Although a bifurcation along 
similar dimensions was noted in the pilot study, the definitions 
differed in terms of specifics: the cognitive aspect of the 
definition was related more to Hencken and O'Dowd's (1977) concept 
of self-acceptance than to self-definition. While Harry and De 
Vall's assertion that "most gay males use the expression coming out 
in a behavioral sense" (p 67) may be valid (a behavioural 
definition was marginally the most frequently proffered type of 
definition in the pilot study), their assumption that the 
behavioural event to which it refers is the commencement of 
association with other gay people is not. The predominance of the 
behavioural definition of coming out in terms of social interaction 
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among studies of North American males and the minor role which it 
played in the behavioural definitions elicited from the British 
group in the pilot study is curious when one considers that before 
it became connected with the concept of gay identity, the meaning 
most frequently attributed to the term coming out related to the 
debut of young women on the social circuit in British aristocratic 
circles. Quite how a term which refers to the making of a social 
debut retained that meaning when passing into gay vernacular in the 
USA but lost it in British argot is unclear. 
The self-acceptance and disclosure elements of the pilot study 
definition belong at different levels in McDonald's (1982) 
definition: self-acceptance may be the precursor of the integration 
of one's homosexuality into the totality of one's identity if one 
is taking an overview of the gay identity formation process, while 
self-disclosure ranks with the concrete particulars of this 
process. However, the two definitional aspects are not necessarily 
as distinct as they may appear. Self-disclosure is not a once-and- 
for-all phenomenon, but may be viewed as processual in that the 
audience constantly changes: one may disclose to friends, parents, 
siblings, work colleagues, etc., and may even progress to the level 
of large-scale public disclosure examined by Lee (1977). This is 
implicit in the way in which the verb "to come out" is used with 
the preposition "to" as in "to come out to your parents": the 
common adjunct acknowledges the variability of disclosure 
audiences. Furthermore, although the act of disclosure is 
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exclusively behavioural, the literature on the disclosure of sexual 
preference suggests that its precursors and consequences are 
predominantly cognitive and affective. For example, beforehand one 
must decide whom to disclose to, how much to disclose, and what 
their most probable reaction will be, while post-disclosure 
concerns may focus on handling the reactions of others and the 
possible alterations in social relationships and in one's self- 
conception which may result. The two most commonly cited 
definitional aspects of coming out are therefore not as dissimilar 
as they may initially appear. 
From this consideration, it may be concluded that the term "coming 
out" is more or less simply a subcultural shorthand for the 
academic term "gay identity formation", with differences in meaning 
attributed to the former being arguably due in no small part to the 
lack of definitional consensus in the case of the latter. As it 
adds little to the non-subculturally specific term "gay identity 
formation", the latter term will be used throughout the present 
study, as it clearly expresses the link between general identity 
development and gay identity formation. 
78 
2.2 Expectations of Models of Gay Identity Formation 
The relevance of studies of identity for studies of gay identity 
has rarely been fully appreciated. The study of gay identity has 
evolved alongside but not within the context of more general 
research on identity, the insights of which could greatly enhance 
any study of gay identity, but writers on gay identity have largely 
ignored and failed to build upon the insights of those who have 
studied identity in a more global sense. The lack of interplay 
between the two areas of study has also meant that certain 
questions about the relationship between the two have been 
difficult to answer. For example, it would be of interest to 
investigate whether gay identity could be regarded as similar to 
other realms of identity and/or to identity in a global sense in 
terms of its structure and the processes and principles which guide 
its development. Granted, some models of identity development 
appear to exclude gay men because of the way in which they are 
formulated. For example, a key component in the Generativity 
versus Stagnation stage of Erikson's model is the development of 
an interest in guiding and influencing the next generation, 
achieved most directly through parenthood, a life option not freely 
chosen by many gay men. Although Erikson admits that generativity 
may be expressed in other ways such as engagement in altruistic or 
creative activities, Sohier (1985) expresses the opinion that he 
speaks condescendingly of those who pursue such a path and points 
out that Erikson has referred to homosexuality as a negative 
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identity. However, Sohier's small study suggests that the gay men 
and lesbian women she examined possessed the qualities identified 
by Erikson as necessary for growth and development in the same 
measure as heterosexuals. 
If writers had capitalised upon existing work on identity, one 
would expect to find certain characteristics in models of gay 
identity formation. If the concepts outlined in the models of 
Erikson, Kegan, Breakwell and McAdams were gathered together, 
integrated and applied to gay identity, the development of gay 
identity might be characterised as an attempt to synthesise and to 
impart meaning onto the components of a particular aspect of one's 
life space, i. e., the sexual, that lacks coherence, definition, 
intelligibility and integration, and that fails to meet an 
individual's needs for self-esteem, continuity and distinctiveness. 
This meaning-making endeavour might be described as developing 
through the construction of a personal narrative or through a 
series of stages, at least some of which are associated with 
specific identity tasks, decisions or crises, the successful 
resolution of which permits movement to another more 
developmentally complex stage, either directly or after a period 
spent in transition between stages attempting to resolve issues 
pertinent to these stages and thus to facilitate movement. General 
identity development or movement between stages might be achieved 
through revisions in the evaluations accorded to existing and 
prospective identity components, which determine what is 
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assimilated into identity and how existing identity structures 
accommodate it. Development might also be characterised and 
impelled by changes in the nature of the relationship and 
interactions between an individual and his social environment, 
specifically expressed in terms of changes in the relationship 
between an individual's personal and social identities. Moreover, 
there is no inherent reason why gay identity should not be usefully 
conceived of in terms of the composite model of identity outlined 
in Chapter One, i. e., as a theme which underlies much of a person's 
personal narrative and which takes centre stage in some crucial 
chapters, evaluating, assimilating and accommodating to new 
material and moving the storyline forward as it promotes 
continuity, self-esteem and/or distinctiveness. 
These expectations may be regarded as a series of hypotheses about 
the ways in which gay identity might be conceptualised by writers 
who acknowledge the relevance of general identity development for 
gay identity formation in terms of macro-level structural and 
processual properties, and who incorporate these properties in 
their study of gay identity development. In order to consider 
whether writers have capitalised and built upon studies of 
identity, it is necessary to examine existing research on gay 
identity formation. 
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2.3 Models of Gay Identity Formation: An overview 
When one attempts to review that body of literature which concerns 
itself directly with issues of gay identity formation, what is 
immediately apparent above the quite considerable amount of work 
on the subject is its relative recency as a topic of investigation. 
A substantial body of work only began to appear in earnest in the 
1970s, but throughout that decade and in the 1980s, a number of 
studies were produced which had as their aim the delineation of 
the processes and events whereby gay men arrive at conceptions of 
their sexuality and/or themselves as gay and how they cope with the 
impact that this has upon their psychosocial world. Some studies 
attempted to formulate these progressions in the form of models of 
development in much the same way as has been done in the fields of 
cognitive development by Piaget, moral development by Kohlberg and 
identity development by Erikson. Other studies did not seek to 
place any such general framework upon their findings but opted 
instead to mirror experiences in a more loosely organised way. It 
is as if the gay individual had been discovered to have an 
intrinsic legitimacy as an object of study rather than being a 
resource for the study of psychopathology or family dynamics. The 
rising popularity of phenomenologically-based trends in the human 
sciences and the championing of the validity of personal 
experiences, e. g., in the Rogerian person-centred approach and the 
radical theories of the anti-psychiatrists Laing and Szasz in 
psychology, helped to create an atmosphere in which investigations 
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of gay men as individuals whose experiences merited study were 
admissable. 
Although the number of investigations into gay identity is 
considerable, the number of themes which emerge is not. Therefore, 
in order to examine the area, the progression of the ideas of one 
theorist will be charted in detail and other studies will be 
considered as they arise from the exposition of these ideas. The 
chosen theorist is Vivienne Cass, an Australian clinical 
psychologist whose 1979 theoretical model of gay identity formation 
provided the original impetus for this dissertation. Cass's work 
has been selected because it concisely and coherently encompasses 
many of the themes treated by other authors. It must, however, be 
borne in mind that although she intends to put her model to the 
empirical test and has taken some steps along this road (Cass, 
1984a), her work remains largely theoretical, her attempt at 
testing her model being methodologically unsatisfactory. 
Cass's (1979) paper outlines her model of gay identity formation, 
derived from her clinical experience. Her basic assumptions are 
clearly stated. Firstly, she holds that identity formation is a 
developmental process and she conceives of this process as 
proceeding through six identifiable stages. The stage approach is 
favoured by several other theorists, e. g., Coleman (1982), Lee 
(1977), Minton and McDonald (1984) and Troiden (1977), but 
unfortunately, as is the case in stage models of identity 
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development, all too often the concept of a stage is left largely 
unexamined and undefined. It is never clearly stated whether or 
not a stage in gay identity formation is a hierarchy of 
qualitatively different structures, as it is in cognitive 
developmental psychology. Weinberg (1984) criticises the 
formulation of gay identity formation in terms of stages, claiming 
that stage models, originating in the physical and biological 
sciences, are used to impart the "credibility, validity and 
reality" of those domains to the social sciences. He insists that 
developmental stages or sequences posited by social scientists do 
not correspond to any biological reality and are simply frameworks 
imposed on phenomena that may be real only for those who devise 
them. Cass's second basic assumption is that interaction between 
individuals and their environments is the basis of behavioural 
stability and change in gay identity. The emphasis on this 
dialectic is a recurring motif in the general literature on 
identity development. 
The underlying theoretical orientation of the model is that of 
Interpersonal Congruency Theory (Secord and Backman, 1961,1964, 
1974; Secord, Backman and Eachus, 1964), which is closely allied 
to her second basic assumption. Interpersonal congruency theory, 
which is based on the tenet that stability and change in human 
behaviour depend upon the degree of congruency which exists in an 
individual's personal environment, is employed in Cass's model to 
elucidate the dynamics of inter-stage movement. It is held that 
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the individual experiences incongruency between his/her perceptions 
of self and perceptions of others as a result of assigning 
homosexual meanings to his/her own thoughts, feelings or behaviours 
and that growth occurs through attempts to resolve this. A number 
of models refer to the conflict which may exist between one's 
awareness of homosexual thoughts, feelings or behaviour and a 
homosexual identity (Coleman, 1982; Dank, 1971; Lee, 1977; Plummer, 
1975). 
Two points arise from this consideration. The first concerns the 
trend among models of gay identity formation for importing concepts 
from other relevant literatures in psychology. Weinberg (1976) 
regards the concept of cognitive dissonance (Festinger, 1957) as 
a catalyst for identity change in his analysis of gay identity 
formation accounts: he holds that when individuals initially 
suspect they are homosexual, this suspicion produces dissonance - 
because their conceptions of themselves and their conceptions of 
the particulars of the homosexual category appear irreconcilable - 
to which they must respond. Although general psychological 
concepts such as this have been imported, concepts found in the 
existing literature on identity have not been widely or 
specifically employed, although it is clear even from the brief 
exposition of Cass's model that has been presented so far that it 
shares certain features with models of general identity 
development, i. e., the (uncritical and unexamined) use of a stage 
framework, and the positing of changes in the relationship between 
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an individual and his environment as a mechanism of identity change 
and development. 
Secondly, Cass's model, in common with too few other stage models 
in this area and in the area of identity development in general, 
makes explicit the processes which facilitate movement between 
stages. This is expressed in terms of interpersonal congruency 
theory; e. g., progression beyond the identity comparison stage is 
associated with the extent to which an individual is successful in 
tolerating being different from others and in resisting pressure 
exerted by social norms. All too often, the dynamics of the gay 
identity formation processes are overlooked in the eagerness to 
describe the contexts of each stage or the nature of each 
developmental factor. Coleman (1982) states that movement occurs 
but fails explain how it does so. Troiden's (1977) model was 
assembled with five specific questions in mind, one of which 
concerns the nature of the events or conditions which mark the 
transition between stages. While he succeeds in identifying such 
events or conditions, he omits to elaborate upon the important 
question of how they enable the individual to move to a higher 
level of identity development. One is left with only half the 
answer and from a psychological point of view, the least 
interesting half at that. The question of what cognitive, 
affective and social as well as behavioural changes facilitate the 
developmental advances is left largely untreated. 
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Among those studies which attend to inter-stage dynamics, various 
mechanisms of movement have been posited. As previously mentioned, 
Weinberg (1976) views the resolution of cognitive dissonance, which 
he sees as consequent upon the cognitive and/or behavioural tasks 
involved in each stage, as being a major force for such change. 
In the same context, he also mentions the role of positive and 
negative feedback in response to the disclosure of sexual 
preference, a topic examined in detail later in this chapter. 
Cass's avowed aim in constructing her model is to avoid the 
concentration of her predecessors on taxonomical concerns, i. e., 
the delineation of types of homosexual identities (Bell, 1973; 
Weinberg and Williams, 1974) and the identification of the nature 
of the problems encountered by homosexuals in managing their 
identities (Warren, 1974; Williams and Weinberg, 1971). Instead, 
she intends to build upon those studies which examine the question 
of how an individual acquires a homosexual identity (e. g., Hencken 
and O'Dowd, 1977; Lee, 1977; Plummer, 1975; Schafer, 1976b), which 
suggests that writers on gay identity formation may seek to build 
upon the work of those within the domain of research on gay-related 
issues in general and gay identity in particular rather than adopt 
a broader perspective and link their work with that on general 
identity development. The general thrust of Cass's model accords 
with McDonald's (1982) succinct description of the aims of models 
of gay identity formation as being the tracing of the development 
of gay identity from "an initial awareness of same-sex feelings 
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through homosexual behavior to eventual self-labelling, self- 
disclosure, and the final stabilization of a positive gay identity" 
(p 48). The themes of such studies have also been encapsulated by 
Minton and McDonald (1984) in their tripartite summary which 
involves the egocentric interpretation of homosexual feelings, the 
internalisation of normative assumptions about homosexuality, and 
the achievement of a positive gay identity. It is worth noting 
that within the empirical section of the present study all the core 
topics mentioned by McDonald (1982) and Minton and McDonald (1984) 
are examined, as well as many of those outlined in the foregoing 
consideration of the diverse meanings attributed to the term 
"coming out". 
Cass's theoretical model itself comprises six universal stages of 
the development of a homosexual identity, which every lesbian and 
gay man is held to pass through en route to the goal of a 
homosexual identity which is fully integrated with the overall 
concept of self. The attempt to posit universal developmental 
stages provides an insight into her conception of a stage in that 
the search for universality also characterises the cognitive 
developmental conception of a stage. Individual differences arise 
in the length of time taken to traverse the stages. This specific 
topic is addressed by Troiden and Goode (1980) who examine the 
influence of behavioural and psychological factors on rates of gay 
identity formation. The possibility is acknowledged that not all 
individuals who embark upon the process of gay identity formation 
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will achieve maximal levels of development. There remains the 
possibility of what Cass terms "identity foreclosure", i. e., when 
the individual chooses not to develop any further, a concept which 
presupposes that the individual is aware that further development 
is possible. Also, alternative paths of development are posited 
within each stage. Stages are differentiated on the basis of 
differences in individuals' perceptions of their own behaviour and 
the actions which are consequent upon these perceptions. 
This brief exposition of Cass's view of the nature of the processes 
involved in gay identity formation raises several issues important 
in the area of modelling gay identity which must be addressed. The 
first concerns the nature of the content of the developmental 
stages. Cass (1984b) observes that in some models of gay identity 
formation, stages tend to be outlined in purely cognitive terms, 
while in others, behavioural descriptions predominate. Her own 
model is confusing in this respect owing to the ambiguous and over- 
inclusive use of the term "behaviour", which she applies both to 
the cognitive/affective sphere and to what is more usually regarded 
as behaviour, i. e., actual conduct. Of those initial stages 
examined here, Coleman's is by far the most purely 
cognitive/affective, while Cass, Troiden and Weinberg appear to aim 
for a coalescence of cognitive, behavioural and social factors. 
The wisdom of the multi-factorial approach has been questioned. 
Although it is accepted that identity and behaviour are related in 
that identity becomes translated into relatively predictable 
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behaviour patterns (Cass, 1984b), their frequent confusion has 
prompted a number of theorists (e. g., Altman, 1979; Goode, 1980; 
McDonald, 1981; Omark, 1978; Richardson, 1981; Stoller, 1980; Weeks, 
1981; Weinberg, 1978) to argue for a clear distinction between 
behavioural and identity terms. Such an approach may clarify 
conceptualisations of gay identity formation, but it must be 
remembered that it is merely a theoretical artefact and does not 
correspond to the dynamic interrelationship that exists in 
actuality between identity-related cognitions and behaviours, with 
behaviours leading to reflection and to the formation of identity- 
relevant concepts and hypotheses that are then tested in further 
behaviours, thus causing the cycle to recommence. 
The treatment of social factors appears to be of great importance 
to most studies of gay identity formation. Plummer (1975) believes 
the social element of homosexuality to be paramount and identifies 
"the perceived hostility of the societal reactions that surround 
it" (p 102) as the single most problematic factor in gay identity 
formation, as from this arises problems of identity, guilt, 
concealment of stigma and the formation of relationships. McDonald 
(1982), noting that gay identity is formed in an anti-homosexual 
environment lacking institutional and social support systems, 
regards the primary task of the individual engaged in the identity 
formation processes as being the redefinition of the self against 
a prejudiced and discriminatory social background. Cass (1984b) 
acknowledges the importance of social factors, while simultaneously 
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warning against an overconcentration upon them. She views them 
rather as subsidiary factors in that her major concern is with 
tracing the cognitive restructuring which occurs on an individual 
level in response to changes in social structure. She holds that 
the expressed object of study should be the individual's 
perceptions of the world rather than the nature of the world 
itself. Drawing on the conceptualisation of identity adopted in 
the present study, it may be contended that a most effective way 
of accessing an individual's perceptions and interpretations of his 
world is through an examination of his personal narrative in which 
these perceptions are interconnected in such a way as to boost. his 
sense of self-esteem and continuity. In common with other identity 
theorists, Cass recognises the reciprocal relationship between 
cognitive and social factors, "the dialectic between individual and 
society" (Berger and Luckmann, 1967). Habermas's (1979) conception 
of ego development, employed by Minton and McDonald (1984), also 
assumes a reciprocal interaction between the person and social 
beliefs and values in the form of critical evaluation, while De 
Monteflores and Schultz (1978) conceptualise gay identity formation 
in terms of a feedback loop which regulates the relationship 
between the person and society. 
This emphasis on the interplay between personal and social factors 
in the genesis of a gay identity recalls the distinctions outlined 
earlier between personal and social identity, which it was claimed 
were different aspects of a more overarching identity project. 
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Yet, this theoretical dialectic thrust remains largely 
unincorporated in any explicit way into existing research and 
writing on gay identity which is replete with models that simply 
list the contents of a sequence of linear stages while ignoring 
inter- and intra-stage dynamics. Weinberg (1984) even seeks to 
preserve this stasis by advocating that future research should 
concentrate upon itemising elements common to all approaches to gay 
identity formation without ordering them as a developmental 
sequence. The advocacy of such a "shopping list" approach 
represents an unnecessary lowering of theoretical sights, resulting 
from an undiscriminating blanket criticism of stage models. The 
major research recommendations that may be adopted from this 
examination of the nature of the content of identity stages is that 
if a gay identity study aims to delineate a complete picture of 
individuals' accounts of the processes involved, it should attend 
to the cognitive/affective, behavioural and social factors which 
might influence the development of a gay identity. Further, it 
must be recognised that these operate in a dynamic interdependence 
and they should therefore be studied in terms of their interaction. 
Another noteworthy feature of Cass's model is the fact that she 
posits several alternative developmental routes within each stage. 
She does not however outline the possibility of variation in the 
order in which stages are traversed, unlike Woodman and Lenna 
(1980) who clearly state that the stages of gay identity formation 
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do not occur in a fixed order. The idea of alternative routes 
within models is one to which much lip service has been paid but 
which remains under-utilised, possibly because, Weinberg (1984) 
would argue, it is at base inimical with the biological concept of 
a developmental stage which he claims has been imported into models 
of gay identity formation. Another reason may be that to include 
alternative routes is to increase the complexity of the model when 
the general aim is to achieve the parsimony of universal formulae. 
There is also the question of the extent to which individual 
differences in gay identity formation should be incorporated within 
models of the processes involved, and of how many instances of a 
particular developmental route must be encountered before it ceases 
to be an idiosyncratic detail and becomes an alternative 
developmental pathway. The lack of consensus around this question 
may have contributed to the general tendency to opt for linear- 
progressive models of gay identity formation, which again suggests 
that it is the cognitive developmental idea of a stage that informs 
the structural frameworks of these models. 
McDonald (1982) directly attributes the paucity of studies which 
attempt to chart more than one developmental route to the 
prevalence of both the linear-progressive and stage-sequential, 
i. e., the cognitive developmental modes of modelling. However, 
these two frameworks are not coterminous and should be 
independently evaluated. The stage-sequential format does not per 
se exclude the possibility of alternative routes, as Cass's model 
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demonstrates. Yet, while allowing for these routes, her model is 
somewhat judgemental in its implicit terminological refusal to 
acknowledge the legitimacy of those routes which lead to a 
cessation in the development of gay identity before the final stage 
of the model is reached; this for her constitutes identity 
foreclosure. Minton and McDonald (1984) describe the same 
occurrence using the term "fixation". The possibility that a 
person has progressed to a level of identity stability which he 
finds workable and which satisfies his needs, or that he has moved 
as far as his cognitive resources and/or interpersonal matrix allow 
at that moment is not adequately considered, although Cass does 
recognise that an individual need not pass through all stages in 
order to create a viable, fulfilled gay identity. However, she 
believes that foreclosure occurs when an individual fails to 
resolve the tasks associated with a specific stage, although 
Woodman and Lenna (1980) insist that because a person traverses a 
particular stage, this does not mean that he will want to move on 
to another stage. These writers eschew the idea of neat typologies 
of gay identity formation. They propose that not all individuals 
encounter all stages of the process and that the negotiation of any 
stage does not mean that the issues related to that stage will not 
have to be dealt with again. Their conceptualisation of gay 
identity formation is similar to Erikson's model of identity 
development in this latter respect. The opinion that deviations 
from a single developmental pathway indicate immaturity, regression 
or fixation is again attributed by Weinberg (1984) to the adoption 
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of the biological notion of stage, which appears to be something 
of a whipping boy for him. Stage models are undoubtedly 
restrictive and are more useful as classificatory tools rather than 
as reflections of actual experience, as Kroger's (1989) research 
suggested. However, they become even more restrictive when a 
linear-progressive framework is placed upon them. This approach 
is at base incompatible with the conceptualisation of alternative 
identity routes as it assumes movement in a straight line. 
Although many stage models break free from the straitjacket of 
strict linearity and outline alternative developmental paths to a 
gay identity (e. g., Coleman, 1982; Lewis, 1984; Troiden, 1977; 
Weinberg, 1976) they generally retain the linear assumption that 
there exists an ultimate or final developmental objective or an 
identity state towards which an individual is striving, e. g., 
Minton and McDonald's integrated sense of self, another artefact 
of the use of the biological conception of stage, according to 
Weinberg (1984). Kitzinger (1989) criticises those models of gay 
identity formation which she classes as being based on the tenets 
of "liberal humanistic ideology", i. e, the position which stresses 
the personhood of the gay man and regards his sexual preference as 
but one relatively unimportant aspect of the person; it rejects as 
limiting the process of labelling people and believes that the gay 
man should not be treated separately but seen as part of natural 
human diversity. Singling out the work of Cass (1979), Coleman 
(1982) and Minton and McDonald (1984), she criticises these models 
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generally for undermining the challenge which she believes lesbian 
and gay identities present to the established social order by 
assimilating them within that order. 
However, as the policy of the present study is to set aside such 
macro-criticisms (hence the work of Foucault and is not considered) 
and to assume that most people do not wish to be revolutionaries 
but wish to carve out a quiet life within the existing social order 
(cf Milligan, 1989), Kitzinger's specific criticisms of liberal 
humanistic models rather than her general ones are more pertinent 
here. She characterises them as presenting individuals who, in 
order to follow "the proper developmental pattern work through the 
early stage of identification with the aggressor, through 
subsequent intermediary stages, to achieve the dizzy heights of 
liberal humanistic self-conception, in which the alleged deviance 
ceases to be of any great importance in the person's life and she 
or he becomes a creative, loving, self-actualizing human being, 
integrated into and contributing to the wider society generally" 
(Kitzinger, 1989, p 88). This quite accurate description neatly 
points to the two major objections that have already been levelled 
at existing models of gay identity formation, i. e., their linearity 
and the positing of developmental goals. Kitzinger explains why 
these goals exist and why they are of the nature that they are: 
models tend to be underpinned by liberal humanistic theory which 
regards the proper goal of individual development to be the 
integrated and socially useful state of self-actualisation. To 
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think thus is to ignore both the refusal of identity stage 
theorists such as Erikson (1959) and Kegan (1982) to posit a 
definitively-attained end-goal for identity and the basic 
flexibility of human beings whose life spans are often 
characterised by major shifts and changes. In her treatment of gay 
identity, Berzon (1979) emphasises this in saying that "(i)dentity 
is a moving, changing process, not a fixed, established point. But 
this is an intolerable truth. Our sanity requires a compromise. 
We select components of ourselves to relate to in awareness. We 
arrange them into a semblance of order and think of ourselves as 
this configuration as long as it makes sense to us and to those 
around us" (p 1). She thus simultaneously stresses the 
constructive, meaning-making and coherence-bestowing purpose of 
identity formation, together with the mutability of a sense of 
identity. As has already been outlined, this mutability has been 
held to apply even to the fundamental which underlies gay identity, 
i. e., sexual preference. Mead (1934) held that identity is 
emergent and so end points and goals are meaningless. A more 
practical endeavour would therefore be the delineation of the paths 
towards various levels of identity stability so that what is 
described are the processes which lead to the formation of 
relatively stable gay identities. Acknowledgement of the fact that 
these identities remain open to change after the attainment of 
initial stability may be made by investigating the nature of these 
changes with regard to specific phenomena. Lee (1977), for 
example, discusses the possibility of a gay identity becoming a 
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pivotal identity for someone who has made a public declaration of 
their sexual preference to a wide audience and has risked the 
consequent engulfment of their total identity by their sexual 
identity. 
Having criticised models of gay identity formation for failing to 
import frequently-used ideas from the literature on identity 
development, it is somewhat ironic that throughout the foregoing 
consideration of the structures and processes that have been 
associated with models of gay identity formation, many of the 
criticisms levelled at them may at base be attributed to their 
adoption of just such an idea, i. e., the organisation of gay 
identity formation experiences into developmental stages. It may 
be that Weinberg (1984) is correct and that the adoption of this 
framework within psychology in order to structure a wide variety 
of developmental phenomena represents an attempt to ape the 
typologies of the natural sciences in order to impart "scientific" 
credibility to the human sciences. If this is so, the attempt is 
misplaced as it imparts only obfuscation and artificiality, 
squeezing the variety and richness of an individual's experiences 
into a narrow and restrictive framework and often imposing upon 
them such theoretical concomitants of the framework as linearity, 
stage-sequentialism and directedness towards one goal, that may be 
inimical to the diversity and mutability of the phenomena it 
purports to describe. To employ such aframeworkwould be justified 
if it were held to represent the organisational framework that 
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individuals themselves employ to order the potential chaos of their 
identity-relevant cognitions and behaviours - as is contended in 
the construal of gay identity as a narrative and as an aspect of 
a larger personal narrative - but nowhere is this claim advanced. 
It must therefore be assumed that the conceptualisation of identity 
and gay identity development in terms of stages is a structural and 
taxonomical device that is found aesthetically pleasing by writers 
on identity and gay identity rather than organisationally valuable 
by those whom they study. 
Cass warns that her model may require alteration in the light of 
changing societal attitudes and circumstances, although she does 
not state whether it might simply require alteration in terms of 
its content or whether the principles of operation that she 
outlines might not apply to new identity contents and would need 
to be replaced. This emphasises the way in which models may be 
limited by content specificity and it stresses the advisibility of 
focussing upon structures and processes, such as the narrative 
framework, the assimilation-accommodation and evaluation processes 
and the continuity, self-esteem and distinctiveness principles, 
that can apply to identity regardless of the nature of identity 
content. 
Cass's warning is currently most pertinent in the face of changing 
societal attitudes towards gay men because of AIDS (Altman, 1986; 
Patton, 1985; Watney, 1987). The AIDS issue has implications for 
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gay men's self-conceptions both during and after the formation of 
a stable identity. Those engaged in movement towards such an 
identity must take account of a new and generally more hostile set 
of social pressures and prejudices than those who attained a gay 
identity in the pre-AIDS era. The latter group may find their 
identity stability threatened by having to react to the 
increasingly negative societal reactions to their sexuality (for 
an examination of negative attitudes toward homosexuality in the 
wake of AIDS as reflected in the press, cf. Armstrong, 1984-1985). 
The effects of the AIDS situation upon gay identity have been 
surprisingly overlooked amid a plethora of AIDS-related behavioural 
studies. However, as it provides a most apposite example of how 
changing social circumstances may affect identity, thereby 
highlighting the artificiality of end points in identity formation 
models, the effects of the AIDS situation on respondents' self- 
conceptions will be examined in the present study. 
One further consideration to arise from Cass's preamble to her 
model is her stated intention to tailor it to the coming out 
experiences of both lesbians and gay men, even though she employs 
the generic terms "he", "him", and "his" throughout. Like many 
other studies of gay identity formation, the present study examines 
the experiences of gay men only; masculine pronouns have therefore 
been used throughout this review and in the discussions of the 
present study which follow, except where general processes are 
being considered not specifically in relation to gay identity 
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formation. Most models opt for a delineation of the experiences 
of one gender or the other, citing gender differences in identity 
formation as justification for their approach, e. g., De Monteflores 
and Schultz (1978) note gender differences in emotional attachment 
and of the timing of the decision to engage in same-sex sexual 
activity, and Woodman and Lenna (1980) warn that therapists should 
not generalise from the experiences of gay men to those of lesbian 
women. Basic differences in male and female sexuality are 
compounded by political considerations, most notably by the role 
of the women's movement in lesbianism, by lesbian separatism and 
by the existence of "political lesbians" who reject men as sexual 
partners primarily because of a more overarching rejection of the 
patriarchal nature of western societies. Such factors have no 
direct correlates among men. These issues are treated by Kitzinger 
(1987), who claims that gay men have produced little in the way of 
a political challenge to the established order and that what little 
they have produced has failed to command widespread support among 
the male gay movement. Although one might assume that there exists 
a large degree of solidarity between lesbian women and gay men on 
the basis of their same-sex object choice and their shared 
experiences of societal condemnation, Frye (1983) points out that 
there is in fact little reciprocal involvement between the lesbian 
and gay communities. Many lesbians have rejected the concept of 
a mixed gender gay movement on the grounds of what they see as gay 
men's sexism, obsessive sexual activity, phallocentrism and lack 
of political awareness (Stanley, 1982). Those lesbians in 
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Kitzinger's (1987) study who framed their identities in terms of 
radical feminism did not identify as "gay women" or feel any 
solidarity with gay men. One woman claimed that gay men are simply 
"what heterosexual men would be if they didn't have to present a 
veneer of civilised and mature behaviour in order to attract the 
women they need to service them" (p 114). 
Cass's framework omits explicitly political considerations in an 
attempt to achieve cross-gender applicability. However, she later 
(1984a) acknowledges the existence of qualitative differences 
between lesbian women and gay men in the identity formation 
processes. Assertions such as that of Hedblom (1973) that 
"lesbians have more in common with female heterosexual than with 
male homosexuals" (p 334), together with the practical difficulties 
for any male researchers of gaining access to a group which may 
adopt a separatist stance with regard to men, have led most writers 
to attempt to model the experiences of one gender only. 
This is not to say that there does not exist a degree of cross- 
gender experiential convergence or that an examination of the 
concepts employed in lesbian identity formation will not be 
illuminative in the realm of male gay identity formation. Both 
groups face the same problems of disclosure and of overcoming the 
heterosexual socialisation process and negative societal attitudes. 
This is apparent in Ponse's (1978) work on lesbian identities which 
echoes the themes of studies of male gay identity in its 
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concentration upon the issues of secrecy and the subculture. The 
received wisdom, however, is that male and female sexuality should 
be treated separately, otherwise Kinsey (1948,1953) and Hite 
(1977,1990) would not have produced separate volumes on the two 
genders. It is therefore intended to limit the scope of the 
present study to male gay identity formation and thus implicitly 
to recognise that for women the lesbian identity formation process 
is complicated by their having to resolve issues associated with 
their gender in addition to issues related to their same-sex sexual 
preference. 
2.4 Cass's First Stage: "Identity Confusion" and Other Initial 
stages of Gay Identity Formation 
Much has already been said about the structures and processes that 
characterise or that might characterise conceptualisations of gay 
identity formation, but little consideration has been given to the 
contents of gay identities as they arise, change and develop and 
are given shape and form by these structures and processes. In the 
exposition which follows, much weight is attached to the contents 
of various models of gay identity formation in an attempt to 
identify the most salient themes which will need to be incoporated 
into any research instrument that hopes to address gay identity 
formation, as it is through the examination of these identity 
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contents, their organisation and the principles by which they 
change that one may observe and infer the structures and processes 
that give shape to a gay identity. Note then that the aim of this 
review is primarily to present literature on gay identity formation 
that is relevant to the present study, to weigh it, and to extract 
its recurrent themes, rather than to criticise it. Much of what 
has passed for informed writing on gay identity and on 
homosexuality generally is so obviously underscored by quasi- 
medical and moral discourses (for example, see Moberly's (1983) 
discussion of homosexuality from a "Christian" perspective) that 
it presents a sitting target for those who wish to criticise. This 
mass of uninformed and/or uninformative material has therefore been 
omitted from consideration. 
Cass's account of the contents and organisation of the stages of 
her model commences with a preamble outlining the general social 
context against which they must be viewed, i. e., the context of 
social approbation and stigmatisation of homosexuality, in which 
individuals have been socialised, which is elaborated by Hetrick 
and Martin (1987). Heterosexuality and to some extent asexuality 
are portrayed in our society as the only acceptable outlets for 
sexual expression. Although many families may not explicitly 
denigrate the idea of homosexuality as an acceptable sexual 
preference, the absence of discussion on the topic itself conveys 
a negative message (Browning, 1987; Hite, 1990). Therefore at the 
outset, an individual's interpersonal system strongly supports the 
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idea that he is heterosexual, a process delineated by Plummer 
(1981,1984) and termed the "heterosexual assumption". Cass's 
first stage of gay identity formation is said to be initiated by 
the development of a feeling of incongruency between a person's 
perceptions of self, the interpersonal matrix, and the growing 
"conscious awareness that homosexuality has relevance to themselves 
and their behaviour" (p 222): this behaviour may be overt, e. g., 
same-sex sexual activity, or internal, e. g., thoughts, emotions or 
physiological responses. Cass terms this first stage "Identity 
Confusion". The growing awareness that whatever information or 
experiences that are encountered regarding homosexuality are 
relevant to the self becomes a source of confusion and turmoil for 
the person, who has to consider the possibility that he may be 
homosexual. Feelings of doubt and personal alienation predominate 
as the potential homosexual identity is at odds with the previously 
held nonhomosexual/heterosexual identity: "who am I? " becomes the 
burning question of this stage. Outside help is, however, rarely 
sought at this juncture, owing to the nebulous and personal nature 
of the issues involved; most individuals attempt to solve their 
identity confusion on their own. Another possible reason for this 
which Cass omits to mention is that to seek outside help would 
compel those involved to think seriously about the possible 
personal applicability of a homosexual identity; the 
crystallisation of a socially devalued identity is unlikely to be 
a desired occurrence at this stage unless the person has access to 
sources of support for the assumption of that identity and the 
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means to attribute a positive evaluation to it. 
Attempts to resolve identity confusion, i. e., to render these 
experiences intelligible and to deal with the threat they may pose 
to one's existing identity or personal narrative generally and to 
self-esteem and continuity particularly, are regarded as following 
one of three possible paths. Firstly, when the individual finds 
the homosexual interpretation of his behaviour correct and 
acceptable, he may question his heterosexual identity and seek 
evidence that will help confirm or disconfirm a homosexual 
identity, usually by gathering more information on homosexuality, 
perhaps also in an attempt to counteract what Hetrick and Martin 
(1987) term "cognitive isolation", i. e., a lack of access to 
accurate information about homosexuality. However, although this 
strategy may be regarded as coping through accepting that change 
may be necessary, it is most unlikely that the person will move 
directly to an acceptance of a gay identity for themselves until 
this identity has become positive or at least neutral for them 
(Sophie, 1987). Instead, the more certain the person becomes that 
they are homosexual, the more acute is the sense of incongruency. 
It is held that attempts to resolve this incongruency move the 
individual to the next stage of "Identity Comparison", although the 
dynamics of this move are not specified. Secondly, when the 
homosexual interpretation is correct but undesirable, an attempt 
is made to restore the interpersonal matrix to its original state 
by inhibiting all behaviours that have been interpreted as 
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homosexual, by controlling the information available on 
homosexuality, or by denying that such information is personally 
relevant. These tactics may be supplemented by the denial of the 
existence of past homosexual behaviour, the adoption of asexuality 
(to avoid the possibility of encountering situations with a 
homosexual aspect), the adoption of a strong antihomosexual stance, 
or engagement in opposite-sex sexual activity to buttress a 
heterosexual identity. A self-conception as potentially homosexual 
is avoided, self-esteem and personal continuity are safeguarded, 
and identity foreclosure is said to occur. 
Of course circumstances may militate against an individual's 
attempt to avoid situations in which homosexuality plays a role or 
to escape the "pull" of a homosexual identity. It is easier to 
avoid potentially threatening situations than to prevent the 
occurrence of erotic dreams or physiological responses to people 
of the same gender. Also, if one cannot respond sexually and/or 
emotionally to the opposite sex, a heterosexual role may be 
difficult to maintain. 
These various strategies may represent a period of cognitive 
experimentation, tentative hypothesis testing and rumination on 
the meaning of a person's behaviour rather than a permanent 
adaptation. A homosexual meaning may eventually become acceptable 
to the person. However, an unwilling acceptance sows the seeds of 
a negative or self-hating identity. 
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The third alternative arises when the homosexual interpretation is 
both incorrect and undesirable and involves the redefinition of 
behaviour as nonhomosexual, e. g., males may regard kissing, 
emotional attachment, or repeated contacts with the same male as 
homosexual, while purely genital contact is seen as "fooling 
around" or "experimenting" (Weinberg, 1976). The person may also 
define homosexuals in such a syllogistic way as to exclude 
themselves from the definition, e. g., "all homosexual males are 
effeminate; I'm not effeminate, so I'm not homosexual". With 
behaviour redefined, the individual can reject the idea that he is 
homosexual, self-esteem and continuity are again protected, and 
identity foreclosure is said to occur. 
It is worth noting that Cass does not specify at what chronological 
age the Identity Confusion stage or any of her other stages is most 
likely to be encountered, thus implying that gay identity formation 
may commence at any point in the life course and that the issues 
pertaining to each stage may never be definitively resolved but may 
resurface at any time. The impact of certain gay identity 
formation experiences may however be related to an individual's 
chronological age in that if a person commences the process during 
that period when he is addressing a range of primary developmental 
tasks related to self-definition, it may be congruent with and can 
be related to the self-exploration occurring in his life. If, on 
the other hand, the gay identity formation process begins later in 
life, it may cause major upheaval as the person may have felt 
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secure in his identity only to have to reevaluate it and negotiate 
the process of identity development again (Browning, 1987). 
An examination of the starting points of other stage models reveals 
the arbitrary nature of the concept. Troiden (1977) regards the 
gay identity formation processes as commencing in a period prior 
to the stage of identity confusion. In common with Altman (1971), 
Minton and McDonald (1984) and Plummer (1975) - and Lewis (1984) 
with regard to lesbian identity formation - he suggests that 
experiences during childhood, i. e., before the age of 13, produce 
a sense of difference which during adolescence, i. e., before the 
age of 17, crystallises into a sense of sexual difference as a 
result of genital and emotional experiences. He terms this initial 
phase "Sensitization". The significance of these experiences is 
retrospectively revised and a homosexual meaning is applied to 
them, so that the person may come to believe that they were "really 
gay all along" (Richardson, 1981). The childhood experiences most 
frequently identified as sources of a sense of difference among 
Troiden's respondents were of a social nature, namely feelings of 
alienation, gender inadequacy and excitement in the presence of 
other males. The adolescent experiences which generated an 
awareness of sexual difference were the recognition of less 
opposite sex interest than other males, excessive interest in young 
men, feelings of gender inadequacy, and same-sex sexual activity. 
Almost two thirds of Troiden's 150 respondents engaged in their 
first homosexual activity to orgasm during this stage. It is only 
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during his second stage of "Dissociation and Signification" that 
the element of questioning identified in Cass's first stage 
appears. The commencement of this second stage is marked by the 
suspicion that one might be homosexual, sparked by the realisation 
that one is becoming sexually aroused by other males or is 
beginning to view other males in sexual terms; by physically 
enjoyable homosexual experiences or fantasies; by the desire to 
repeat a homosexual experience; by reading or learning about 
homosexuality; by a realisation that one's heterosexual interests 
or emotional involvements are less strong than those of one's male 
peers; or by an emotional attachment to another male. This 
suspicion is however dissociated from sexual identity in the same 
ways that same-sex sexual behaviour is in Cass's model, e. g., by 
regarding it as a passing phase or by regarding same-sex sexual 
activity as mere sexual experimentation and not as an indicator of 
any lasting preference, or by insisting that one has little or 
nothing in common with homosexuals as a group. 
Weinberg (1976) also speaks of a self-suspicion stage, with the 
emphasis being on the self: less than one third of his sample of 
30 men reported that other people played an active role in the 
initiation of self-suspicion. Instead, other people were directly 
influential in serving as sources of comparison, allowing the 
individual to perceive that his feelings and desires were different 
from others'. The list of factors which initiated self-suspicion 
among Weinberg's group overlaps considerably with that produced by 
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Troiden's respondents. Additional factors named by Weinberg's 
subjects were a lack of interest in traditionally "masculine" 
activities, an interest in "feminine" activities, and a perception 
that one fits the effeminate homosexual stereotype. Weinberg adds 
a more psychological dimension to the suspicion stage by reporting 
resultant affective states, i. e., anxiety and fear of isolation, 
of contempt, of hurting one's parents and of non-acceptance; guilt; 
self-hatred; repulsion; confusion and frustration. Such negative 
feelings were reported by the vast majority of respondents. 
Significantly fewer reported neutral reactions and positive 
reactions were mentioned only twice. Responses to negative 
feelings included withdrawal from others, the channelling of 
energies into other activities, the search for others with whom to 
discuss one's feelings, and the repression, denial or 
rationalisation of these feelings. Weinberg views self-suspicion 
as causing cognitive dissonance between the perceptions "I am 
homosexual" and "homosexuality is bad". An individual may respond 
to this by repressing the possibility that he could be homosexual; 
by cultivating a more "masculine" image; by engaging in sexual 
relations with women; and by the adoption of very negative 
attitudes towards homosexuals in an attempt to distance himself 
from the category of "homosexual" and all that it implies. 
Alternatively, the person may simply tolerate the dissonance and 
do nothing or may seek to investigate the homosexual category and 
its applicability to himself further by having sexual relations 
with men or with men and women; by gathering more information about 
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homosexuality; by discussing the matter with others; or by 
attempting to contact other homosexuals or gay organisations. Such 
strategies are aimed at effecting change in a positive direction 
in the meanings which the individual associates with a gay 
identity, thus rendering it more easily assimilable into the 
existing identity structure and reducing its capacity to damage 
self-esteem. For Sophie (1987), this cognitive restructuring 
constitutes the major coping strategy on the path to self- 
acceptance as gay or lesbian. 
The dissonance concept is also utilised by Lewis (1984) to describe 
the conflict experienced in the initial stages of lesbian identity 
formation by women between the expectation with which they were 
socialised that they will marry and have a family and their desire 
for intimacy with other women. A woman may quell the resultant 
anxiety, shame and turmoil by denying her same-sex sexual 
attractions or by bargaining with them, e. g., by claiming that just 
because she is attracted to one woman, this does not mean that she 
is a lesbian. In her discussion of possible reactions to feelings 
of dissonance, Lewis's themes echo those of writers on male gay 
identity formation, e. g., the possibility of confusion, and of 
anger, fear and extreme hostility at the mention of homosexuality 
is discussed, so it may be that at least with respect to the 
fundamental dynamics of gay identity formation, the experiences of 
lesbians and gay men may show a considerable degree of convergence. 
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To continue our examination of the various starting points adopted 
by models of gay identity formation, Woodman and Lenna (1980) 
appear to borrow the terminology of Kubler-Ross's (1969) five-stage 
model of coping with terminal illness, which in one sense is 
appropriate in that they are addressing the ways in which a person 
relinquishes and grieves for one mode of being and one set of 
experiences - however unsuited to their sexual feelings and 
attractions these may have been - and attempts to make sense of an 
uncertain future. Their initial denial phase has much in common 
with Cass's Identity Confusion stage. The denial to which they 
refer relates to an individual's denial of a same-sex sexual 
preference, although he may wish for or have had same-sex sexual 
experience. Other coping mechanisms may be employed to deal with 
material that cannot be denied, e. g., repression, rationalisation 
or projection. Yet, whereas Cass sees the successful deployment 
of such coping mechanisms as leading to foreclosure, Woodman and 
Lenna do not consider this possibility, perhaps because they are 
writing from a counselling perspective and are therefore centrally 
concerned with moving clients on from such a position. Rather, 
they see the failure of these coping mechanisms as inevitable and 
as provoking a development-inducing crisis, which moves the 
individual to their second stage of identity confusion. Although 
it shares its name with Cass's first stage, Woodman and Lenna's 
version focusses upon different issues, i. e., self-suspicion as 
gay; fear of losing relationships; anxiety about reconciling the 
known self and the emergent self; the projection of anger onto 
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other gay men; and identification with negative societal attitudes 
towards homosexuals and homosexuality. 
Another initial stage that has been posited is Coleman's (1982) 
vague and nebulous "Pre-Coming Out" stage, which addresses the same 
themes that have already been outlined, i. e., the internalisation 
of negative societal attitudes towards homosexuality; feelings of 
rejection and depression; concealment of the awareness of a 
homosexual identity by denial, suppression and repression. 
Movement to Coleman's second "Coming-Out" stage is facilitated by 
an acknowledgement to the self of homosexual feelings. His 
exposition is noticeably less systematic and more simplistic than 
that of other writers and may be better described as a loose 
collection of descriptive ideas. Malyon (1982) too highlights the 
effects of what he terms "biased socialization" on those who in the 
early stages of gay identity formation become aware of their same- 
sex sexual attractions, i. e., a diminution of self-esteem; the 
acquisition of a tendency towards self-punishment and depression; 
and the development of such defensive strategies as denial, 
compensation, suppression and compartmentalisation. To this list 
of woes which are said to result from an internalisation of 
negative societal attitudes towards homosexuality, Richardson 
(1981) adds alienation, guilt, loneliness and isolation. Woodman 
and Lenna (1980) stress that progress towards a positive gay 
identity cannot occur until the grip of internalised negative 
stereotypes of homosexuals is broken. These negative social 
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stereotypes of homosexuals and homosexuality may thus be regarded 
as perhaps the major societal constraint placed upon the gay 
identity formation process, as it means that in order to establish 
a gay identity, an individual must first define himself in terms 
of a socially devalued category which may pose an enormous threat 
to his self-esteem. 
It may be contended that the initial stages of most of these models 
of gay identity formation share not only certain content themes - 
i. e., individuals internalising negative social stereotypes of 
homosexuals and homosexuality; being sensitised to their being 
different or sexually different from their peers; developing 
suspicions that they may be homosexual; and defining same-sex 
sexual attractions and/or behaviours as nonhomosexual - but also 
a general lack of form and of specific mechanisms for change, 
characteristics that continue to be notable by their absence as the 
models unfold. It seems that what many of these writers mean by 
a stage is simply a period during which certain sexual identity- 
related concerns are uppermost in the minds of those undergoing the 
gay identity formation process. This is especially so in the case 
of those whose interest in the topic is chiefly from a clinical or 
therapeutic perspective, e. g., Coleman (1982) and Woodman and Lenna 
(1980), and who appear primarily concerned with describing the most 
commonly-encountered experiences and broad processes in gay 
identity formation than with formulating a model that can also 
predict gay identity formation courses and generate testable 
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hypotheses about them. 
2.5 Cass's Second Stage: "Identity Comparison" and Passing 
Stage two of Cass's model, termed the "Identity Comparison" stage, 
has as its central task the handling of the social alienation which 
arises from the incongruency between the differences in the 
individual's perceptions of his own behaviour and himself 
(determined by his tentative commitment to a homosexual self) and 
the individual's perception of how others view that behaviour and 
self. This alienation assumes the form of a feeling of difference, 
a sense of not belonging to society or to specific social subgroups 
such as family and peers. In terms of Kegan's (1982) model of 
identity development, the individual's culture of embeddedness is 
no longer seen as a suitable context through which to define 
himself. It is at this stage that the individual may feel "I'm the 
only one in the world like this". Acceptance of the self as 
homosexual or not heterosexual leads the person to a realisation 
that the guidelines for behaviour, ideals and future expectations 
associated with a heterosexual identity are no longer relevant to 
him and need to be replaced, which may be seen as the essential 
identity task upon which he must embark during this stage. 
In making this assertion, however, Cass does not appear to take 
account of the cognitive capacity or degree of cognitive 
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development that would be required for the recognition of the 
inappropriateness of heterosexual behaviour, values and 
expectations, and for the construction of an alternative set of 
guidelines. The basic capacity necessary for this is what Kelly 
(1955) termed "constructive alternativism", i. e., the realisation 
of the facticity of the given or the recognition that things do not 
have to be as they are. There may be individual differences in the 
degree to which people possess this capacity. Some may only dimly 
perceive that the heterosexual guidelines internalised in the 
socialisation process do not provide the optimal strategy for 
dealing with an identity based around their same-sex feelings, and 
may persist in attempting to fit a heterosexual framework onto a 
homosexual context. According to Hetrick and Martin (1987), this 
is a real possibility if the person has only limited access to 
accurate information on homosexuality, limited opportunities for 
non-sexual socialisation in the gay subculture and a lack of role 
models. This means that the person cannot evaluate the established 
order and so may espouse values which deny his worth, creating a 
sense of conflict which is said to result in alienation, anxiety 
and demoralisation. For others, their perception of the 
inappropriateness of the guidelines internalised during 
socialisation may lead them to realise that an entirely new or 
modified set of guidelines is possible and necessary but, unsure 
of what these new guidelines should be or of how to construct them, 
they may enter a strategic moratorium. For others still, the 
creation of a new set of guidelines may be unproblematic in that 
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they know which sources of guidance to consult. Even when the 
individual has constructed a personally-tailored set of guidelines, 
they may have to consider how feasible it is to implement them. 
The successful execution of these identity tasks requires what 
Browning (1987) terms a shift from a focus on external validation 
to internal validation so that the person becomes able to adopt 
positions that may or may not be validated by others without this 
being a threat to his identity. These diverse possibilities 
provide an example of one set of unconsidered alternative routes 
within Cass's model, and suggest that this particular strategy, as 
it involves a substantial degree of cognitive restructuring about 
oneself and one's relationship with the world, properly belongs 
much later in her model. Indeed, Browning (1987) regards the shift 
to internal validation as "the final outcome of achieving identity" 
(p 50). It is also worth noting that the sort of processes 
considered here are not specific to the formation of a gay identity 
but are vital to the development of adult consciousness. Gould 
(1978,1980), for example, sees the thrust of adult development as 
being towards the acceptance of ourselves as creators of our own 
lives, and away from the idea that the rules and standards of 
childhood determine our destiny, a task which principally involves 
the replacement of our parents' values and assumptions with ones 
of our own. 
Four strategies aimed at reducing feelings of alienation are 
posited in the Identity Comparison stage. The first is adopted by 
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those who react positively to the idea of being different and to 
the possibility of a homosexual self and a homosexual 
interpretation of their behaviour. They reduce incongruency by 
devaluing the importance of other people's opinions of them, while 
at the same time presenting a public image of heterosexuality so 
that they will not be confronted personally with others' negative 
evaluations of homosexuality. The maintenance of the heterosexual 
self-image - referred to as "passing" (Goffman, 1963) - also allows 
the individual to absorb and manage an increasing commitment to a 
homosexual identity. Passing may be achieved by avoiding 
threatening situations, by careful and selective self-presentation, 
by deliberately cultivating an image of heterosexuality or 
asexuality, or by conveying an air of detachment from the subject 
of homosexuality. It represents the maintenance of a social 
identity that is not contiguous with one's personal identity as 
homosexual. If passing is successful, incongruency is reduced but 
not eliminated, and the desire to reduce it further leads the 
person to stage three. 
A second type of strategy may be used when the individual accepts 
a homosexual meaning for his behaviour but not for his self-image. 
The aim of this type of strategy is to alter the homosexual self- 
image in a way that will not require alteration of actual 
behaviour, again with the aim of salvaging what self-esteem and/or 
continuity one can within one's personal narrative. Of the four 
sub-strategies outlined - akin to Woodman and Lenna's (1980) coping 
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mechanisms of their denial phase - the first involves defining 
one's behaviour as homosexual only in relation to a particular 
person, which allows someone to argue that if it were not for that 
person, they would be heterosexual. This approach is termed the 
"special case strategy". The easiest manner of coping with 
alienation is found in the second approach, the "ambisexual 
strategy", where the individual identifies as both potentially 
heterosexual and potentially homosexual: actual heterosexual 
behaviour is not required for the maintenance of this self-image, 
but an acknowledgement of the possibility of its occurrence is 
needed. Alienation is reduced by identifying others in one's 
interpersonal environment and also well-known public figures as 
(am)bisexual, which reduces feelings of sexual uniqueness and 
isolation. In the third approach, the "temporary identity 
strategy", the individual accepts the homosexual self-image but 
regards it as a temporary manifestation which will pass. The 
fourth approach, the "personal innocence strategy" is commonly used 
by those who hold very negative views of a homosexual self-image, 
and is characterised by such comments as "I was born this way" or 
"I cannot help it", designed to permit acceptance of a homosexual 
self-image but to deflect responsibility for it away from the 
person. This strategy does not serve to reduce feelings of 
alienation and, as the self-image is viewed negatively, it leads 
to the development of a negative, self-hating identity. Passing 
also plays a role in this general path through stage two, with its 
aims being either to appear more acceptable to others and perhaps 
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to the self or to compartmentalise one's homosexuality and separate 
it from all other aspects of one's life. The notion of strategies 
designed to allow same-sex sexual behaviour to be interpreted in 
ways which preclude self-labelling as homosexual is developed by 
Hencken (1984). He outlines sixteen such strategies for 
"explaining" same-sex sexual behaviour, including "I was drunk"; 
"it's just physical"; "I was just experimenting"; "it's just for 
variety"; "it's more available with guys"; "it was just a phase"; 
and "I was seduced". 
A third route through stage two is observed when the person accepts 
that a homosexual meaning can be attributed both to the self and 
to one's behaviour but views the latter as undesirable, a state of 
affairs also observed in Woodman and Lenna's (1980) phases of 
bargaining and depression, although there the acceptance of the 
self-relevance of a homosexual meaning is said to vary according 
to how successfully the person can implement coping mechanisms to 
avoid it. The circumstances in which the attribution of a 
homosexual meaning to one's behaviour is undesirable are most 
likely to arise when the person anticipates strong negative 
reactions from significant others; the behavioural element is not 
accepted because it is the means by which the person will be 
confronted with the negative reactions of others. This too may be 
regarded as a social constraint placed upon the development of a 
gay identity mediated through the negative social stereotype of 
homosexuals and homosexuality. If the individual is aware of or 
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has encountered this stereotype, he will be aware of others' 
negative evaluations of homosexuals and homosexuality and hence 
will be led to expect negative reactions from others to his own 
homosexuality. The chief strategy for dealing with the situation 
is the attempted inhibition of overt behaviour which might expose 
the person as homosexual, and also of possibly homosexually-related 
covert behaviour. This permits the person to adopt an asexual role 
and self-image which then distances him from threatening sexual 
situations, and leads to him attempting to reduce the impact of 
others, e. g., by moving to another city. 
The fourth alternative in stage two occurs in the face of extreme 
alienation when both the self and behaviour are negatively viewed 
and change is desired in both. As a result, all homosexual 
behaviours are inhibited, homosexuality is devalued and 
heterosexuality is positively portrayed, allowing the rejection of 
a homosexual self-image and the adoption of an asexual or 
heterosexual self-image. If these strategies are successful, 
identity foreclosure occurs. If not, such is the degree of self- 
hatred engendered that, following repeated failures of the 
inhibitive strategy, the individual may resort to suicide. 
Cass Is identity comparison stage has no obvious corresponding stage 
in other models due to the fact that her model deals with quite a 
specific set of issues within a six-stage framework, while other 
models comprising fewer stages must deal with a broader range of 
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concerns within each stage. The second route outlined through the 
stage has certain characteristics in common with Troiden's (1977) 
third "coming out" stage in that while his sample labelled their 
sexual feelings as definitely homosexual at this juncture, two 
thirds of them did not at the same time designate themselves as 
homosexual, i. e., they did not have a homosexual self-image. This 
state of affairs was achieved by these individuals regarding their 
feelings as a temporary phenomenon - corresponding to Cass's 
temporary identity strategy - or as being indicative of 
bisexuality, which mirrors the ambisexual strategy: with regard to 
the latter, nine of Weinberg's (1976) 30 gay men claimed to have 
considered themselves as bisexual at some point in the gay identity 
formation process. Furthermore, De Monteflores and Schultz (1978) 
note that it is common for women to adopt a temporary bisexual 
identity when they first become sexually involved with other women 
because such a label carries a lesser degree of stigma than the 
"lesbian" or "homosexual" labels and because it permits them to 
retain some of the social advantages accorded to heterosexuals 
while they explore same-sex relationships. Note however the 
discrepancy between the position of this occurrence in the models 
of Troiden and Cass: Troiden places it in the coming out stage 
while for Cass it begins at a stage which is far removed from any 
idea of the acceptance of one's homosexuality. There may exist a 
broad consensus regarding the major themes in the gay identity 
formation process, but the various models show discrepancies in 
matters of sequencing and detail, possibly stemming from 
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experiential differences among the individuals whose accounts of 
their gay identity formation experiences constitute the foundations 
upon which the various empirically- or clinically-based models are 
founded. 
Cass Is Identity Comparison stage is subsumed to a large extent 
within Minton and McDonald's (1984) "Sociocentric Stage", which is 
described as being characterised by an individual's heightened 
awareness both of the possibility of possessing a homosexual 
identity and of negative societal attitudes towards homosexuality. 
In fact, both the Identity Confusion and Identity Comparison stages 
are cited to elaborate the concepts involved in this stage of their 
theoretical model. Other models, studies and literatures deal with 
some of the issues raised in the Identity Comparison stage, 
especially the concept of passing. In his treatise on the 
management of "spoiled" or stigmatised identities, Goffman (1963) 
pinpoints passing as a major technique of self-presentation by 
which information about the self is controlled and the impressions 
which one creates for others are managed. In common with Malyon 
(1982), Woodman and Lenna (1980) and Cass, he outlines the 
possibility of dealing with a stigmatised identity by 
compartmentalising one's life but, like Ponse (1978), traces the 
social consequences rather than the psychological manoeuvres of 
such a strategy, i. e., the creation of a situation where the 
individual moves in two or more circles which each have their own 
different biography of the person, and where some circles are 
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unaware of the existence of others, as in the example of Sydney 
Biddle Barrows, cited in Chapter One: two social identities may 
overlap to varying degrees with the person's personal identity but 
may themselves be mutually exclusive. 
Among the problems inherent in passing which Goffman identifies is 
the possibility of the person learning what others think of those 
who possess the stigmatised identity, e. g., when heterosexuals 
discuss homosexuality in a disparaging way in the presence of 
someone whom they do not know to be gay (cf. Sawchuk, 1974). This 
type of occurrence was mentioned in pilot research for the present 
study by several respondents who felt obliged to laugh at jokes 
told by heterosexual friends which ridiculed gay men. Despite 
feeling that they were "letting the side down", their desire to 
pass as heterosexual inhibited them from reacting otherwise. Such 
situations again act as societal constraints upon the development 
of a positively valued gay identity as they are instrumental in 
conveying the social approbation associated with homosexuality to 
the person who is beginning to acknowledge the personal relevance 
of homosexuality in the Identity Comparison stage and they 
consequently engender feelings of social alienation. 
Goffman also examines the various conceptions of the psychic state 
of those who pass, which form a consistent part of analyses of 
passing. It is assumed, for example, that the passer experiences 
a high level of anxiety because of the possibility that that which 
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he is trying to hide will be uncovered, partly because he can never 
be entirely sure how well the deception is working. Richardson 
(1981) claims that those who pass may experience feelings of self- 
denial, dishonesty and loneliness, a sense of alienation from self 
and others and of conflict between what is felt to be a true self 
and a false self, and acute self-consciousness arising from 
continuous self-monitoring. Equivocal evidence is provided for 
such opinions by Weinberg and Williams (1974) who found that for 
their respondents, passing was significantly negatively related to 
three of their eight measures of psychological well-being, i. e., 
to depression, interpersonal awkwardness, and guilt, shame or 
anxiety regarding one's homosexuality. Furthermore, the authors 
suggest that depression and interpersonal awkwardness may be due 
more to worry about exposure or anticipated discrimination than to 
passing per se, although they conclude that a direct relationship 
does exist between passing and guilt, shame or anxiety about one's 
homosexuality, feelings which may constitute prime motivators for 
passing behaviour. They contend however that passing does not 
usually impose an intolerable psychological strain upon the 
individual who passes as heterosexual, firstly because he has 
learned through heterosexual socialisation how to present himself 
as heterosexual and may well be able to do so easily, and secondly 
because passing may in time become a routine and non-problematic 
means of managing potentially discrediting information about 
himself. Derlega and Chaikin (1977), in their consideration of 
lying, regard this passing strategy as especially costly as it 
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involves not only the witholding of discrediting information but 
also the maintenance of a flow of faked information, and they cite 
a most apposite example: "homosexuals who attempt to pass as 
heterosexuals may feel compelled to construct an imaginary 
heterosexual appearance for friends and relatives, possibly 
including dates with the opposite sex, making up descriptions of 
heterosexual sexual exploits, etc. " (p 112). In her study of 
lesbian identity, Ponse (1978) examines various strategies for and 
consequences of passing as heterosexual, which forms part of the 
concept of secrecy, fundamental to her view of the influences which 
structure lesbian identity and in terms of which she frames her 
basically diptychical typology of lesbian women. It is Goffman's 
opinion that the idea that passing necessarily entails great 
psychological strain is misleading, but he offers no evidence to 
support his assertion. Reports of passing experiences sought in 
the present study may help assess his hypothesis. 
2.6 Cass Is Third and Fourth Stages: "Identity Tolerance", "Identity 
Acceptance", Subcultural Involvement and Self-Labelling 
Stages three and four of Cass's model will be examined in tandem 
because the issues which they address are dealt with in a unitary 
fashion in most other studies of gay identity formation. Stage 
three, termed "Identity Tolerance", sees the person relieved of 
much of the preceding confusion and turmoil and willing to 
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acknowledge his social, emotional and sexual needs, but in a spirit 
of toleration rather than acceptance. However, such 
acknowledgement heightens his awareness of the incongruency between 
how he sees himself and how others are believed to see him, which 
accentuates feelings of alienation and isolation. In order to 
alleviate this, the person seeks out homosexuals and the homosexual 
subculture. The positive acceptance of his homosexual self-image 
and behaviour which the individual is presumed to find in the 
subculture leads to a decrease in alienation and isolation and an 
increase in the feeling of not belonging with heterosexuals. The 
latter is diminished by an increased general detachment from and 
careful and selective interaction with heterosexuals. Feelings of 
helplessness also abate as the individual realises that he is 
taking responsibility for his life situation. The possibility of 
negative outcomes to initial subcultural experiences is also 
admitted, with factors such as poor social skills, shyness, low 
self-esteem and fear of exposure or of the unknown being cited as 
possible contributors to negative experiences. In her treatment 
of lesbian identity formation, Richardson (1981) suggests that 
negative outcomes may arise if the individual feels that she has 
little in common with those whom she meets in the subculture. 
Weinberg and Williams (1974) point out that subcultural rejection 
may occur in the other direction: members of the subculture may 
reject the person because he is not suited to the group as, for 
example, he may be too old, too flamboyant, not radical enough or 
not conservative enough. Such rejection can produce an acute sense 
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of isolation, marginality and psychological strain. 
Positive subcultural experiences render other homosexuals more 
significant to the individual and cause them to be viewed more 
favourably by him. When the person sees homosexual others viewing 
his homosexual self-image and behaviour in a positive light, 
congruency is created in the interpersonal matrix between the self, 
behaviour and other elements, and the person comes to feel 
positively about the self and about the desirability of a 
homosexual self-image. This leads to decreased social alienation 
because of the support provided by interaction with homosexual 
others, increased commitment to a homosexual identity and a desire 
for further contact with the homosexual subculture. Negative or 
unrewarding subcultural experiences lead to the person devaluing 
the subculture, the homosexual self-image and his homosexual 
behaviour, resulting in a self-hating individual. Such self-hatred 
is handled either by inhibiting all homosexual behaviours if the 
individual feels extremely negatively about the self, or by 
reducing contacts with homosexuals if he feels less negatively. 
If behaviour is successfully inhibited, identity foreclosure is 
said to occur. If homosexual contacts are reduced, the individual 
acknowledges the necessity of meeting his social, emotional and 
sexual needs, and there is therefore some degree of continuing 
commitment to a homosexual self-image. 
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Among those who perceive their homosexual behaviour as desirable, 
but not a homosexual identity, the strategies of stage two (special 
case, ambisexual, temporary identity and personal innocence) 
continue to be employed to increase the acceptability of the self- 
image to the self. However, tension is created by contact with 
others who are seen as viewing the person as homosexual and who 
confront him about the use of these strategies. The manner of 
tension resolution adopted will depend upon whether contacts with 
homosexuals are regarded by the person as rewarding or punishing. 
Subcultural contact permits the individual to become aware of the 
positive features which the subculture offers, such as the 
opportunity to meet a partner, the provision of gay role models, 
the chance to learn how to handle a homosexual identity, and social 
support. The negative aspects may also be learned, e. g., the 
demands for greater commitment to a homosexual identity, and the 
possibility of the person's homosexuality becoming known outside 
the subculture if members of the subculture inform outsiders. The 
degree of subcultural involvement is an important factor here as 
although minimal involvement still permits the person to observe 
the potentially rewarding aspects of the subculture, it may lead 
to greater emphasis being placed upon the negative aspects which 
may encourage the continuation of such minimal involvement. 
Whatever the details of the individual's course may be, if identity 
foreclosure has not occurred by the end of stage three, his 
commitment to a homosexual self-image will have increased to the 
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point where he can say "I am a homosexual". It is at this stage 
therefore that the basic questions that McAdams (1988) regards as 
motivators of the construction of a personal narrative begin to 
find an answer. In terms of his developing sexual identity, the 
individual can state who and what he is and can begin to construct 
an appropriate narrative on this basis. The question of the nature 
of his relationship with the adult world finds at least a partial 
and possibly a positive answer in his involvement in the gay 
subculture, which may be seen as a new context or, in Kegan's 
(1982) terms, a new culture of embeddedness in which further 
developmental work can take place. 
Stage four, termed "Identity Acceptance", is a natural continuation 
of stage three and is characterised by increased contact with other 
homosexuals, which permits the individual to experience accounts 
of homosexuality which "normalise" it and validate it as a way of 
life. This prompts a move towards accepting rather than simply 
tolerating a homosexual self-image. As homosexual social contacts 
increase, individuals begin to build subcultural friendship 
networks which lead them to evaluate homosexuals more positively 
and accord their homosexuality a significance equal to that of 
other aspects of their life. The "Who am I? " and "Where do I 
belong? " questions of previous stages now find firmer answers. 
The person's progress through the remaining stages of gay identity 
formation is determined to a large extent by the types of 
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subcultural groups with which he interacts at this stage, a factor 
largely ignored by other authors who tend to assume that the gay 
subculture is homogeneously legitimist in outlook and positive in 
its effects upon individuals' developing gay identities. Within 
the subculture, some groups may espouse the belief that 
homosexuality is fully legitimate, i. e., both in public and in 
private. If the person accepts this concept, inner tension is said 
to be created because of incongruency between how the person 
regards the self and how other (nonsubcultural) people are believed 
to regard the person. Attempts to resolve this incongruency lead 
the person to stage five. 
Other groups may offer only a partial legitimisation and may 
believe that homosexuality is only valid as a private identity 
which should not be displayed before the rest of society. The 
adoption of such a belief involves the use of the strategies of 
passing, limited contact with heterosexuals and/or selective 
disclosure. By this stage, a certain adeptness at passing may have 
developed and it may have become an unproblematic, routine means 
of compartmentalising the homosexual aspects of one's life and of 
reducing the likelihood of being confronted by the reactions of 
heterosexuals. Living and/or employment arrangements may be 
altered in order to limit contact with those who might most 
heighten the incongruency between self-perceptions and others' 
perceptions of self. While passing and limitation of heterosexual 
contact serve to prevent an increase in incongruency, selective 
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disclosure of sexual preference reduces it. If these strategies 
are successful, incongruency reaches manageable proportions and 
identity foreclosure is said to occur. With low incongruency, a 
positively evaluated identity, stability in one's interpersonal 
environment and an ability to adapt in both the gay and 
heterosexual worlds, many homosexuals find this to be a 
satisfactory way of life. If the strategies prove unsuccessful, 
the individual may attempt to modify them or to reject the notion 
of partial legitimisation in favour of that of full legitimisation: 
the consequent increased incongruency in the latter case moves the 
person to stage five. 
The centrality in the identity tolerance and identity acceptance 
stages of subcultural involvement renders them close in meaning to 
the general conception of "coming out". The issue of the 
importance of subcultural involvement in the gay identity formation 
process is one of the few on which there appears to be consensus. 
Erikson himself can be regarded as upholding the vital role of a 
supportive culture in his insistence that identity formation 
resides in "in the core of the individual and yet also in the core 
of his communal culture" (1968, p22). Sophie (1987) regards 
subcultural involvement as "crucial" in helping individuals 
attribute a positive evaluation to a gay identity. She alone 
considers the paradox which is created for the lesbian women whom 
she studied by their holding negative evaluations of homosexuality 
and of lesbian women while requiring contact and interaction with 
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lesbian women in order to change these evaluations. For many of 
her subjects, the problems created by this paradox were overcome 
as they encountered groups of lesbian women by chance. 
Both Plummer (1975) and Troiden (1977) place the initiation of 
subcultural involvement in a stage which they term "coming out". 
Plummer - who provides a succinct history of the development of the 
gay subculture in a later work (Plummer, 1984) - regards 
interaction with other homosexuals as being fruitful in three ways 
for identity development: it presents homosexuality as a 
meaningful, rewarding and legitimate alternative lifestyle; it 
permits the negation of the homosexual stereotype and allows the 
individual to see that it is possible to be homosexual and well- 
adjusted, a good person and a respectable member of the community; 
and it neutralises feelings of guilt concerning a homosexual 
identity, allows the rebuilding of identity and hence facilitates 
the arrival at a favourable self-conception. To these benefits, 
Weinberg and Williams (1974) add that social involvement can reduce 
any fear that a person may have about labelling himself as 
gay/homosexual and disclosing his sexual preference to others.. 
Through interaction with other gay men, the individual can learn 
that the adoption of an openly gay identity is possible and 
manageable, that all heterosexuals will not reject the person, and 
that a supportive social environment exists to cushion the blow if 
or when rejection is encountered. Weinberq and Williams also 
report that among their respondents a high degree of subcultural 
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involvement was associated with a greater likelihood of having or 
having had an exclusive relationship with another man, a large 
number of sexual partners, and a high degree of gay acculturation, 
commitment to a gay identity and psychological well-being. An 
interesting analogy is drawn by Clark (1987), who regards 
involvement in the gay subculture as fulfilling for. the gay person 
the role played by the family for the person who belongs to a 
racial minority, i. e., it counters isolation and provides support, 
shared values, role models and a feeling of being "at home". In 
short, the gay subculture may be regarded as aiding the individual 
in the development of strategies to manage the social and 
psychological demands that are made by gay identity formation, and 
as counteracting some of the social mechanisms that conspire to 
obstruct the development of a gay identity. 
Among Troiden's group of gay men, 52% reported that they first 
became involved in the homosexual subculture around the time they 
designated themselves as homosexual (which they did at a mean age 
of 21.3 years) and a further 41% became involved within six months 
of doing so. Half of Dank's (1971) respondents reported the same 
contemporaneity of events. Indeed, 33% of Troiden's cohort 
attributed their self-designation as homosexual to the fact that 
they became involved with other gay men socially. Eighty seven per 
cent of the group reported that their attitudes towards themselves 
and towards homosexuality changed approximately one year after 
self-designation (and hence between six and 12 months after initial 
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subcultural involvement). They described an awareness of a 
positive, firmer sense of identity, higher levels of happiness and 
self-acceptance, and a reduction in guilt or anxiety about their 
sexual preference. Homosexuality came to be viewed as a violation 
of the sexual norm rather than as a pathological manifestation: 
their "biased socialization" was overcome and the meaning of the 
cognitive category of "homosexual" was transformed for them. The 
vast majority of respondents attributed these changes to their 
exposure to the gay world, a causative connection also treated by 
Dank (1971) and Warren (1974). 
Weinberg (1976) investigated the means by which people make contact 
with the subculture. Seventeen men out of 28 made the initial move 
themselves; for most of the remainder, initial contact was 
"accidental", e. g., they discovered gay relatives who introduced 
them to other gay people. Self-initiated involvement may entail 
the cultivation of friendships with reputed homosexuals who can 
then provide a point of entry to the subculture; seeking out places 
which gay men are known to frequent; engaging in sexual relations 
with other gay men which may lead to greater social involvement; 
or contacting gay organisations. The aim of these strategies was 
identified as an attempt to gain social support, reassurance that 
those involved in the formation of a gay identity were acceptable 
people, or information about various aspects of the gay world. 
However, once entry had been gained to the subculture, initial 
conversations focussed not on these concerns but centred around 
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casual "small talk": only much later did serious conversations 
arise. Weinberg also describes what he terms the "gay coach" 
situation, where a young man who is only beginning to deal with his 
homosexuality forms a social relationship with an older man who is 
more committed to and comfortable in his identity. The older man 
shares his experiences and feelings about being gay and acts partly 
as an advisor to and partly as a role model for the younger man. 
A number of Crites' (1976) respondents described such relationships 
too. This type of relationship is not exclusive to the realm of 
gay identity formation. In their consideration of the tasks 
involved in adult development, Levinson et al. (1978) highlight the 
importance of forming mentor relationships in early adulthood. 
Mentors may act as exemplars and role models for the young adult; 
may provide counsel and moral support in times of stress; and may 
facilitate the realisation of what Levinson et al. term "The 
Dream". "The Dream" refers to "a vague sense of self-in-adult- 
world. It has the quality of a vision, an imagined possibility 
that generates excitement and vitality (Levinson et al., 1978, p 
91). In this case, the relevant aspect of the young person's Dream 
which the gay coach may help facilitate is the attainment of a 
positively-evaluated gay identity. The prevalence and effects of 
this gay coach or mentor relationship will be explicitly examined 
in the present study. 
Some of Weinberg's group did not appear to be receptive to the 
positive meanings accorded to homosexuality in the subculture and 
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their feelings of shame and guilt about being homosexual were not 
assuaged, in one case because many of the values expressed by 
members of the subculture were antithetical to those with which he 
was raised, which were strongly negative with regard to sex in 
general and homosexuality in particular. The possible clash of 
personal or internalised parental values with those observed in the 
subculture is also examined in the present study. 
Sustained contact with other gay men was reported by Weinberg's 
respondents to have played a major role in changing the meanings 
which they attributed to their feelings, fantasies and behaviours 
in a more positive direction. It also permitted the forging of a 
link between "doing" and "being", i. e., between same-sex sexual 
contact and a homosexual self-image or identity: the implications 
of behaviour for identity were accepted, so that the maintenance 
of something other than a homosexual identity while engaging in 
same-sex sexual activity or experiencing homoerotic thoughts and 
feelings was no longer tenable. The ways in which subcultural 
involvement altered the meanings which Weinberg's group attached 
to homosexuals and homosexuality can be observed from the pre- and 
post-involvement conceptions of these categories. Sustained 
contact with subculture members added an emotional dimension to 
what constituted homosexuality for some men. It also led to half 
the group identifying positive differences between gay and 
heterosexual men, e. g., gay men were described as more accepting 
of and sensitive to others, more creative, more sincere, mentally 
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and emotionally superior, more open about sex, less racist and less 
sexist than heterosexual men. As regards changes in identity, 17 
of the 23 men who were socially involved in the subculture when 
they labelled themselves as homosexual reported that social 
involvement with other gay people helped them to solidify a 
homosexual self-identity in the same ways that Troiden's group 
described, i. e., it provided a setting in which they felt more 
comfortable, accepted and happier than they ever felt among 
heterosexuals; provided the social support which enabled them to 
disclose their sexual preference to heterosexuals; and presented 
them with positive images of gay men, with a sense of pride in 
their gay identity, and with the realisation that there existed 
other gay people with similar life histories and experiences as 
themselves which countered the sense of difference and isolation 
they had experienced while growing up. Some respondents who 
experienced positive changes in feelings about the self during the 
gay identity formation process attributed this to the support of 
gay people and/or gay organisations and the development of identity 
pride consequent upon this. On the other hand, a lack of social 
contact with other gay people resulted in few positive definitions 
featuring in the person's conceptions of homosexuality, which meant 
that if self-labelling as homosexual occurred, it proved 
distressing and the label was unwillingly accepted. 
The themes outlined concerning the effects of subcultural 
involvement are repeated in other models of gay identity formation, 
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rendering it one of the few near-universal stages, but it is the 
positioning of this occurrence which is interesting. Minton and 
McDonald (1984) place it in their sub-stage of "Acceptance and 
Commitment to a Homosexual Identity", which constitutes part of 
their third "Universalistic Stage" in which societal norms are 
critically evaluated. They conclude that the opportunity to 
interact with other homosexuals and to learn more about 
homosexuality is closely linked to the acceptance of a positive 
homosexual self-image. Coleman (1982) places initial subcultural 
contact in his third stage of "Exploration", which follows coming 
out, as he defines coming out principally in terms of the 
disclosure to others of one's sexual preference. He omits the 
major repercussions for identity of subcultural involvement which 
other studies outline and instead concentrates upon the sexual 
exploration which is afforded by involvement in the gay community. 
The surge of interest in and actual sexual activity which may occur 
at this stage and which may be problematic if the subcultural 
initiate views it as shameful, sinful or indicative of promiscuity, 
is regarded by Coleman as a necessary retracing of the 
developmental steps of adolescence - if the individual is not still 
negotiating adolescence in actuality - which because of his having 
been embedded within a heterosexual social milieu at the time, he 
had been unable to negotiate properly. Positive aspects of social 
and sexual subcultural experimentation are also noted, e. g., the 
development of interpersonal skills and of a sense of personal 
attractiveness and competence. 
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Additional issues are implicated by Lewis (1984) in relation to 
involvement with the lesbian community. The same need for a 
support group which can accept and validate a lesbian identity and 
encourage a positive self-conception is postulated, as in models 
of male gay identity formation. But entrance into the lesbian 
community may present a woman with certain choices with regard to 
separatism, i. e., the attempt to minimise or avoid all contact with 
men, and often with heterosexual women, in order to escape the 
oppressiveness of patriarchal western culture: such an ideology 
exists as a lifestyle option in the lesbian community but has no 
direct correlate in the male gay community. The benefits offered 
by separatism include the opportunity for lesbians to discover new 
avenues of self-definition and new strengths and skills in 
themselves which they formerly defined as male and therefore 
unavailable to them. Separatism also permits a woman to express 
any anger which she might harbour towards men and allows the 
consideration of how she might wish to relate to men in the future. 
With these advantages, Lewis regards separatism as an extremely 
healthy and active way for women to explore their strengths, 
attitudes and relationships, but warns against its adoption as a 
permanent lifestyle because of the possibility of a woman becoming 
permanently reactive to men and never resolving emotional problems 
and issues fully. In reiterating the role of the subculture as a 
source of support, assistance and companionship, Lewis goes beyond 
the concepts used by other theorists and describes the small 
community of lesbian friends which a lesbian woman may draw around 
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herself as a "chosen family", implying that if support and 
acceptance are not found among her family of origin, a woman may 
replace them in her hierarchy of significant others with friends 
of her own choosing who will provide such support. The extent to 
which such a strategy could be ultimately successful would 
certainly be doubted in the context of psychoanalytic theory: the 
family of choice may be able to assume some of the nurturing and 
supportive role that may not be fulfilled by the family of origin, 
but it is the latter who first played this role and whose favour 
was most sought at crucial times in development. It may be 
hypothesised then that the most satisfying support in later life 
would be that of the family of origin and that when this is not 
forthcoming any attempt to replace it with support from another 
source would not be fully effective. Lewis also remarks on the 
disadvantages of a lack of subcultural contact and support in the 
context of the isolation and consequent low self-esteem which this 
may engender. Isolation from the subculture may also lead to 
difficulties and over-dependence in relationships as, without 
access to a larger lesbian community, two women may remain in a 
problematic relationship simply out of the fear that they may never 
meet another lesbian. 
One further major theme treated by several studies is that of 
labelling oneself as homosexual. The occurrence of this in Cass's 
model may be traced to stages three and four where the individual 
recognises, tolerates and then comes to accept the fact that he is 
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homosexual. The most thorough treatment of the labelling 
perspective is provided by Weinberg (1976) who examines the factors 
which led to his respondents labelling themselves as homosexual and 
the consequences of such self-labelling. In the order of the 
frequency with which they were cited, the factors identified as 
having created a sense of certainty that respondents were 
homosexual were the pleasure and sense of appropriateness which 
accompanied same-sex sexual contact; a lack of interest in or 
sexual failure with women; contact with other gay people; the 
experience of emotional, love feelings for another man; I involvement 
in gay organisations and the development of identity pride; and the 
experience of sexual fantasies about other men. Other respondents 
described a "decision-making", "self-admission", "acceptance" or 
"self-realization" process as having been more important than any 
factor or combination of factors in their self-labelling as 
homosexual. This serves as a reminder that gay identity formation 
is essentially a dynamic process and any attempt to trace isolated 
dimensions of it must recognise that the pictures uncovered are 
akin to "freeze-frames" in the gay identity formation narrative, 
i. e., they depict present reconstructions of what occurred at 
chosen points in the process. Although half of Weinberg's 
respondents viewed the self-labelling process as a decision or 
self-admission, others regarded it as a realisation that their 
feelings, attractions or behaviour had a homosexual meaning, or as 
a gradual, growing awareness that they were homosexual, so 
individual differences in the time scale and in the experience of 
143 
the processual nature of gay identity formation were uncovered in 
their narratives. 
Such was the degree of certainty regarding the appropriateness of 
the homosexual label, most respondents reported that they felt no 
need to investigate further the nature of their sexual preference. 
Of those who sought to verify it, the avenues chosen were 
engagement in same-sex sexual activity, the seeking of a love 
relationship with another man, or opposite-sex sexual activity, the 
aim of the lastmentioned being to test the exclusivity of one's 
sexual feelings. With the major part of their identity 
experimentation at an end, the vast majority of respondents turned 
to the homosexual subculture either for social reasons, for sexual 
reasons or for both. Some also reported that they decreased their 
social involvement with heterosexuals, mirroring the limitation of 
contact strategy designed to minimise confrontation with 
heterosexuals, which Cass outlines in the identity acceptance stage 
of her model, and reflecting to a lesser extent the separatist 
strategy which Lewis highlights in relation to lesbian identity 
formation. The effects of the subculture upon the self-conceptions 
of Weinberg's men have already been delineated, i. e., it provided 
a setting in which they felt comfortable and accepted; it furnished 
role models for them; it allowed them to see that others had 
similar biographies to themselves and to develop a sense of pride 
in their identity. By the time of self-labelling, only eight of 
the 30 men expressed unhappiness or ambivalent feelings about their 
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homosexuality: the predominant feeling was instead one of relief 
that they had finally acknowledged their homosexuality and were 
dealing with it. This contrasts with the feelings of fear, 
anxiety, guilt, repulsion, and frustration reported by subjects 
when they first began to think that they might be homosexual. 
Weinberg stresses the importance of a clear, firm, secure identity 
in terms of how it simplifies one's life. He asserts that "(t)o 
decide, finally, what one 'really' is, is a decision 
that ...... defines one's relevances and priorities.... (and).... 
provides one with criteria for meeting and resolving all sorts of 
situations" (p 505). In this context, one can understand the 
relief and happiness at self-labelling which was reported by most 
respondents. Yet, the adoption of the homosexual label did not 
prove an effective panacea for all. For some of the eight men who 
reported differing degrees of ambivalence in their feelings after 
self-labelling, this disappeared after positive subcultural 
experiences, but for others these feelings persisted. The major 
cause of this ambivalence was pinpointed as being an awareness of 
negative societal attitudes towards homosexuals and homosexuality, 
exemplifying yet again how effective this can be in impeding gay 
identity formation. The concomitants of ambivalent feelings after 
self-labelling were summarised as an isolated, unhappy, troubled 
and confused adolescence and young adulthood. "Ambivalent men" 
suspected they were homosexual at a lower mean age than "non- 
ambivalent men" (13.9 years as opposed to 16.1 years), and were 
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more likely to have had their first same-sex sexual experience 
after they first suspected they were homosexual. 
Another perspective which Weinberg takes on the self-labelling 
issue is the identity configurations produced by his respondents 
in terms of the order in which they first suspected that they were 
homosexual (S), first labelled themselves as such (L), and first 
engaged in same-sex sexual activity (E). Twenty eight of his 30 
men first engaged in same-sex sexual activity before self-labelling 
(EL), while the most common subpattern within this over-arching 
configuration was for men to have sexual contact with other males, 
suspect they might be homosexual, and then label themselves as such 
(ESL, n=17). The same milestone events in gay identity formation 
were examined by Coyle (1988) in Britain, Dank (1971) and Kooden 
et al. (1979) in the USA, and McDonald (1982) in Canada. In terms 
of the average age at which each event occurred, Kooden et al. and 
McDonald found the SEL sequence to be most common; Dank found that 
suspecting and engaging occurred at approximately the same time and 
before labelling; in terms of the sequence most frequently reported 
by respondents, Coyle reported that the SLE configuration was most 
common and that just as many of his respondents labelled before 
engaging as engaged before labelling. This lastmentioned 
"suspect/label before engaging" sequence is said to be the most 
common overall pattern among lesbian women (Browning, 1987). 
Differences in results may be accounted for by cultural differences 
concerning mores and attributions about same-sex sexual activity 
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in Britain and North America. If such sexual activity were more 
accepted and open to non-homosexual interpretations among the North 
American groups than among the British group, a greater incidence 
of same-sex sexual activity in adolescence or earlier first same- 
sex sexual experiences may be observed among the North Americans: 
hence, they would exhibit the general EL configuration with greater 
frequency than would the British. 
After reviewing his respondents' experiences of self-labelling, 
Weinberg summarises them by outlining four courses of labelling: 
" (f)irst, one can label oneself because one ' wants to' , accept this 
label, and be happy with it. Second, one can label oneself in this 
way because one does not perceive any other choice, accept the 
label, and become adjusted to it and happy with it. Third, one can 
label oneself as a homosexual, become resigned to accepting it 
because one sees no other alternative, and remain unhappy with it. 
Fourth, one may label oneself as a homosexual reluctantly and 
constantly seek to reject the label" (p 527). 
Other approaches to the labelling question include examinations of 
the factors which influence the speed of gay identity formation. 
Troiden (1980) examines the mean ages at which his respondents 
encountered five central events of the gay identity formation 
process (including self-labelling) along several dimensions. His 
analysis suggests that relative youth, i. e., being between 20 and 
25 years old; little or no high school heterosexual activity 
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involving more than kissing; frequent episodes of homosexual 
behaviour in the high school years; relatively low levels of 
education; and being in certain occupational categories, e. g., 
students, facilitated the acquisition of a gay identity. The age 
dimension is held to be an influential facilitating factor by Dank 
(1971), who hypothesised that in contemporary society the freer 
circulation of information on homosexuals and homosexuality which 
challenges negative societal stereotypes should permit males to 
identify the homosexual component in their feelings more easily 
nowadays than in the past, thus permitting self-definition as 
homosexual to occur at earlier ages. Greater exposure to images 
of homosexuality in the media may alert young people to the 
existence of the homosexual category at earlier ages than in 
previous years and hence they may be provided with a cognitive 
framework with which to structure their sexual feelings early on. 
Kimmel (1978) notes that "a young person dealing with being gay in 
the 1970s has an entirely different set of historical-cultural 
conditions to ease the development of a positive gay identity from 
that of a person who grew up in the early 1900s" (p 124). The 
aspect of the Dank hypothesis that is open to contention is his 
belief that information on homosexuals and homosexuality which 
challenges existing negative stereotypes is freely available. 
Media presentations of gay men have never been highly favourable 
even before the advent of AIDS, which has led to much of today's 
coverage of gay men being more negative in tone, content and 
subtext than in the pre-AIDS decade (Armstrong, 1984-85; Watney, 
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1987). Yet, it may be posited that the manner of presentation is 
not as important as the fact of presentation per se, as it allows 
the person who is working through their sexuality to interpret 
their experiences in terms of a given homosexual category and 
provides them with a label with which to experiment (Lofland, 
1969). Dank found support for his hypothesis in that those who 
were under 30 years old in the group of gay men which he studied 
defined themselves as homosexual at a mean age of 17.2 years, while 
for those who were 30 or above, the same event occurred at a mean 
age of 21.4 years. Among Troiden's (1977) group, the corresponding 
mean ages were 20.7 and 22.6 years respectively. Troiden also 
found that several of the other milestone events which he examined, 
e. g., the age at which one's feelings are first labelled as gay 
and the age at which first love relationships are initiated, also 
occur at earlier ages among young age groups. McDonald (1982) 
likewise concluded that younger respondents are arriving at 
homosexual self-definitions and involving themselves in gay 
relationships earlier than in the past, but Coyle (1988) with a 
British group found no support for the Dank hypothesis. 
One final comment on the content of Cass's stages three and four 
concerns her use of the concept of "homosexual others" and the 
consequences for identity of contact with them. During pilot 
research for the present study, one respondent when asked about the 
disadvantages of the gay subculture pointed out that the concept 
of "a gay subculture" was itself a disadvantage in that it masked 
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the heterogeneity of the many and various groupings which comprise 
this subculture: he suggested that reference to "gay subcultures" 
might be more correct (cf. Humphreys and Miller, 1980, for an 
exposition of the diversity of gay "scenes" and subcultures), a 
point noted by Weinberg and Williams (1974), who recognised a 
variety of gay communities divided along the lines of occupational 
status. Cass recognises this heterogeneity in her positing in 
stage four of two subcultural groupings differentiated on the basis 
of their view of the legitimacy of homosexuality in the private and 
public realms. As has been noted, this represents an advance on 
the majority of studies which create the impression of subcultural 
homogeneity. However, Cass fails to consider the possibility of 
subcultural groups which do not regard homosexuality as either a 
valid public or private identity and who espouse a view of 
homosexuality as what Kitzinger (1987) termed a "sorry state" and 
whose community is based on mutual consolation. This construction 
of homosexuality, because of its historical roots, is often 
attributed to older (i. e., over the age of 50) homosexuals 
(Plummer, 1981). However, there is no reason why, if such a 
grouping predominated in an isolated subculture, this "sorry state" 
conception of homosexuality should not be transmitted to 
subcultural initiates, with the expected negative consequences for 
gay identity development. The internalisation of such an outlook 
may constitute a further developmental option in stage four, 
although its most probable outcome would be a temporary or 
permanent halt in identity development. Such an outcome would 
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instantiate a subcultural hindrance to gay identity formation, to 
add to the cultural or societal constraints highlighted previously. 
The same criticism of an insufficiently rigorous application of a 
valid concept may be made concerning her recognition of the 
possibility of subcultural involvement which is experienced 
negatively. Some studies imply that contact with homosexual others 
is the catalyst which inevitably imparts a positive evaluation to 
a person's gay identity, e. g., Coleman (1982). While avoiding this 
approach, Cass still presumes in stage four that increased contact 
with other homosexuals permits the individual to encounter 
validating accounts of homosexuality. It is not the quantity of 
contact that is important but rather its quality in terms of the 
views of homosexuality espoused by those with whom the individual 
interacts. one may increase contact with those who hold "sorry 
state" views in order to avail oneself of consolatory group support 
but, in the absence of more positive attitudes, no legitimating 
accounts of homosexuality can be internalised. 
2.7 Cass's Fifth Stage: "Identity Pride", Relationships and 
Disclosure 
Stage five of Cass's model commences with the person being aware 
of the incongruency between his own positively evaluated homosexual 
sense of self and society's negative views of homosexuality. This 
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incongruency is resolved by the use of strategies which decrease 
the importance of heterosexuals and increase the importance of 
homosexuals in the person's interpersonal matrix, which permits the 
individual to accord less weight to how heterosexuals perceive him 
and more weight to homosexuals' perceptions. The implementation 
of these strategies involves the division of the person's world 
into homosexuals and heterosexuals, i. e., into significant and 
insignificant people. A sense of group identity develops with 
commitment to the gay subculture, which is characterised by the 
individual immersing himself in the subculture and by the evolution 
of a sense of "gay pride". It is the development of this sense of 
"identity pride" which constitutes the major task of this stage and 
which gives it its name. Heterosexual values, e. g., marriage, are 
rejected as promoting the concept of homosexual inferiority, and 
an alternative set of values is drawn from the subculture. At this 
stage, a gay identity is not only accepted but is preferred to a 
heterosexual one. 
Although these strategies render incongruency manageable, the 
person finds himself forced to adhere to a system based on 
heterosexual values in everyday life which leads to an anger born 
of frustration and alienation. This anger, together with identity 
pride, makes of the person an "activist", intent on confronting 
established institutions as the only means of validating the 
concept of homosexuality as a positive entity. By raising further 
the significance of the gay subculture in the person's 
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interpersonal matrix, activism may reduce incongruency to a 
manageable level. 
However, the proposal that such activism may be an important part 
of gay identity formation may be specific to the milieu in which 
Cass's model was formulated. It could be claimed that gay men are 
no longer as eager as they were in former years to challenge either 
on an individual level or on a collective level those social 
institutions which they believe perpetuate the heterosexual values 
that serve to oppress them. Certainly, it has been said that gay 
men who frequent the gay social scene today are "out for 
entertainment, sex and companionship" and little more (Milligan, 
1989, p 43). The battles which made possible the level of 
organisation that exists in the gay community today and which 
brought gay men recognition if not wholehearted acceptance as a 
minority group were fought in the 1970s. With these attainments, 
gay political activism geared towards gaining social acceptance or 
civil rights or effecting social change appeared to diminish, 
perhaps because in the 1980s the efforts of activists were 
channelled into the HIV/AIDS field, promoting understanding of the 
syndrome among gay men in particular and the public in general and 
lobbying for adequate treatment and facilities for those affected 
by HIV, many of whom are gay men. Although this view may represent 
a reconstruction of the past, fabricated from the reminiscences of 
writers on the events of that period, e. g., Weeks (1987b), it could 
still be argued that today, activism may be less important in gay 
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identity formation that it once was but this is not to say that it 
no longer plays a part, even if that part is only a temporary 
reaction among subcultural initiates, for example, who, enamoured 
with the sense of having found answers to the questions of "who am 
I? " and "how I fit into the adult world" as their identities begin 
to cohere and with a growing awareness that a gay identity may 
possibly provide a meaningful life framework, reject 
heterosexuality and all its trappings and institutions, in much the 
same way that a religious convert may in the post-conversion period 
regard their denomination as all good and exalt it above all 
others. 
In Cass's model, the major offshoot of a confrontational approach 
is the abandonment of strategies which were previously used to 
conceal a gay identity. When the person rejects established 
institutions, he becomes generally unconcerned with how 
heterosexuals perceive him, which leaves him free to choose 
disclosure as a strategy for coping with incongruency. As Goffman 
(1963) points out, disclosure alters the identity tasks for the 
person who is coping with a stigmatised identity: the individual 
ceases to be concerned with the management of potentially 
discrediting information and instead becomes involved in the 
management of potentially uncomfortable social situations. While 
bringing public identity into line with private identity and 
continually affirming one's gay identity, the disclosure of sexual 
preference may also heighten incongruency, an outcome which may 
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cause the person to opt for a strategy of selective disclosure. 
If disclosure is perceived as personally threatening by the 
individual, e. g., in that it may lead to the loss of one's job, the 
disparity between what one would like to do and what one is 
constrained to do may act as a source of conflict. This may be 
alleviated by altering one's life situation, e. g., by changing 
one's job or by the adoption of the compromise strategy of 
nonconcealment rather than disclosure. 
. The nature of the reactions elicited by disclosure have important 
implications for identity development. Reactions which are 
perceived to be negative are consistent with the person's 
expectations, based upon his perception of negative societal 
attitudes towards homosexuality. If this occurs regularly, 
identity development may be halted. However, if reactions are 
perceived to be positive, this is inconsistent with the person's 
expectations. Attempts to resolve this inconsistency lead the 
person into the sixth and final stage of Cass's model of gay 
identity formation. 
The two central issues which the Identity Pride stage raises are 
those of the development of commitment to a gay identity and of 
identity pride, which is an extension of the effects of subcultural 
involvement treated in the two previous stages, and the disclosure 
of sexual preference. Both Plummer (1975) and Troiden (1977) 
describe a post-acceptance stage in which the individual takes 
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pride in possessing a homosexual identity and also rejects 
heterosexual values. This sense of pride may be related to an 
individual's conclusion that a homosexual identity is of equal 
worth to a heterosexual identity. Troiden (1977) terms this phase 
"commitment", which he describes as the reluctance on the part of 
the individual to abandon a homosexual identity even if given the 
opportunity to do so: 91% of his respondents asserted that they 
would not wish to become heterosexual even if there were a 
foolproof method of effecting this change. The most frequently 
cited reasons for this were contentment and happiness with a 
homosexual preference, the belief that nothing would be gained by 
changing, and an expressed preference for a gay lifestyle. Such 
commitment to a homosexual identity has been found to be positively 
related to psychological well-being (Weinberg and Williams, 1974). 
Seven of Weinberg's (1976) 30 respondents, however, wished they 
were not homosexual at the time of the study; six had never 
harboured this wish, and 17 had desired a change in sexual 
preference only before they labelled themselves as gay. Plummer's 
(1975) delineation of those factors which encourage commitment to 
a homosexual identity include the ease of remaining committed to 
and the difficulty of changing familiar behavioural patterns; 
pleasure in the homosexual role and in homosexual activity; the 
secondary benefits of being gay such as a higher standard of 
living; a lack of in-group homosexual support for a decision to 
change; and the difficulty of shedding the public label of 
homosexual. 
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The development of identity pride and commitment - like subcultural 
involvement - is subsumed within Minton and McDonald's (1984) phase 
of acceptance of and commitment to a homosexual identity, which 
forms part of their broader universalistic stage. Also cited as 
a variable which increases identity commitment in this stage is the 
development of a same-sex love relationship. It is the emotional 
and identity-enhancing possibilities of relationships that Browning 
(1987) focusses upon in her treatment of lesbian women. She points 
to the potential in a same-sex love relationship for "validating 
her personhood, reinforcing that she deserves to give and receive 
love" (p 51) and to its being able to act as "a source of 
tremendous emotional support as the woman explores her goals, 
values, and relationship to the world" (ibid. ). The question of 
relationships and their effect upon identity is surprisingly 
overlooked by Cass and Weinberg. The latter really only examines 
them as a factor which facilitates self-labelling as homosexual. 
The relationship issue is however accorded a major role in the 
models of Coleman (1982), Troiden (1977) and Warren (1974). The 
lastmentioned regards the taking of a lover as representing a 
commitment to the emotional as well as the sexual aspects of a 
homosexual identity. Coleman (1982) posits a need for intimacy 
after the sexual exploration stage, as do Gagnon and Simon (1973), 
but recognises that first gay relationships may be disastrous 
because of the intensity, possessiveness and lack of trust 
involved. The individuals concerned may feel that the 
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relationships must make the struggle for a gay identity seem 
worthwhile and must be perfect: excessively high expectations are 
easily disappointed. Strain may be placed upon relationships by 
one or both partners attempting to derive all of the emotional 
support and validation needed for their gay identity development 
from it (Browning, 1987). Additionally, the relationship may 
suffer not only from the same difficulties which any heterosexual 
couple face, but also from a lack of external validation from 
family and friends who either refuse to accept the relationship or 
who have not been told about its existence (Plummer, 1981). The 
oft-quoted maxim that gay relationships do not last may become a 
self-defeating, self-fulfilling prophecy. 
The need for intimacy -a need possibly fed by years of sexual and 
emotional isolation and which has been termed "fusion" (Karpel, 
1976) or "merger" (Burch, 1982), curtailing personal autonomy - may 
engender feelings of restriction and confinement among those 
involved, which may in turn lead to an interest in sexual activity 
outside the relationship. Equally, a fear of intimacy, possibly 
arising from having been rejected by close and significant others 
following the disclosure of sexual preference, may undermine 
relationships (Clark, 1987). Initial relationships may also fail 
because, as Clark (1987) notes, the person is often first attracted 
to someone who is very different from themselves. This he 
attributes to the person's inability to value themselves at this 
point: they can only value and find attractive what is different 
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from themselves. Some may not even be able to do this if an 
unremittingly negative evaluation of homosexuality has been 
internalised and has not been challenged: the person may 
unconsciously devalue their partners as well as themselves and 
because of this may be unable to establish warm, intimate 
relationships (Hoffman, 1968). 
The failure of initial relationships may cause some individuals 
to return to the sexual exploration stage, now convinced that gay 
relationships cannot work, or to continue in a similar pattern of 
destructive relationships, or even to question whether he is really 
gay at all (Browning, 1987). Alternatively, there may be a 
realistic lowering of expectations and a recognition that 
successful relationships require mutual trust and freedom. 
Underpinned by increasing self-acceptance and by the continued 
development of a gay identity, mature and healthy relationships may 
evolve, which may in turn promote further self-acceptance, self- 
esteem and general psychological well-being. Weinberg and Williams 
(1974) found that those respondents who had more experience of 
exclusive homosexual relationships, compared with those who had 
less experience, reported more self-acceptance, stability of self- 
concept, and less depression, interpersonal awkwardness and 
loneliness. 
Coleman's (1982) treatment of the issue of relationships is notable 
in its presumption that they are based on the ideal of sexual 
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exclusivity, the infraction of which causes conflict within the 
relationships. The development of mature and healthy relationships 
may be linked to the rejection of the marriage ideal with which the 
person is likely to have been socialised (if not in one's family 
of origin then through the recognition of this as a societal ideal) 
in that the person may, independently of this, arrive at a 
conception of the type(s) of relationship which are best suited to 
his social, emotional and sexual needs. If mature relationships 
are defined in this personalised manner, monogamous relationships 
have no claim to pre-eminence over more sexually open ones, and 
both merit equal consideration in any model of gay identity 
formation which focusses upon them. The social and psychological 
implications of various types of gay relationships have been 
treated at length by Bell and Weinberg (1978) but the most usual 
angle adopted in the study of relationships in the gay identity 
literature has been the tracing of their effects as a homogeneous 
factor upon gay identity. 
In Troiden's (1977) model, the taking of a lover is placed at the 
beginning of the commitment stage and is regarded as signifying 
"the fusion of gay sexuality and emotionality into a meaningful 
whole" (p 157). The importance of this fusion for identity 
development has long been acknowledged (cf. Erikson, 1959) and 
Troiden sees it as a precondition for the development of a gay 
identity. The contention of Gagnon and Simon (1973) that gay men 
are more likely to enter into love relationships after, rather than 
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at the same time as, they label themselves as gay is borne out by 
the fact that those respondents in Troiden's study who had 
initiated one or more love relationships first did so approximately 
two and a half years after the mean age of homosexual self- 
definition. 
The relationship pattern among lesbians appears to be somewhat 
different. Lewis (1984) contends that as women are socialised to 
have and maintain relationships, sexual exploration and 
experimentation often occur within a relationship context. This 
is due also to the fundamental nature of female sexuality which may 
lead to sex outside the context of a meaningful relationship being 
difficult or unpleasant. Such a recognition of difference between 
female and male sexuality further justifies the decision to pursue 
only male gay identity formation in the present study. Like 
Coleman (1982), Lewis acknowledges the likelihood of initial 
relationships being unstable but moves beyond this by recognising 
the possibility of experimentation with different types of 
relationships at this stage, rendered necessary by a lack of 
relationship models. Relationships are also viewed as holding 
implications for the ways in which lesbian women may deal with 
their families. Anxiety about the consequences of the discovery of 
her relationship may induce a woman to distance herself from her 
family, but alternatively the support which she finds within her 
relationship may act as an impetus for her to disclose her 
lesbianism to her family. 
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This consideration dovetails neatly with the other central issue 
in Cass's stage of Identity Pride, i. e., the disclosure to others 
of one's sexual preference. Within the general disclosure 
literature the most celebrated figure is Jourard, whose examination 
of the relationship between disclosure and psychological well-being 
is most relevant to the present study. Although he rarely makes 
specific reference to the disclosure of a gay identity, the mixture 
of review and commentary which follows demonstrates that many of 
his concepts may be fruitfully applied to this area. The role of 
the disclosure of sexual preference in models and descriptions of 
gay identity formation will be treated in some detail firstly 
because it is a particularly salient issue in a number of the 
models outlined and secondly because of its potential for assuming 
an important position in terms of both the content and the 
structure of gay identity-relevant personal narratives. Unlike 
many of the quite nebulous, protracted and process-based 
experiences examined heretofore, instances of, reactions to and the 
ramifications of disclosure may be comparatively specific 
behavioural events that are contained within limited temporal 
parameters. Such qualities, it might be hypothesised, increase the 
likelihood that disclosure experiences will be recalled and 
retained in their entirety by gay men as they construct their gay 
identity formation narratives. These experiential sequences 
(disclosure-reactions-ramifications) may act as structural models 
within narratives, causing other narrative contents to be 
elaborated and organised in similar ways. Additionally, because 
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of their potential salience, disclosure experiences may act as 
focal points or perhaps as turning points within narratives around 
which accounts of other less salient experiences are organised. 
Jourard (1971) observes how social systems require their members 
to assume certain roles, the fulfilment of which is held to 
constitute "normality". In a gay identity context, the most 
pertinent role which must be adhered to is that of "the 
heterosexual", which implies a certain lifestyle and structure to 
one's relationships. These role demands may create problems for 
certain individuals if their sense of identity or the gratification 
of certain basic needs - for example in this case, the need for 
sexual, emotional and social relationships with other gay men - are 
rendered subordinate to the fulfilment of the role and the 
attainment of "normality". As the performance of a role is held 
to involve the suppression of all behaviour irrelevant to the role, 
the person who does not naturally fit the role may become estranged 
from the real nature of the self which must be suppressed. Such 
self-estrangement has been identified by Horney (1950) as lying at 
the root of neurosis. Thus the attempt by a person with same-sex 
attractions to play the role of the heterosexual and to suppress 
their feelings has major implications for the person's 
psychological well-being. Continuous tension may well result from 
the awareness that discovery of one's secret prejudices one's 
current social situation and established relationships and the 
current and future images which others hold of one (Goffman, 1963), 
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although, as has been outlined in the discussion of passing, this 
assumption has been challenged. 
The historical origin of self-disclosure has been traced by Jourard 
back to the "talking cure" of Breuer and Freud in the last century 
who discovered that hysterical symptoms disappeared when patients 
talked about their feelings. It remains "a means of ultimately 
achieving healthy personality" (Jourard, 1971, p 32) and of 
overcoming the falsity in interpersonal relationships consequent 
upon the self-alienation engendered by playing an ill-fitting role. 
For such a role player, psychological well-being is held to remain 
elusive while he/she struggles and works ceaselessly to appear to 
fit the normality-bestowing role. Only by self-disclosure may 
others come to know the person's real self, by which Jourard 
presumably means the essence that underlies all the roles a person 
plays and all the self-presentations he/she makes. By the 
affirmation of the nature of the real self in disclosure, the 
person is said to come to a fuller awareness of their real self. 
This contention may be linked to those studies which claim to have 
identified psychopathology in homosexuals (Carlson and Baxter, 
1984; Evans, 1970; Friedberg, 1975; Hart, 1978; Hooberman, 1975; 
Jacobs and Tedford, 1980; Nurius, 1983; Prytula, Weltford and De 
Monbreun, 1979; Rizzo, Fehr, McMahon and Stamps, 1981; Siegelman, 
1972; Sipova and Brzek, 1983; Skrapec and MacKenzie, 1981; Van den 
Aardweg, 1985; Weis, 1977; Weis and Dain, 1979; and Williams, 
1981), the source of which may be posited to be the constant 
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struggle to appear "normal" by conforming to the heterosexual role 
(Pinka, 1977) and the social rejection experienced by many gay men 
(Clark, 1987; Feldman, 1984). The disclosure of one's sexual 
preference should thus have the dual effect of alleviating the 
anxiety described in many such studies and solidifying a sense of 
a gay identity through the assertion to others and hence also to 
oneself that one is gay, although the extent of disclosure must be 
carefully considered, as Cozby (1973) suggests that self-disclosure 
may be curvilinearly related to psychological adjustment, in which 
case too much disclosure may have as deleterious an effect as too 
little. The benefits of disclosure are not solely confined to the 
discloser. Jourard claims that the vicarious experience of others' 
experience enables the listener to agree, disagree, compare and 
contrast his/her experiences with those of the discloser; this 
allows the listener to broaden and deepen the dimensions of his/her 
experience and sharpen his/her sense of identity. 
Jourard also examines the inhibitory effect of the male role with 
regard to disclosure. It has been consistently shown that men 
reveal less personal information about themselves to others than 
do women (Cozby, 1973; Hood and Back, 1971; Jourard, 1961; Jourard 
and Lasakow, 1958; Jourard and Richman, 1963). This unwillingness 
to be known by others is presumed to carry a constant burden of 
stress and to involve the expenditure of large amounts of energy 
in order to maintain secrecy: Jourard implicates this as a 
contributory factor in the relatively shorter male lifespan. It 
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follows that the stress and tension experienced by gay men who have 
not disclosed their sexual preference to anyone should be chronic 
both because of their maleness which is said to inhibit disclosure, 
and because of the importance of the area which they keep hidden, 
an area which is intrinsically important and important in terms of 
the consequences which might follow disclosure, and is rendered 
subjectively important by the extent to which the person is forced 
to focus on it by an acute awareness of the problems its management 
will create and of the social approbation it attracts. Moreover, 
as both Jourard (1971) and Maslow (1954) argue that significant and 
substantial self-disclosure to others is a prerequisite for the 
achievement of a healthy personality, the implications for 
psychological well-being of the non-disclosure of such a 
fundamental aspect of the person as their sexual identity are 
clear. 
Jourard also outlines the most powerful determinants of self- 
disclosure, chief among which are the identity of the person to 
whom one will disclose information and the nature of the 
relationship between the two people. Perception of the other 
person as someone who is trustworthy, of good will and perhaps 
willing to make equivalent disclosures is a major facilitating 
factor. Thus, in terms of the disclosure of sexual preference, a 
gay man may be most likely to disclose to someone who is 
significant to him and to whom he feels close in order to allow 
that relationship to proceed and possibly deepen on a more honest 
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basis than before. On the other hand, initial disclosure may be 
made to a total stranger so that the discloser may test and refine 
his disclosure procedures for the future and gauge the type of 
reactions that may be expected. Also a stranger is "trustworthy" 
to the extent that he/she does not play a role in the discloser's 
interpersonal system and so cannot betray the discloser's public 
heterosexual identity, if he maintains one. This is what is meant 
by the more conventional description of the person to whom 
disclosure is made as "trustworthy": the discloser must feel 
confident that his secret will not be imparted to those whom he 
does not feel should know. The possibilty exists, however, that 
the spreading of the secret beyond the two people involved in the 
disclosure relationship is the actual aim of the disclosure. 
Permission may be given either implicitly or explicitly for the 
person to whom disclosure is made to inform others within the 
discloser's interpersonal network of the subject of disclosure - 
in this case that the discloser is gay. Such "disclosure by proxy" 
means that the gay man does not have to endure the possibly 
traumatic procedure of disclosure repeatedly, and reduces the 
likelihood of him encountering negative reactions to the 
information that he is gay, as those who have been indirectly 
informed will probably have had the opportunity to formulate their 
ideas on the subject before their next encounter with the gay man 
and hence may be more aware of the implications for him of any 
negative reactions on their part. 
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A further aim of disclosure may be the elictation of reciprocal 
disclosure, which Jourard terms the "dyadic effect" and which he 
believes underlies ordinary social dialogue. It is because 
intimate relationships almost inevitably involve the mutual 
disclosure of secrets that Goffman (1963) regards disclosure as a 
natural consequence of being closely involved with others. If the 
person to whom disclosure is made has presented a heterosexual 
self-image before the disclosure, the discloser may hope that their 
reciprocal disclosure will reveal that they too are gay and will 
consequently relieve the discloser's isolation or provide a 
possible sexual partner. If the person to whom disclosure is made 
is known to be or is suspected of being gay, it may be hoped that 
reciprocal disclosure will additionally provide information about 
the management of a gay identity or about the gay subculture. 
There is always an aim underlying the disclosure of sexual 
preference, whether it be the gaining of support, advice or 
information or the relieving of isolation, guilt or fear. No one 
voluntarily undergoes "the terrors which attend self-disclosure" 
(Jourard, 1971, p 31) or risks the destruction of their 
interpersonal environment by the disclosure of potentially damaging 
information to significant others whose reactions are assumed but 
not known without expecting such disclosure to be in some sense 
beneficial to them. 
The possibly problematic nature of others' reactions to self- 
disclosure are also examined by Jourard. He traces these problems 
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to the expectation held in social interaction that those with whom 
we interact will appear before us in ways with which we are 
familiar and with which we can cope without strain: we exert 
pressure on people to remain as they have been. If a person's 
identity has developed so that they no longer are what they once 
professed to be - in this case, if they have decided to dispense 
with a public image of themselves as heterosexual and to disclose 
themselves as gay - they may move the location of their everyday 
life to a place where no one has experience of them in their former 
role of heterosexual or, more commonly, because of constraints on 
their mobility, they may attempt to change the ideas which others 
hold about them so that they encompass their identity development. 
This is not an easy task, as people may feel threatened by change 
of any sort. As Weinberg (1976) observes, "people who are close 
to one have a kind of 'stake' or vested interest in the 'picture' 
which they have developed of the person ....... (h)ow we 
behave 
toward the person, the understandings we build up with him 
concerning mutual expectations, etc., are all based on what we 
conceive him to be. If the image is challenged or destroyed, it 
is not merely the image that is impaired or rendered internally 
dissonant; our whole relationship to him, and even our 
relationships to others ....... are thrown 
into confusion" (pp 429- 
430). This is multiplied if others are asked to sanction the 
change involved in someone adopting a socially devalued identity. 
To accept such change may also threaten their conceptions of sexual 
normality, decency and masculinity and they may attempt to 
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invalidate new ways of being that are disclosed by someone whom 
they have known for a long time. Some of the men in Weinberg's 
study reported that their friends refused to believe that they were 
homosexual "because they had built up a particular perception of, 
and relationship to, the men which would have been destroyed if 
they had accepted this information as being true" (p 430). 
Disclosure involves change both in the world of the discloser and 
in the worlds of those to whom disclosure is made. If the latter 
are unwilling or unable to change, the discloser may attempt to 
revert to his past identity which, although very difficult in the 
disclosure of a gay identity, may be possible if the disclosure was 
provisional or qualified: instances of this are cited by Weinberg 
(1976). Alternatively, the significance of the opinions of the 
rejecting others may be devalued, as outlined in Cass's Identity 
Acceptance and Identity Pride stages and others may be sought who 
will accept the disclosure of a gay identity. 
Among the studies of gay identity formation which have been 
emphasised so far, the most thorough treatment of the issues 
surrounding the disclosure of sexual preference has been undertaken 
by Weinberg (1976), although he does not directly acknowledge the 
general disclosure literature. His contribution will be examined 
in detail here because of the degree to which it is relevant to the 
examination of the disclosure of sexual preference in the present 
study. Weinberg identifies the period during which disclosure of 
sexual preference to heterosexuals most commonly occurs as being 
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after self-labelling as homosexual. The pre-disclosure stage is 
characterised by a fear of rejection combined with a fear that 
self-disclosure will solidify for the gay man a negatively 
evaluated identity which he is not yet ready to accept and will 
make it impossible to alter that identity should he choose to do 
so at some time in the future, as a declared homosexual identity - 
like other deviant public identities such as "the alcoholic" - is 
difficult to recant. Weinberg and Williams (1974) suggest that the 
origin of apprehension about disclosure is located in the 
depictions of the homosexual in literature, the mass media and 
scientific publications in which it is implied that disclosure is 
accompanied by ridicule, censure and violence; and in acquaintance 
with the "sad tales" of other homosexuals which often overdramatise 
the disclosure experience, thereby, incidentally, underlining its 
importance within their gay identity formation narratives. 
Qualified disclosures were employed by Weinberg's respondents not 
only to allow the possibility of a later withdrawal of the 
homosexual identity but also, in conjunction with gradual or 
indirect disclosures, to mitigate the impact of the disclosure on 
others. What Goffman (1963) terms "disclosure etiquette" was 
employed, involving the use of various techniques of gradual or 
qualified disclosure, e. g., referring to homosexual "tendencies" 
or "attractions" rather than labelling oneself as homosexual, or 
completely omitting the terms "gay" and "homosexual" from the 
disclosure. The disclosure techniques which an individual adopts 
are regarded as being open to change, depending upon the degree to 
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which he accepts and is comfortable with his gay identity, the 
nature of the disclosure audience and his estimation of likely 
reactions. Thus, such techniques are said to vary both across and 
within individuals, but their shared aim is the maintenance of 
control over the manner and content of the disclosure of sexual 
identity and the possible reactions to it. 
In a consideration of those people who were chosen as initial 
objects of disclosure, Weinberg reported that many respondents 
first selected those whom they knew to have had the same sort of 
sexual experiences as themselves, or those whom they knew or 
suspected to be homosexual, although the support which they hoped 
for or expected from these people was not always forthcoming. 
Those heterosexuals to whom disclosure was subsequently made were 
usually close friends of the discloser, although room-mates, 
counsellors, girlfriends or financees and fellow workers were also 
mentioned. Parents, siblings and other relatives were less likely 
to have been told. At the time of the interview, seven men had 
told one parent, 12 had told both, and 11 had not told either 
parent, although five of the latter group believed that their 
parents knew that they were homosexual: the same differentiation 
between family members who knew that the person was gay and those 
that had actually been told was recognised by respondents 
participating in Project SIGMA, a study of gay men and AIDS, which 
included a number of questions on the disclosure of gay identity 
(Hunt, 1989). Just as interesting as an examination of those who 
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have been told is a consideration of those who have not: this 
category included friends with whom contact was no longer 
maintained, employers, fellow workers and clergymen. Among the 
reasons cited for non-disclosure to these people were a belief that 
they could not accept or cope with the person's homosexuality, 
based, for example, on their reactions to other sorts of 
"deviance"; a feeling that the disclosers could not have coped with 
the possible negative reactions of or rejection by these people; 
and a belief that their relationships with these people were not 
sufficiently close as to merit disclosure or that disclosure would 
have served no purpose. Very few had not been selective in the 
disclosure of their sexual preference. In accordance with 
Goffman's (1963) conceptions of the management of stigmatised 
identity, most were said to have divided their world into those who 
knew about them and those who didn't, but perhaps a finer 
triptychical division - in line with the tell/know distinction - 
might involve those who have been told, those who are thought to 
know but who have not been told, and those who do not know. 
The most common theme in responses to the question of why 
disclosure was made was a reported feeling of closeness to those 
told. Mention was also made of a desire to be honest with those 
to whom one feels close and a weariness of having to deceive others 
about one's activities (also reported by Lee's (1977) subjects): 
the men felt that acceptance by others was worthless if it was 
based on a presentation of the self which denied or concealed 
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essential parts of the self. This stage is described by Goffman 
(1963) as the "final, mature, well-adjusted one" in the management 
of a stigmatised identity. It was further hoped that disclosure 
would relieve social isolation and the tension generated by the 
necessity of controlling potentially stigmatising information about 
the self, and would provide the disclosers with a source of 
understanding and support. Only in a minority of cases was 
disclosure precipitated by a crisis situation, e. g., by the 
desperate need for positive reactions following an extremely 
negative reaction to an initial disclosure. From an analysis of 
the responses of their subjects, Steinman and Maclean (1975) 
enumerate various reasons for disclosure. More than a quarter were 
classified as political reasons, e. g., in order to participate in 
a gay march, to work for a gay group, or to confront those with 
anti-gay attitudes, and an equal proportion concerned "self- 
consideration", e. g., in order to enlist help in dealing with being 
gay, or because the individual was tired of having to lie. One 
fifth of responses focussed on sexual concerns, e. g., individuals 
disclosed because they wished to avert opposite-sex interest in 
them, or because they were sexually attracted to the person to whom 
they disclosed or because they wanted to be able to talk freely 
about a male lover. 
As regards the nature of the disclosure process, Weinberg's data 
suggest that the initial decision to disclose sexual preference 
generally involves much thought, debate and anxiety. There were 
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only a few instances of disclosure occurring without careful prior 
consideration of the possible implications and ramifications, and 
these tended to take place in the context of an intense emotional 
crisis, for example, in the course of a more general bitter 
argument. Woodman and Lenna (1980) note that the disclosure of a 
gay identity is sometimes made in order to punish people who have 
somehow inflicted pain in the past. Another crisis which sometimes 
precipitated disclosure was the death of a parent (Steinman and 
Maclean, 1975), chosen as an opportune moment to disclose to the 
surviving parent possibly because at such a time family members may 
be particularly open and tender in their feelings for each other 
or because, by embedding the disclosure in the context of the 
greatest possible familial crisis, its negative connotations are 
relativised and a muted response is likely. More usually, the 
method of disclosure was planned well in advance and was determined 
by an estimation of the probable responses which disclosure would 
elicit. The most common technique reported in Steinman and 
Maclean's (1975) study was explicit verbal disclosure, used by more 
than a third of respondents. Considerably smaller proportions 
employed implicit verbal (e. g., dropping hints), explicit non- 
verbal (e. g., showing physical affection for a male lover in 
public) or implicit non-verbal (e. g., associating with known 
homosexuals) techniques. Among Weinberg's respondents, methods 
tended to alter as more people were told: disclosure became more 
spontaneous and less cautious, and the process was subjectively 
experienced as being increasingly easy. This is understandable, 
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given that the majority of men received positive responses to 
initial disclosures and hence were encouraged to disclose to more 
people. Disclosure was almost always carried out by the 
respondents themselves: only in a few cases did significant others 
find out about respondents' homosexuality from third parties. 
However, disclosure was not always self-initiated but was sometimes 
made in response to a query concerning the person's sexuality, or 
as a reaction to disparaging comments being made about homosexuals 
or during a moment of anger, bitterness or during a family dispute. 
Disclosure to one person at a time was the most common occurrence 
but simultaneous revelation to several people was also reported. 
Three possibilities were examined in relation to the types of 
feedback consequent upon the disclosure of sexual preference. 
Positive feedback was regarded as facilitating gay identity 
formation, although another study has suggested that general 
support from significant others does not influence the extent to 
which a person is committed to their gay identity or their level 
of psychological adjustment (Hammersmith and Weinberg, 1973). An 
absence of feedback, i. e., where the disclosure was ignored or 
where there was a refusal to deal with it, was viewed as being more 
damaging to identity formation than non-disclosure. Negative 
feedback was deemed either to act as a very concrete social 
constraint on gay identity formation and inhibit the development 
of a gay identity or to solidify it in a type of reaction formation 
in which the person rejects the authority of those who rejected 
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him. The different responses to negative feedback were explained 
by hypothesising that those who rejected their rejectors were 
enabled to do so by their being less dependent upon the support of 
others than were those for whom gay identity formation was impeded 
by rejection. Alternatively, despite having encountered negative 
reactions from some, they may have received support from others. 
There is evidence among Weinberg's respondents which favours the 
latter but the lack of support for the former explanation is hardly 
surprising, given his sociological approach which prefers to seek 
explanations in terms of social relations rather than in terms of 
characteristics within the person, and given the way in which his 
questions were framed. With regard to the nature of the feedback 
received, 14 of Weinberg's 30 men reported that they received what 
they classed as positive, supportive responses from all the 
heterosexual friends to whom they had disclosed their sexual 
preference, and four received a mixture of positive and negative 
responses. Eleven did not receive any encouragement at all, 
although the responses to their disclosure were sometimes simply 
unenthusiastic, ambiguous or neutral rather than being completely 
negative. When questioned about the effects of others' positive 
reactions to disclosure, most respondents replied that they had 
helped them to accept, feel comfortable with and evaluate 
positively their gay identity. Some men also stated that positive 
reactions helped deepen their friendships with those to whom they 
disclosed: they regarded these people as being more sensitive, 
caring and mature than they had previously imagined. Negative 
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feedback, on the other hand, led some respondents to view their 
rejectors as insensitive and intolerant people who could no longer 
be trusted: they felt disappointed in them and alienated from them. 
Almost every respondent was accepted by at least one person 
following disclosure. Positive reactions only facilitated self- 
definition as homosexual in a few cases, as most men had already 
negotiated this stage before disclosing themselves to 
heterosexuals. A differentiation in positive feedback was reported 
in that some people to whom disclosure was made accepted both the 
person and his homosexuality while others made it clear that while 
they accepted the person, they did not accept his homosexuality, 
at least at first. One extreme form of negative feedback was 
described by eight men who encountered complete rejection from some 
of their friends to whom they revealed their sexual preference and 
they subsequently became estranged from them. This reaction is not 
experienced very often because of the careful pre-disclosure 
planning outlined earlier: people usually disclose their 
homosexuality to others only if they are relatively certain of 
acceptance. 
One surprising conclusion reached by Weinberg's respondents was 
that the reaction of other people to disclosure had only an 
indirect effect upon the development of the discloser's gay 
identity: it may be that, being unwilling to confer the 
responsibility for and the inherent merit of their surviving the 
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struggle to attain a gay identity upon anyone but themselves, they 
had revised their narratives accordingly and had boosted their 
sense of self-efficacy. Weinberg does however conclude that 
disclosure to other homosexuals had a greater effect in developing 
commitment to a gay identity among his respondents than did 
disclosure to heterosexuals. Some indicated that it was the 
support of gay people which enabled them to disclose to 
heterosexuals. Among the outcomes of disclosure mentioned were the 
derogation of the authority of those who reacted negatively and the 
corresponding upgrading of those who reacted positively, and the 
provision of an impetus to find out more about homosexuality. 
Perhaps because they frequently fulfil the role of significant 
others and hence because of the potentially great influence which 
they may exert on the development of a gay identity, in Weinberg's 
study the discloser's family is examined in particular detail with 
respect to the feedback which they provide in response to 
disclosure. The likelihood of the person behaving differently 
among the family compared to how he would behave among friends is 
stressed by Westwood (1960) - admittedly in the days before the 
rise of the gay liberation movement and the increased public 
profile of homosexuality - who said that "(e)ven some of those who 
behave fairly openly in public are most careful to avoid arousing 
suspicions in the family circle" (p 40). Twenty-five of Weinberg's 
men had disclosed their sexual preference to relatives and in ten 
of these cases, the disclosure was not so much a revelation as a 
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confirmation of their suspicions or their prior knowledge, a 
bridging of the previously noted distinction between knowing and 
being told. Only six of these men reported that all the relatives 
whom they told accepted this information and four of the men had 
disclosed only to those relatives whom they felt would accept it. 
It therefore appears that acceptance of one's homosexuality by all 
of one's family, at least initially, is extremely unlikely, and 
that there is a much higher proportion of adverse reactions to 
disclosure among relatives than among close friends. This was 
hypothesised as being due to the frequently considerable 
psychological and emotional investment in the person which family 
members may have or to a feeling of parental guilt or failure in 
response to their son's homosexuality. 
Various parental reactions to disclosure were described which 
included a refusal to discuss or acknowledge the information; a 
belief that the homosexuality was a temporary phase; and an attempt 
to persuade their son to see a psychiatrist in order to change his 
sexual preference. Negative reactions were sometimes interpreted 
as a rejection of the person, i. e., the discloser. Those relatives 
whose reactions were thus perceived were (step) fathers and sisters: 
mothers and brothers were not perceived as rejecting. Supportive 
reactions from at least one family member were reported by a 
majority of the men and sometimes had the effect of deepening the 
relationship between the respondent and the relative concerned. 
Negative responses from close friends caused hurt and distress but 
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some men said that they understood these responses in terms of the 
problems which disclosure had caused for their heterosexual 
friends. Feelings of hurt, anger and upset were much more common 
in response to the negative reactions of family members and 
sometimes led to a deterioration in relationships with those family 
members. Yet some men were able to rationalise negative familial 
reactions, possibly because the emotional investment of family 
members in the homosexual son or sibling can be reciprocal and can 
thus provide the motivation to do so. 
Weinberg's examination of his respondents' reactions to others' 
reactions to disclosure produced findings which were in accordance 
with the symbolic interactionist principle that the feelings people 
have about themselves are closely related to the perceived nature 
of the feedback which they receive from others: those men who 
believed they were being accepted by others became more relaxed and 
confident, felt more comfortable with their homosexuality and began 
to like themselves more, while those who believed they had been 
rejected felt negatively about themselves. Twenty men believed 
that their feelings about themselves had changed following 
disclosure (17 in a positive direction and three in a negative 
direction), whereas nine men reported no changes. 
An analysis of the strategies used to deal with negative reactions, 
not specifically in relation to family members, revealed that some 
men risked permanent alienation from their rejectors by confronting 
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them, demanding acceptance and threatening to sever all links with 
them if it were not forthcoming: this approach was not successful 
in gaining acceptance for those who employed it. Others were not 
so confrontational but insisted on the legitimacy of their gay 
lifestyle. Such action served to provide them with an esteem- 
raising view of themselves as autonomous, confident people who were 
not dependent upon the approval of others. Not all reactions were 
quite so positive, however. One man reverted to a complete 
concealment of his homosexuality and became a social isolate; 
another attempted to change his sexual preference. A more 
constructive but more risky strategy which was outlined involved 
seeking out others who might react more positively to disclosure, 
which runs the risk of repeated rejection. As action options 
regarding negative familial reactions tend to be more restricted 
(the confrontational approach may not be feasible because of one's 
emotional investment in or financial dependence upon one's family), 
inaction was the most common response among respondents who had 
experienced them, although some men became hostile towards or moved 
away from those family members who had rejected them. 
Weinberg acknowledges that his treatment of initial disclosures of 
sexual identity provides only part of the picture, since people's 
responses to disclosure may change over time, as may the gay man's 
feelings about those people. A number of his subjects believed 
that some people who had not initially reacted positively to 
disclosure were now at least attempting to understand the gay 
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lifestyle, even if they did not fully accept it as a legitimate 
alternative mode of being. This change was judged to have been 
caused by a realisation on the part of the people concerned that 
they had no control over the gay man's sexuality and should not 
risk alienating him. Such a perspective was primarily attributed 
to those who had a high degree of emotional investment in the gay 
person, i. e., family members, and was often accompanied by a 
differentiation between the person, who was fully accepted, and his 
homosexuality, which was not. Some families expressed their non- 
acceptance of their son's/sibling's homosexuality by refusing to 
acknowledge or discuss it. These reactions are not confined to the 
subject of homosexuality but occur when parents are confronted by 
any aspects of their children's lives which are unacceptable to 
them and they must choose between some form of acceptance and the 
risk of alienating the child. Increased acceptance may develop if 
the families encounter their son's/sibling's gay friends and gain 
positive impressions of them which may help dispel any negative 
stereotypes they may hold. Just like the men themselves before 
they had contact with other gay men, their families may have 
stereotypical views partly because of a lack of knowledge about and 
contact with homosexuals. 
Affective change in a positive direction was also reported in 
relation to the men's feelings about the people to whom they had 
disclosed their sexual preference. Those who had initially 
received supportive responses from family members continued to have 
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positive and sometimes enhanced relations with these relatives. 
However, not all disclosure accounts had happy endings: some 
respondents related that they remained alienated from friends or 
family at the time of the study. Positive changes in attitudes to 
the self over time were noted too. These were attributed to the 
acceptance and support found among other gay people and to the 
development of a sense of "gay pride" resulting to a large extent 
from involvement in gay organisations. 
In summary, the disclosure experience appeared to have facilitated 
most men's self-acceptance, increased their self-confidence, 
reduced feelings of guilt, enabled them to be more open and direct 
with those to whom disclosure was made, to feel more comfortable 
with themselves and free to live a gay lifestyle. These positive 
results were attributed not only to positive responses to self- 
disclosure but also to the feelings of self-efficacy which the 
decision to disclose engendered. 
The other studies of gay identity formation that have been under 
consideration also examine the disclosure of sexual preference but 
to varying degrees. Lewis (1984) discusses the process of 
disclosure to family members by lesbian women, which she claims is 
almost always experienced as a turning point in the formation of 
a lesbian identity, thereby supporting the hypothesis outlined at 
the start of this discussion of disclosure which related to the 
structural role that may be accorded to disclosure experiences 
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within gay identity formation narratives. Disclosure is considered 
as an option by a woman when she becomes aware of her increasing 
acceptance of her lesbian identity and is consequently unwilling 
to continue to conceal it. It occurs only after careful 
consideration of the possible outcomes - as outlined by Weinberg - 
but unlike Weinberg, Lewis states that it tends to be the result 
of a crisis situation. She also believes that entirely positive 
parental reactions are most unlikely. Even where there is 
acceptance, the intergenerational bond which arises when the 
younger generation have children of their own and thereby identify 
with their parents may be lost (which presumes that the women do 
not already have or want to have children). Parents may also feel 
concern or a sense of loss at the prospect of their offspring not 
gaining social acceptance or not fulfilling the cultural norms or 
expectations with which they were socialised. 
Coleman (1982) refers to disclosure in the context of giving advice 
on how to help lesbians and gay men in the development of their 
identities. Recognising that disclosure to some significant others 
can be critical in the development of positive self-conceptions, 
he firstly advises that lesbians and gay men be encouraged to take 
calculated risks in disclosing their sexual preference to others. 
Secondly, he recommends that anyone to whom disclosure is made 
should convey acceptance, as such positive reactions will challenge 
both internalised negative societal attitudes and any negative 
self-conceptions which the lesbian or gay man might have. He 
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believes that individual reactions to disclosure make a greater 
impact on the gay person than any direct or indirect societal 
reactions to homosexuality. This stands in opposition to the 
reported finding of Weinberg and Williams (1974) that the reaction 
of individuals is perceived by gay men as a reflection of the 
broader reactions of society so that the significance to a gay man 
of the person who reacts to his homosexuality does not determine 
the degree to which that reaction influences the gay man's 
thinking. 
Minton and McDonald (1984) place disclosure primarily in the 
"Homosexual Identity Management" section of their Universalistic 
Stage. They regard this last phase of homosexual identity 
formation as being characterised by an integration of personal and 
public identities through disclosure to others. The disclosure of 
sexual preference is summarised as "a lifelong process, comprising 
decisions of whether or not to disclose, how and when to disclose, 
and how to face the consequences of disclosure" (p 102): these 
dilemmas are also identified by Goffman (1963) as being faced by 
the "discreditable" person, i. e., by someone whose stigma is not 
immediately apparent. The discloser's perception of self is held 
to be altered positively if interpersonal support results from 
disclosure and negatively if such support is lacking. Psychological 
well-being and the possibility of an integrated personal identity 
or authentic relationships may be jeopardised if such a fundamental 
aspect of the self as a gay identity is concealed from significant 
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others. As Woodman and Lenna (1980) note, "an identity, 
particularly a positive, creative identity, requires sharing if it 
is to grow" (p 62). Minton and McDonald suggest - as Weinberg's 
respondents pointed out - that concealment of one's homosexuality 
leads the person to feel that he is valued for what others expect 
him to be rather than for who he really is. At the other extreme, 
widespread disclosure has its disadvantages. If most of those in 
one's interpersonal environment know of one's homosexuality, 
everyday interactions can become apprehensive and uncomfortable and 
may always hold the possibility of rejection. Declaration of a gay 
identity carries the risk of eliciting discrimination, physical 
harrassment or verbal abuse; it may lead to an abridgement of 
housing and employment rights and general civil liberties. 
In Lee's (1977) three-stage model of gay identity formation, 
disclosure first occurs in the second "Coming out" stage and begins 
with the individual revealing his sexual preference to a few 
carefully selected heterosexual friends, each of whom are sworn to 
secrecy. The next step involves the person allowing his sexual 
preference to become known within a restricted social network, such 
as among a mixed circle of gay and heterosexual friends, or to a 
clearly defined group at his workplace. The progressive revelation 
then proceeds to a disclosure to "a gay liberation organization or 
to individuals expressing a gay liberation ideology" (p 56). Lee's 
terminology may appear somewhat dated, but the underlying idea of 
revelation to a group or an individual that espouses a positive 
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conception of what it means to be gay is clear. It is believed 
that only a small proportion of all homosexuals take this step, but 
it is described as an essential prerequisite to the stage of 
ultimate disclosure which has already been mentioned in the context 
of "going public". In his examination of the processes involved 
in a public declaration to a mass audience of one's sexual 
preference, Lee goes beyond all other treatments of the disclosure 
of gay identity. In order to examine the sizeable risks, costs and 
possible advantages of such a strategy, which Plummer (1975) 
mentions, Lee analysed media coverage of the public declarations 
of 14 homosexuals in Canada and the USA and conducted personal 
interviews with a further nine. 
The reasons for the relatively small number of public homosexuals 
hardly require exposition. Given the generally negative societal 
attitudes towards homosexuality, the price to be paid for openness 
may be the loss of one's job: those who successfully went public 
in Lee's study tended to be self-employed, involved in businesses 
related to the gay subculture or employed in the sometimes liberal 
academic world. Relationships with work colleagues, lovers, family 
members and friends were reported to have become strained - and not 
only with heterosexual friends. Gay friends sometimes feared the 
increased visibility that the public figure brought to the gay 
subculture and, if they were afraid of their own homosexuality 
being generally discovered, they offered no support or 
encouragement to him and even avoided contact with him: it may be 
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that what Lee terms the publicly identified person's "act of 
authenticity" is interpreted as an adverse judgement on those gay 
people who routinely pass as heterosexual. As many of these costs 
could be anticipated, the question remains as to what motivates 
public disclosure. Lee's subjects appeared to have employed a 
cost-benefit analysis and decided that the costs of passing as 
heterosexual, e. g., guilt, anxiety and fear of disclosure, 
outweighed the likely costs of public revelation. Political 
considerations were also cited: some respondents stated that they 
opted for complete openness in order to attempt to educate the 
public about homosexuality and/or to encourage others in their 
struggle for a gay identity on a personal level or gay rights on 
a political and group level. These lofty intentions sometimes came 
to nothing and disenchantment set in as they felt increasingly 
isolated and their experiences were neutered and sanitised by their 
presentation in a non-threatening context in the press. 
Lee acknowledges the existence of degrees of public identity 
because the concept of "public" can be regarded on several levels, 
ranging from a localised and limited audience to the audience of 
the mass media. Progressive revelation to the latter level was 
reported by some subjects, while others attempted to confine the 
extent of their public identity by revealing themselves to 
restricted audiences, thereby hoping to prevent people such as 
their family or employers from learning of their homosexuality. 
Social standing also appears to be influential in determining the 
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extent of a person's public identity in that the more influential 
a person is in a given community, profession or interest group, the 
greater will be the interest in his declaration. 
One of the major problems faced by a publicly identified person is 
the possibility of their being completely engulfed by their 
homosexual identity, which can easily become a "pivotal identity" 
or master trait and can swamp all aspects of the person: they come 
to be regarded only or primarily as homosexual. For the gay men 
studied by Weinberg and Williams (1974), this did not appear to be 
a desirable state of affairs. The person may also feel trapped in 
his gay sexuality: such is the level of public commitment that he 
has made to it that he may feel it is unacceptable to explore 
further or change his sexual preference. 
The topic of the public disclosure of one's homosexuality may 
appear largely irrelevant to the present study which aims to 
identify commonalities in reports of gay identity formation 
experiences. After all, only a relatively small number of gay men 
have the desire or the opportunity to declare themselves to a mass 
audience. Yet all disclosure takes place before an audience, 
whether that audience be a person or a nation, and a consideration 
of disclosure both to individuals and to groups can identify 
problems which are common to both. 
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2.8 Cass's sixth stage: "Identity Synthesis" and Integration 
The person enters stage six of Cass's model with a realisation that 
the blanket positive evaluation of all homosexuals and negative 
evaluation of all heterosexuals previously adhered to is not valid. 
Alteration in the interpersonal matrix results and the recognition 
that there are some heterosexuals who accept the person's 
homosexual identity in the same way the he does leads to maximal 
congruency. The anger of stage five is experienced with less 
intensity and feelings of pride diminish as the person acknowledges 
that there is no clear dichotomy between the homosexual and 
heterosexual worlds: the possibility of considerable similarity 
between the self and heterosexuals and dissimilarity between the 
self and homosexuals is accepted. 
Cass's theme of the recognition of basic similarities between 
homosexuals and heterosexuals also appears in the final 
"Commitment" stage of Troiden's (1977) model. When his respondents 
were asked about their perceptions of the similarities and 
differences between homosexuals and heterosexuals, 65% expressed 
the opinion that the only difference between the categories was in 
terms of sexual behaviour and preference. The other major 
concomitants of the commitment stage are held by Troiden to be the 
embarkation upon a sexual and emotional relationship with another 
man, acceptance of and comfort with the present gay identity and 
satisfaction with it as a future identity. Troiden differentiates 
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here between a homosexual identity and a gay identity and believes 
that a person enters this stage with the former and emerges with 
the latter. As indicated previously, he locates the transition in 
the fusion of gay sexuality and emotionality which occurs when the 
person becomes involved in a sexual and emotional relationship with 
another man, and is one of the few writers to incorporate this 
distinction into their model of gay identity formation. Commitment 
is also spoken of in relation to gay identity by Hammersmith and 
Weinberg (1973), who believe that until a person develops an 
identity to which they can become committed, they experience 
anxiety and uncertainty. In their study of almost 2 500 gay men 
in the USA, Denmark and the Netherlands, they found that when a 
person develops such an identity, their self-concept stabilises and 
their levels of self-esteem and psychological adjustment increase. 
They also found that commitment to a gay identity was positively 
related to an individual receiving support from significant others 
and speculated that this may be because as the person becomes more 
committed to his gay identity, he attaches more importance to the 
opinions of those who are supportive of him in his identity and 
less to those who are not, a possibility outlined in Weinberg's 
(1976) consideration of post-disclosure reactions. 
The essence of Cass's final stage may be seen as residing in the 
synthesis of the person's private and public sexual identities into 
one image of self which is supported by his interpersonal 
environment. With the homosexual identity integrated with all 
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other aspects of the self, it ceases to be the identity and instead 
becomes but one aspect of the self: thus the process of gay 
identity formation is considered to be complete. Integration is 
described in very similar terms in the final stage of the model of 
coping with transition outlined by Sugarman (1986) and adapted from 
Hopson (1981). Here, the transition process is seen as complete 
when the individual feels "at home" in the new post-transition 
reality and when new self-conceptions, understandings and 
behaviours have become an integral part of the individual's world 
view. The transition becomes integrated into the life space rather 
than dominating it. In Sugarman's terms, the person is a gay man 
rather than A GAY MAN. Sophie (1987), in her treatment of lesbian 
identity, terms this phenomenon "habituation". 
Only at this late stage is the first explicit link made between gay 
identity formation and more global identity development. If it is 
the case that the optimal level of gay identity development is 
considered to occur when a gay identity can take its place 
alongside other identity components, comfortably and as an equal, 
within a superordinate more general identity structure, it is 
difficult to fathom the reasons why the notion of a more global 
identity, together with its frameworks and its processes and 
principles of operation, is not introduced to the treatment of gay 
identity formation from the outset. However, although little overt 
cross-fertilisation can be observed in Cass's (1979) model, she 
later bemoaned the isolation of the literature on gay identity from 
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writing on general identity and suggested that the relationship and 
the possibility of similarity between the two concepts would be 
worthy concerns for future research (Cass, 1984b). The present 
study may therefore be regarded as implementing her suggestion. 
By positing such an identity synthesis as the optimal level of 
development in gay identity formation, Cass's model carries strong 
implications for radical gay politics, which emphasises the 
irreconcilable differences between heterosexuals and homosexuals 
and espouses the superiority of the latter group in many domains. 
The adoption of such a stance, with its repudiation of integration 
and assimilation into the heterosexual world, is best described by 
Cass's stage five and is therefore viewed as a less than optimal 
form of gay identity. Such a framework is essentially a 
heterosexual one: the challenge presented to the heterosexual 
status quo by the radical gay movement is contained by classing 
those who mount the threat as either being fixated in their 
identity development or as working their way through a transitional 
phase. To this extent, Cass's contribution may be likened to those 
etiological studies of homosexuality which, in seeking to 
pathologise homosexuality, may be said to assume the supremacy and 
inevitability of heterosexuality. 
Cass's themes of integration and synthesis, which were earlier 
hypothesised as characteristics of models of gay identity formation 
that capitalised upon conceptualisations of general identity 
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development, are echoed in the final or later stages of other 
conceptions of gay identity formation. As we have just seen, Lee 
(1977), and also Hencken and O'Dowd (1977), have cited a specific 
means by which a synthesis of private and public identities may be 
attained, i. e., by public disclosure of one's homosexuality. But 
so great are the possibilities of discrimination being encountered 
that, as Minton and McDonald (1984) point out, only very few 
individuals opt for this level of identity synthesis. More 
selective disclosure can, however, promote a satisfactory level of 
synthesis and therefore Minton and McDonald (1984) accord a central 
role to disclosure in the final stage of their model. 
Coleman (1982) terms his final stage "Integration" and adopts a 
more psychological approach to the subject. He regards its 
attainment as being characterised by the person being confident 
that they can maintain relationships, behaving in an open, friendly 
and caring way, and regarding themselves as a fully functioning 
person in their society. The person at this stage has developed 
the ability to handle any rejections which might be encountered 
from others without allowing them to become psychologically 
crippling events. In addition, the integrated sense of identity 
allows the person to feel confident at the prospect of facing the 
developmental tasks of adulthood, such as middle age and old age. 
Integration also provides the title of Lewis's (1984) final stage. 
Prior to its attainment, a woman must first possess a stable 
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lesbian identity, characterised by self-acceptance, a resolution 
of much of the dissonance, fear and anger associated with earlier 
stages, the development of a supportive social network, and 
possibly the formation of an ongoing, committed relationship. The 
woman feels that she has found a niche for herself, whether it be 
in the lesbian and gay community, in her relationships or in her 
family. She no longer focusses on the problems of managing a 
lesbian identity per se but rather on her career or relationships: 
her focus of concern ceases to be chiefly inward and is readjusted 
outward. The stabilisation process is held to occur gradually over 
a period of years during the course of which the woman integrates 
her lesbian identity into an overall positive self-concept. She 
accepts and feels comfortable with her lesbian identity; she 
decides to whom she will disclose her lesbianism and to what 
extent. Lewis's concept of integration is essentially identical 
to that of Cass in that she regards it as being typified chiefly 
by the diminution in the importance of a woman's lesbianism in her 
life; in the demands which her lesbian identity makes on her time 
and energy; and in the pain and anger which she feels about 
discrimination. 
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2.9 Some Further Oversights in the Study of Gay Identity Formation 
In positing integration as the final stage of gay identity 
formation, these authors echo the end points of many more general 
conceptualisations of adult development and specifically of 
identity development. For Jung, the goal towards which an 
individual's psychological development tends is integration or 
wholeness, characterised by an acceptance of oneself and of 
whatever is to come (Storr, 1973). Sugarman (1986), in her review 
of a range of developmental schemata, points to the common theme 
of integration as a developmental goal in the models of Erikson, 
Riegel (1973) and Schaie (1977-78). In this respect at least, 
models of gay identity formation do not constitute a field of study 
that is unconnected with the study of adult development and 
identity in general. A comparison between the models outlined 
here, the various conceptualisations of life-span development 
discussed by Sugarman (1986) and the models of identity development 
described in Chapter One reveals considerable thematic 
similarities. Many are concerned with individuals' attempts to 
render meaningful and to make cohere particular aspects or the 
totality of their life space. They are structured according 
to stage-based frameworks, are based upon the epigenetic principle, 
and describe specific crises, tasks or preoccupations that have 
their particular times of ascendency. Models frequently focus on 
the relationships between the self and significant others and how 
these are altered in the light of changing circumstances. Events 
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and changes carry implications for one's identity, which must 
accommodate them in some way. It might therefore be concluded that 
although writers on gay identity formation do not make explicit 
reference to the substantial body of work on more global identity 
development, there does exist a degree of thematic overlap between 
the two domains which fulfils some of the expectations that were 
outlined earlier in relation to models of gay identity formation 
that made use of insights from the field of general identity 
development. 
Also, gay identity formation may be usefully conceptualised in 
terms of some of the schemata which Sugarman reviews. For example, 
its major tasks may be conceived in terms of Havighurst's (1956, 
1972) developmental tasks, or the entire process may be seen in the 
context of Hopson's (1981) model of the stages which accompany and 
follow transition. The link between the need in gay identity 
formation to construct a value system not based on heterosexual 
mores internalised during socialisation and the necessity of 
replacing parental values and assumptions with one's own for 
successful adult development (outlined in Gould's (1978,1980) 
model) has already been pointed out. Direct reference to these 
conceptualisations of adult development is seldom made by the 
writers on gay identity formation whose work has been discussed. 
This oversight is regrettable as it means that most studies of gay 
identity have failed to capitalise and build upon a considerable 
opus of existing related work on adult development, as well as on 
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general identity development that could provide the sort of 
theoretical background and structure that many of the studies lack. 
In conceiving of gay identity formation as the construction of a 
personal narrative which renders coherent, purposeful and 
intelligible one's experiences in relation to a same-sex sexual 
preference and in importing concepts from other areas of 
developmental study where relevant, it is hoped in the present 
study to correct this oversight. 
From this lengthy and detailed consideration of some of the most 
broad-ranging models and studies of gay identity formation, there 
emerge certain recurring themes. These include the effects of the 
internalisation of negative social stereotypes about homosexuals 
and homosexuality on individuals' willingness to admit a 
gay/homosexual sexual identity into their personal naratives; the 
experience of a sensitisation stage, during which individuals 
become aware that they are in some way different from their peers; 
an awareness or suspicion that one might be homosexual; the 
interpretation of same-sex sexual behaviours and/or attractions in 
such a way that their implications of homosexuality are avoided; 
passing as heterosexual; the disclosure of sexual preference; same- 
sex sexual and emotional relationships; involvement in the gay 
subculture; the development of identity pride or of a sense of 
commitment to a gay identity; and the attainment of identity 
integration or synthesis. Each of these themes appears and is 
accorded a prominent role within several of the models that have 
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been examined throughout this review (see Table 2.1). As most of 
the models and studies outlined were devised or conducted in the 
USA or in Australia, these topics were incorporated, where possible 
and appropriate, into a preliminary questionnaire on gay identity 
which was designed to help ascertain which of the areas outlined 
would be recognised and regarded as significant factors in the 
development of a gay identity by a group of British gay men, and 
to identify any factors which had not been heretofore considered. 
MODEL STAGE/THEME 
Effects of the Sensitisation 
internalisation of 
negative social 
stereotypes about 
homosexuals and 
homosexuality 
Cass (1979) 
Clark (1987) 
Coleman (1982) YES 
Lee (1977) 
Lewis (1984) YES 
Minton and 
McDonald (1984) YES YES 
Plummer (1975) YES 
Richardson (1981) YES 
Troiden (1977) YES 
Weinberg (1976) 
Woodman and 
Lenna (1980) YES 
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MODEL STAGE/THEME 
Suspicion that Interpretation 
one might be gay/ of same-sex sexual 
homosexual behaviours and/or 
attractions so as to 
avoid homosexual 
implications for 
identity 
Cass (1979) YES 
Clark (1987) 
Coleman (1982) 
Lee (1977) 
Lewis (1984) YES 
Minton and 
McDonald (1984) YES 
Plummer (1975) 
Richardson (1981) 
Troiden (1977) YES YES 
Weinberg (1976) YES YES 
Woodman and 
Lenna (1980) YES 
MODEL STAGE/THEME 
Passing as Disclosure of 
heterosexual sexual preference 
Cass (1979) YES YES 
Clark (1987) 
Coleman (1982) YES 
Lee (1977) YES 
Lewis (1984) YES 
Minton and 
McDonald (1984) YES 
Plummer (1975) YES 
Richardson (1981) YES 
Troiden (1977) 
Weinberg (1976) YES 
Woodman and 
Lenna (1980) YES YES 
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MODEL 
Cass (1979) 
Clark (1987) 
Coleman (1982) 
Lee (1977) 
Lewis (1984) 
Minton and 
McDonald (1984) 
Plummer (1975) 
Richardson (1981) 
Troiden (1977) 
Weinberg (1976) 
Woodman and 
Lenna (1980) 
MODEL 
Cass (1979) 
Clark (1987) 
Coleman (1982) 
Lee (1977) 
Lewis (1984) 
Minton and 
McDonald (1984) 
Plummer (1975) 
Richardson (1981) 
Troiden (1977) 
Weinberg (1976) 
Woodman and 
Lenna (1980) 
STAGE/THEME 
Same-sex sexual Involvement in the 
and emotional gay subculture 
relationships 
YES YES 
YES YES 
YES YES 
YES YES 
YES 
YES YES 
YES YES 
YES 
STAGE/THEME 
Development of 
commitment to a gay 
identity/ identity 
pride 
Attainment of identity 
integration or 
synthesis 
YES YES 
YES 
YES 
YES 
YES 
YES 
YES 
YES 
YES 
Table 2.1: A representation of the salient occurrence of the most 
commonly-encountered stages or themes in the conceptualisations of 
gay identity formation in the major models of gay identity 
formation examined. 
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But before moving on to examine the design of the questionnaire on 
gay identity formation, something must be said about the 
interpretations that the present study places upon the findings of 
the many studies of gay identity formation outlined, given its 
conceptualisation of identity as a personal narrative. None of the 
empirical studies reviewed were longitudinal in nature: all 
required respondents to provide retrospective accounts of their gay 
identity formation experiences. In terms of personal narratives, 
the studies accessed present narratives, which incorporated 
accounts of how narratives that were held in the past changed in 
reaction to the events and experiences encountered as the person 
assimilated and accommodated to the demands made by their same-sex 
sexual attractions. Given that the personal narrative is an 
interpretative tool and that studies required respondents to recall 
interpretations of events and experiences which they may have 
encountered some considerable time ago, it is likely that the 
accounts yielded by the studies of gay identity formation are 
highly inaccurate in terms of the actualities of the events to 
which they refer. The possibility of non-isomorphism between 
respondents' accounts of their experiences relevant to the 
formation of their gay identities and the actualities of those 
experiences is not considered, despite the fact that numerous 
studies have concluded that people's recall of past events is 
frequently selective and biased. Nor is the possibility 
entertained that the stages of gay identity formation produced by 
empirical work might be a reflection of organising frameworks which 
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respondents have placed upon their experiences to impose order and 
coherence on them and to help create logical, meaningful personal 
narratives which can accommodate their gay identity formation 
experiences. If it is the case that the gay identity aspect of the 
personal narrative represents an individual's attempt to impart 
meaning, coherence and purpose to his sexuality-related experiences 
by making connections between events, and if the individual can at 
least to some extent choose the material that will constitute the 
narrative, the utility of attempting to chart commonalities in gay 
identity-related narratives, as this study aims to do, appears 
questionable. One might contend that it would be more profitable 
to endeavour to trace the actualities of the relevant events, 
unless it is considered possible to divine what actually happened 
from a careful study of the relevant components of personal 
narratives. The operation of the tendency to reconstruct past 
events has already been alluded to in the treatment of the personal 
narrative but it is a process that any study which relies on 
retrospective accounts must consider carefully if it is not to 
mistake the nature of the data which it obtains. It is to this and 
related issues that the next chapter addresses itself. 
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CHAPTER THREE 
"MY OWN SPECIAL CREATION"...? AUTOBIOGRAPHICAL RECONSTRUCTION AND 
SUBCULTURAL NARRATIVES 
"I am what I am 
and what I am is my own special creation" 
3.1 Introduction 
The lines above from the best-known song in the 1983 musical "La 
Cage Aux Folles" are sung by Albin, the star female impersonator 
at the "La Cage Aux Folles" nightclub, after he has discovered that 
Georges, his lover, and Jean-Michel, his lover's son, have been 
plotting to keep him out of the way when the parents of Jean- 
Michel's fiancee, Anne, come to visit, lest Albin's flamboyant 
gayness should enrage Anne's father, an anti-gay politician. Stung 
by this attempt to conceal him and his gay identity, Albin asserts 
that he is proud of who he is and of the gay identity that he has 
created. The quotation neatly encapsulates the idea adopted in 
this study of (gay) identity formation as a creative, constructive, 
meaning-making process in which the individual is actively 
involved. A gay identity represents a person's attempt to 
interpret in a meaningful way the experiences that he has had which 
are related to his sexual preference and to impart coherence and 
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purpose to those experiences by forging connections between them 
and formulating explanations of them. It is a process whereby an 
individual recollects and organises within his personal narrative 
certain experiences relevant to his sexual preference, to his 
reactions to it, and to the changes that have been wrought in his 
social world because of it, in order to produce an account that is 
his "own special creation" and which helps him to ascertain who he 
is and how he fits into the adult world. 
Gay identity formation intrinsically implies autobiographical 
memory because if it is viewed as a personal narrative, it is 
through the selection, recall and organisation of relevant past 
events that it is constructed. The close relationship between 
autobiographical memory and identity is pointed out by Rubin (1986) 
who states that autobiographical memory is "the sum of people's 
knowledge of their own lives and as such is the basis for their 
concept of self" (p 69). Even if it is not thus conceptualised, 
the study of gay identity formation relies for its data upon 
respondents' recollections of relevant events and experiences. It 
is therefore worth examining the nature of the recollection process 
itself as it can provide further insights into how personal 
narratives are formed and the criteria which may determine whether 
or not an experience is included in a personal narrative, as well 
as permitting further evaluation of the data on which models of gay 
identity formation have been based. 
206 
3.2 Memory as a Biased and Constructive Process 
One of the most basic questions that face anyone whose task it is 
to analyse and interpret data from studies which require 
respondents to supply retrospective reports of life events is 
whether the resultant reports are true and accurate accounts of 
what exactly happened, deliberately falsified or selective accounts 
designed to avoid the disapproval of those conducting the study, 
or a mixture of fact and filtering. The analyst should be aware 
that events may have been reconstructed in terms of the events and 
cognitive changes which followed them. The possibility that the 
accounts obtained by the present study were consciously distorted 
in order to avoid disapproval is unlikely. The questionnaire that 
was used was presented to respondents most of whom had already 
undergone two face-to-face interviews of several hours duration 
with interviewers trained in non-judgemental interviewing 
techniques from a Department of Health and Medical Research 
Council-funded research project entitled Project SIGMA (Sociosexual 
Investigations of Gay Men and AIDS) concerning the most intimate 
aspects of their sexual behaviour. It may therefore be assumed 
that respondents had a high level of commitment to Project SIGMA 
and to its allied research, in the context of which the gay 
identity study was presented, and that they were motivated to 
render as accurate an account as they could. The fact that 
respondents completed the questionnaire by themselves and then 
returned it anonymously by post further decreased the possibility 
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that they may have engaged in approval-seeking self-presentations. 
Let us now consider the other possible descriptions of the data. 
A voluminous literature exists in the general cognition, memory 
and information processing fields which outlines the many and 
varied ways in which information is entered, stored and retrieved 
selectively and with bias. In a theoretical work, Berger and 
Luckmann (1967) posit how individuals reinterpret the meaning of 
past events in their biographies, rather than attempt the more 
difficult task of obliterating them completely from memory, and 
how they fabricate and insert events where necessary to harmonise 
the reinterpreted and remembered past. In empirical studies in the 
1930s, Bartlett showed how memory is a reconstructive process, with 
information about an event being interpreted in the light of 
general background knowledge. Hindley (1979) adds that such 
experimental evidence is supplemented by psychoanalytic clinical 
evidence concerning the ways in which certain experiences may be 
denied, repressed or selectively forgotten. Furthermore, it has 
been claimed that the aim of psychoanalytic therapy is to lead the 
person to restructure their past so that it is a more cohesive 
narrative (Schafer, 1976a). 
Baddeley (1979) notes that people often recall their interpretation 
of events rather than what actually happened: they recall past 
events in a way that makes sense for them and view these events 
through their present construct systems, value systems and life 
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themes, what Wall and Williams (1970) term their "Retrospectro- 
scope" (Brenner, 1985; Tagg, 1985). This means that recollections 
of past events may be quite different from the actualities of those 
events, but as Rubin (1986) points out, "it is often more important 
that our memories seem real than that they be real" (p 4). 
Personal memories typically carry a strong belief value that they 
are a veridical record of events as originally experienced, even 
though they are unlikely to be (Brewer, 1986). Barclay (1986) does 
however highlight that although they are not exact in detail, 
"these memories are true in the sense of maintaining the integrity 
and gist of past life events" (p 82). Woven into a personal 
narrative, they perform an interpretative function and can be 
judged not by their objective "truth" but in terms of the extent 
to which the narrative of which they are constituent parts renders 
a person's experiences coherent and meaningful. Harre (1979) holds 
that when rendering accounts of past experiences, "we are very much 
inclined to represent that which we experienced as mere randomness, 
as if it were principled choice" (p 256), i. e., there exists a 
normative social demand that we should represent our actions as 
intelligible in terms of choices that we have actively made and so 
we revise our past accordingly. This function was earlier 
attributed to the personal narrative, with which the assembly of 
interpretations of past events is inextricably linked. Memory is 
not merely a repository for past experiences but, as Robinson 
(1986) notes, is a generative process, forging (both in the 
creative and in the fraudulent senses of the word) connections 
209 
between events and revealing themes in one's experiences. The 
recounting of parts of our personal narratives or inner stories 
involves the distortive processes of recollection and 
reconstruction. It may be viewed as part of what Glover (1988) 
terms "self-creation", with all the selection, excision, 
abridgement and editing that he describes as being an integral part 
of such a project. These constructed connections and themes in 
memories may take the form of accounts of the cognitive processes 
underlying our choices, evaluations, judgements and behaviours. 
However, as Nisbett and DeCamp Wilson (1977) note, there has 
emerged a growing belief within cognitive psychology that people 
may not have direct access to such higher order mental processes 
as those involved in evaluation, judgement, problem solving and the 
initiation of behaviour. From a series of studies, these writers 
conclude that people are sometimes unable to report correctly about 
the existence of evaluative and motivational responses, to report 
that a cognitive process has occurred or to report correctly on the 
relationship between a stimulus and a response. Instead, they 
propose that accounts of higher order mental processes are 
constructions, based upon a priori causal theories about the sort 
of responses that are typically produced by certain stimuli. 
Several major factors which produce distortion of reported memory 
traces are outlined by Baddeley (1979), including 
conventionalisation, i. e., the tendency to explain unfamiliar 
events in terms of familiar ones; the propensity for reporting what 
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seems most plausible rather than what actually occurred; the 
unwillingness to report frankly on sensitive, emotive topics; and 
the use of leading questions by researchers. Of these four, the 
lastmentioned two are the only ones which can be counteracted to 
any substantial degree. Training in a socio-emotional, empathic 
style of questioning and/or the stressing of stringent procedures 
to protect respondents' anonymity and respect the confidentiality 
of the information which they give may help to promote honest 
reporting on sensitive topics (Coyle, 1989). The framing of 
questions so that they do not suggest a particular answer to 
respondents eliminates the problem of leading questions. However, 
the remaining two factors bedevil attempts to access accurate 
reports of past events. 
Menneer (1979) points to several further distortive influences in 
behavioural reports, namely feelings of guilt about admitting to 
what is generally considered socially unacceptable behaviour (which 
is linked to Baddeley's point about reporting on sensitive topics) ; 
the degree of interest or relevance to the respondent of the 
subject matter of the research, because if the respondent is not 
interested in the topic or does not perceive it as personally 
relevant, then reports of behaviour are highly likely to be subject 
to distortion; and the tendency to "tidy up the past", i. e., to 
simplify considerably the complexity of actual behaviour. The 
first two tendencies which Menneer outlines ought not to operate 
to any major extent in research on gay identity. Firstly, many 
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respondents may have resigned themselves to their place outside 
the general social norms of sexuality or formed their views of 
their sexuality independently of these norms, which would not 
therefore act as a constraint upon their willingness to report 
honestly on matters relating to their sexuality. Secondly, it is 
assumed that most respondents will perceive their gay identity to 
be of such relevance to their general personal narratives and to 
their general conceptions of self and of such intrinsic interest 
that they will be willing to elaborate freely and frankly upon it. 
The tendency to "tidy up the past" is not a major problem, as the 
intention of this study is to uncover general processes and trends 
in gay identity formation narratives, not to present detailed life 
stories. 
Greenwald (1980) outlines several biases associated with 
information concerning the self, i. e., recall of such material is 
better than for other types of material; people seek and assimilate 
most readily into memory information which accords with their 
existing self-concept, a tendency also reported by Markus and 
Sentis (1982) and by Rogers (1981); and, most pertinently, 
autobiographical memories are retrospectively revised so as to 
comply with the current self-concept. Thus, such autobiographical 
reconstruction may be viewed as an inherent process in the human 
memory system. In terms of the present study, there may be a 
desire to portray oneself as always having been what one now is, 
with the attendant smoothing out of the ebb, flow and flux of 
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events and experiences. One example of this is the tendency for 
individuals to reinterpret their past in terms of their present gay 
identity so they come to "realise" that they were always 
homosexual. This strategy reflects what Sawchuk (1974) terms the 
"retroactive character" of the transformation involved in gay 
identity formation and, he believes, confirms the validity of the 
new identity for the individual. Gagon and Simon (1973) point to 
the effect that reconstruction might have upon childhood memories, 
which they regard as being "subject to revision, excision, and 
other forms of subtle editing based on our place in the life cycle, 
our audience, and the mask that we are currently wearing" (p 135). 
Such reconstruction may not even be a conscious process: Kelly 
(1955) posits that by our very nature, we continually construe and 
reconstrue our experiences, seeking to give logic and coherence to 
our world, constructions which may be regarded as being enshrined 
in an organised and integrated fashion within the personal 
narrative. 
Another occurrence which points to the operation of 
autobiographical reconstruction is the definiteness with which 
subjects were able to reply to the questions posed in Project 
SIGMA's examination of the ages at which gay men first suspected 
that they were sexually different, first labelled that difference 
as gay/homosexual/etc., and had their first sexual experience with 
another man or boy (Coyle, 1988). It might be expected that 
respondents would have been able to recall an event that was of 
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major importance to them and which occurred at a definite point in 
time, i. e., the age at which they had their first sexual contact 
with another male, or even, to a lesser extent, the age at which 
they first labelled their feeling of sexual difference as 
gay/homosexual/etc. But what was surprising was both the fact that 
they could give a response to the question concerning the age at 
which they first suspected they might be sexually different and 
that in most cases they were quite definite about the answer, given 
the nebulous nature of the issue addressed. One would imagine that 
the development of suspicion would be a gradual process of dawning 
awareness and hence that it would be difficult to nominate a 
particular age at which it first occurred. Thomas (1979) warns 
against the presumption that because large numbers of people have 
given apparently definite answers to a recall question, those 
answers are necessarily valid and accurate. The general ease of 
response was also unexpected in that the question often concerned 
events which happened many years ago: the greatest difference 
between a subject's age and the age at which he first suspected he 
was sexually different was 66 years. 
This supports the hypothesis that subjects retrospectively 
interpret life events as being indicative of homosexuality, even 
though they may not have so interpreted them at the time. It may 
have been the case that respondents accounted for their 
homosexuality in the standard psychodynamic terms of a "problematic 
childhood", leading them to construe their sexual preference as 
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having arisen and become fixed in their early years: their 
autobiography may have been reconstructed in terms of such 
commonplace developmental theories. This tendency was observed in 
Yarrow et al. 's (1970) study of child development which found that 
mothers' retrospective assessments of their children's childhood 
were influenced both by the children's subsequent development and 
by theories of child development current at the time of the 
interview. Again, in Pledger's (1977) study of gay men's familial 
relationships, subjects' reports of their relationship with their 
fathers in childhood were significantly different from the accounts 
given by the fathers themselves: autobiographical reconstruction, 
prompted by the psychodynamic view of the etiology of 
homosexuality, which tends to focus upon the familial configuration 
of a dominant mother and a distant father, may have shaped the 
versions of events furnished by the sons, the fathers, or both. 
The same criticisms have been levelled by Feldman (1984) at the 
etiological studies of Evans (1969) and Snortum et al. (1969). 
The Yarrow et al. study has further implications for the study of 
gay identity in its finding that mothers tended to rate their 
children's childhood as having been less difficult in retrospect 
than reports recorded during the school years suggested it had 
been. It is possible that the recollection of the potentially 
traumatic experiences and processes involved in the formation of 
a gay identity may divest those experiences and processes of the 
affective charge which they had at the time. It may be 
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hypothesised that the greater the temporal distance between a 
person's present and those initial gay identity formation 
experiences, the less intense will be the reported affect 
associated with those experiences. Then again, it could equally 
be argued that intervening motivational factors may serve to 
exaggerate that affect the more stable one's gay identity is and 
the more central one's homosexuality is to one's view of the self. 
For example, there may be a desire to exaggerate the traumatic 
aspect in order to heighten the sense of the existence of a turning 
point between what one was and what one now is. In support of this 
hypothesis, Berger and Luckmann (1967) outline the possibility of 
a "rupture" or "turning point" featuring in an individual's 
subjective autobiography, with the pre-turning-point part of the 
autobiography being negatively regarded in comparison with the 
present viewpoint. 
Whatever the distortive influences, accounts of past events have 
consistently been recognised as notoriously unreliable. Davis 
(1979) concludes that "reconstruction in the light of subsequent 
personal development and experience, and wishful self-persuasion 
may be unalterable facts in survey life" (p 156). Such distortion 
applies both to the explanations of events as well as "factual" 
accounts of the events themselves. Richardson (1981) attributes 
the persistence of the belief in the essentiality of homosexuality 
among lesbians to autobiographical reconstruction in that those who 
hold this belief tend to reinterpret their past selectively in line 
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with their present identification as homosexual, ignoring previous 
heterosexual experiences and/or identifications. The 
reconstructive phenomenon has been regarded as a universal dynamic. 
As Goffman (1963) said of man "no matter how false, secretive or 
disjointed his existence, or how governed by fits, starts and 
reversals, the true facts of his activity cannot be contradictory 
or unconnected with each other" (p 81). The tendency to smooth out 
contradictory autobiographical elements is also commented upon by 
Berger and Luckmann (1967) who state that "the individual may 
fabricate and insert events wherever they are needed to harmonise 
the remembered with the reinterpreted past ....... subjectively, he 
is not telling lies about the past but bringing it in line with 
the truth that, necessarily, embraces both past and present" (p 
180). They thus shed some light upon the nature of the contents 
of a personal narrative and support the hypothesis that 
retrospective data is a mixture of fact and filtering. 
Gittins (1979) likens the reconstructing respondent to an historian 
whose task is to interpret and reconstruct history using different 
sources. Expanding this interpretative theme, Cherry and Rodgers 
(1979) report that in the Yarrow et al. (1970) study, while even 
straightforward factual information was subject to distortion in 
reporting, attitudinal data was especially vulnerable (cf. also 
Musto and Bennison, 1969). Hindley (1979) therefore explicitly 
advises that replies to questions relating to past feelings and 
attitudes should be regarded as referring to the respondent's 
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present view of them rather than as having any direct relation to 
what they actually were. 
The reconstruction concept is of direct relevance to the identity 
question not only through its relevance to the concept of the 
personal narrative but also in that it forms the cornerstone of 
what Plummer (1981) refers to as the "identity construct model" of 
gay identity formation. This view focusses upon the cognitive 
processes by which people interpret their sexuality by scanning 
their past lives, e. g., their feelings, behaviours, group 
involvements, and connecting this with accounts of sexuality gained 
from diverse sources such as friends, family and the media. 
Retrospective views of the content and nature of these accounts 
will be examined in the present study and the implications which 
they hold for identity will be inferred. The constructionist 
approach iterates that initially our experiences are much more 
random, unstructured and uncrystallised than we believe and that 
these experiences become increasingly defined by the scanning 
process. A slightly different slant is taken by Goffman (1963) who 
notes how individuals may single out and elaborate retrospectively 
the experiences they use to account for how they arrived at their 
present positions. Such a constructionist view of identity 
formation accords with Weinberg's (1976) assessment of the process 
as one which is "initiated by the individual, who is actively 
involved in what is going on and who attempts to maintain some 
control over what is happening to him" (p 572). The thrust of the 
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process is thus shifted onto the individual, who does not simply 
passively accept the definitions and labels of others but who is 
actively engaged in constructing his own identity, seen here as 
expressed in his personal narrative. 
Where the possibility of reconstruction is acknowledged in 
research, it is more often than not in an apologetic manner, with 
it being cited as something which inevitably interferes with and 
contaminates the aim of the majority of retrospective research, 
i. e., the delineation of events as they actually happened. Cherry 
and Rodgers (1979) conclude that "the best that a retrospective 
enquiry can hope to achieve is an approximation of the event or 
condition as experienced by the participant" (p 40). 
Various methods of overcoming or minimising reconstruction have 
been recommended. For example, exhortations are frequently made 
that retrospective accounts of events should be compared with 
records or interpretations of those events made at the time (Cherry 
and Rodgers, 1979). This presupposes a longitudinal-type research 
framework which is most demanding on resources and difficult to 
apply if one is attempting to capture the entire picture in the 
case of gay identity research, as it would involve following a 
cohort of those who exhibit so-called childhood indicators of 
homosexuality through the development of their sexual identity: 
there would be no guarantee that any of the cohort would eventually 
self-identify as gay/homosexual, and the distortive implications 
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for the reports of subjects' sexual identities if the purpose of 
the study became known to them would be great. 
Other writers concentrate on those events which exhibit 
characteristics that have been shown to lead to well-recalled 
personal memories. These characteristics have been summarised by 
Brewer (1986) as uniqueness, consequentiality, unexpectedness, 
emotionality, importance and non-repetition. Some of these 
characteristics also feature in Linton's (1986) definition of 
salience, i. e., the importance and emotionality of items in memory 
and the frequency with which they are rehearsed. According to her 
line of reasoning, the greater the original salience of items and 
the greater their continuing relevance to a person's life, the more 
likely it is that they will be recalled. Nisbett and DeCamp Wilson 
(1977) add that the more salient an event was at the time when it 
was encountered, the more available it will be in memory at the 
point of recall. However, Linton does warn that the salience of 
an item and hence the likelihood that it will be recalled changes 
over time, so the attribution of salience can only be made on the 
basis of what is recalled. Salience may therefore be of limited 
use in predicting what sort of items will be recollected 
accurately. Linton also points out that events which were 
experienced as negative tend not to be recalled. She contends 
that only "robust, coherent, forward-looking" memory contents are 
recollected accurately. This would appear to create problems for 
the present study, as some of the key developmental experiences in 
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gay identity formation outlined in the previous chapter may have 
had negative outcomes. Yet, one advantage that the present study 
has over previous studies is that it relies heavily on recognition 
rather than recall: in most questions in the questionnaire on gay 
identity formation (see Appendix A), respondents are presented with 
a list of potential reactions to or explanations of key 
developmental events and experiences and are required to indicate 
how closely these describe their own reactions to or explanations 
of these experiences. Furthermore, Linton reports that in her 
study the passage of time did not affect the recognition of 
negative items, only their recall. 
Baddeley (1979), working on the assumption that reconstruction 
results from retroactive interference in memory, i. e., the 
interference caused to learned material by similar material which 
has been learned between the learning and the recall of the 
original material, suggests that respondents should only be 
questioned about the most recent occurrence of the type of event 
under study. When one is concerned with events which, when 
initially encountered, may well have been a source of much trauma, 
e. g., in this study, disclosing oneself as gay/homosexual, 
Baddeley's recommended approach is likely to fail to capture the 
cognitive and affective significance of such events for the 
individual, as presumably the magnitude of the changes they 
engender - and hence their implications for identity - diminishes 
considerably the more often the events are encountered. Moreover, 
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if retroactive interference does indeed contribute to 
reconstruction, this may be a most desirable phenomenon, as it 
implies that the account given by an individual of an original 
event, being suffused with elements of similar events that he/she 
has experienced in the interim, is an amalgum of those events, what 
Tagg (1985) terms "a conglomerate typical event", what Brewer 
(1986) terms a "generic personal memory", and which may be seen as 
part of what Grof (1979) calls a "COEX system" or system of 
condensed experiences. It represents a schematisation of a 
particular category of autobiographical memories: the consistencies 
and regularities of the experiences to which they refer are 
abstracted and stored so that any single experience becomes 
indistinguishable from related ones (Barclay, 1986). This amalgum 
thus constitutes a potted history of the role of that type of event 
in an individual's personal narrative. In any case, it has been 
demonstrated that recent memories are more prone to decay than 
distant ones (cf. Bartlett, 1932; Hunter, 1957), so the Baddeley 
proposal may be based on false premises. 
Gittins (1979) and Tagg (1985) advise that past beliefs are more 
likely to be accurately recalled in response to specific rather 
than general questions. Specific questions are, however, liable 
to shade into leading questions with their attendant biasing of 
responses, so in the present study, questions tend to be generally 
framed and accompanied by a range of specific response categories 
in order to incorporate Gittins' suggestion and at the same time 
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avoid bias. Tagg (1985) suggests that life stories are less 
subject to retrospective distortion than are accounts of discrete 
events. It may be that events are recalled with greater accuracy 
when they are anchored among similar or contemporaneous events or 
when the respondent is encouraged to deal with them in the context 
of a larger sequence of events. The likelihood of accurate recall 
and recognition in the present study is therefore increased by its 
examination of a series of thematically linked events, i. e., all 
are or could be relevant to the formation of a gay identity, and 
by the arrangement of questions in logical sequences, derived from 
the sequences suggested in the review of the literature on gay 
identity formation. 
Cherry and Rodgers (1979) recommend that retrospective studies 
should examine only events which are significant to the individual, 
on the grounds that reports of slight or ambiguous experiences are 
likely to be "hearsay, guess-work or grossly inaccurate" (p 40): 
one is unlikely to recall events which were not important enough 
to have been memorised in the first place. The proposition that 
people will recall most accurately those events which were of most 
importance to them has also been posited by Gittins (1979). The 
latter employs this trend as a crude measurement of the importance 
of material recollected in that she assumes that the more detailed 
a recollection is, the more important the recollected event is to 
the person. If it is the case that subjectively important events 
are likely to be recalled accurately, then a study of gay identity 
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formation - which one may assume is significant to those for whom 
it is relevant - ought to yield accurate reports of the related 
events. However, there are good reasons for questioning the 
assumption that events which were subjectively important will be 
recalled accurately. For example, Greenwald (1980) stresses that 
studies have repeatedly shown that the more important the outcome 
of an event is to an individual, the more likely it is that his/her 
recall of the event will exhibit what he terms a "beneffectance" 
bias, i. e., the person is likely to take credit for an outcome that 
is desirable and to deny responsibility for one that is not. More 
generally, Nisbett and Ross (1980) elaborate at length the ways in 
which people derive self-serving inferences from events. Due to 
the operation of such biases, it may be the case that even if the 
particulars of a subjectively important event are recalled 
accurately, inferences, attributions of responsibility and accounts 
of other psychological processes related to that event will be 
subject to distortion and reinterpretation. 
There are clear grounds for regarding reconstruction as a major 
methodological shortcoming when research is chiefly behavioural in 
nature and aims to achieve isomorphism between reports and 
actualities. But when the focus of research is more psychological, 
reconstruction is interesting per se and rather than being a 
hindrance to the uncovering of "truth", may be regarded as a 
legitimate object of study in itself. As Kelly (1955) points out, 
it is not so much events themselves that shape people's outlook or 
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world view, but rather their interpretations of such events: the 
nature of our perceptions are dependent upon our present frames of 
reference. Individual frames of reference may also play a role in 
promoting discrepancies between actual events and reports of those 
events in terms of question interpretation. A seemingly 
unambiguous question may be interpreted by a respondent in a manner 
entirely askance to that intended by the investigator; thorough 
testing of questions in a pilot study should help minimise the risk 
of this occurrence. The frame of reference theme is expanded by 
Becker and Geer (1970) who point out that explanations of change 
and process given in accounts of events are particularly 
susceptible to post factum reconstruction because of the 
transformations in the reporter's general perspective by his/her 
experiencing of those events and by the consequent changes in the 
self and the social environment which they engender. They state 
that from a person's new perspective "he cannot give an accurate 
account of the past, for the concepts in which he thinks about it 
have changed and with them his perceptions and memories" (p 141). 
This again is a valid point if one's aim is to chart events as they 
actually happened, but unimportant if one is attempting to access 
the perspective on certain events with which a person is currently 
operating. The present perspective is the one with the greater 
phenomenological validity for the person as it is the one with 
which he functions in his everyday relations with his gay identity. 
Slugoski and Ginsburg (1989), when considering autobiographical 
reconstruction in terms of "explanatory speech" through which 
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people engage in a self-presentation as active agents within their 
own life course, rightly point out that theories based upon the 
assumption that there exists an isomorphism between explanatory 
speech and the actualities of the events under study must be 
questioned, but fail to consider that for the reporter, the account 
of events given in explanatory speech may have replaced the 
actualities of those events in the mental representations with 
which they operate in any situation which requires the recall of 
the events in question. Kelly (1955) devotes no serious 
consideration to past construct systems but does take account of 
present constructions of the past, and it is with these that the 
study in hand concerns itself. 
Among those who acknowledge the operation of reconstruction in 
accounts of past events and who adopt it as a specific object of 
study are Gittins (1979) who regards it as something which 
highlights how and why individuals select certain aspects of their 
lives and accord them prominence in their memories, and Kitzinger 
(1987) who takes the social construction of lesbian identities as 
her focus of study. Being unwilling to claim the ability to sift 
through accounts given by subjects and separate fact from fiction, 
Kitzinger explicitly states that her aim is "not to reveal the 
'real' histories, motives and life events of the participants, but 
to understand how people construct, negotiate and interpret their 
experience" (p 71). This assertion could also be viewed as a 
concise statement of intent for the present study, with the added 
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intention of outlining the nature of those constructions, 
negotiations and interpretations and the ways in which they are 
organised within the personal narrative. In a recognition that 
autobiographical material is actively constructed rather than 
passively assimilated, Kitzinger classes it as "a reconstruction 
of the past told from the viewpoint of the present, tailored to 
meet current contingencies, structured, selected and edited as the 
person sees fit, and influenced by fallible memories, reconsidered 
passions, and selective vision" (pp 71-2), which indeed could serve 
as a definition of the personal narrative. 
3.3 Frameworks for Collective Reconstruction: Subcultural 
Narratives 
"In order not to forget its past, a community 
is involved in retelling its story, its 
constitutive narrative" 
- Bellah et al. (1985) 
Analyses of the dynamics of autobiographical reconstruction tend 
to attempt to identify possible individual distortionary factors, 
but seldom adopt a broader assessment of the phenomenon, perhaps 
because it is treated more as a methodological shortcoming than as 
a subject of intrinsic interest. Among the concepts which may 
elucidate the process with regard to sexuality is that of the 
cultural sexual scenario (Simon and Gagnon, 1987), which is 
regarded as specifying the appropriate objects, aims and desirable 
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qualities of self-other relations and instructs in what the actor 
and coparticipants in a scenario are assumed to be feeling. Simon 
and Gagnon concentrate upon describing how the cultural scenario 
for heterosexual interaction arises from a variety of components 
of collective life, e. g., the mass media and the contents of 
folklore, and how it may be "tried on" by individuals and altered 
if found wanting. But here we may posit an entirely separate 
scenario for homosexual interaction and identity formation, which 
is available only in the gay subculture: to this extent it may be 
considered a subcultural scenario. It must specifically address 
the problems of sexual identity pertinent to homosexuals which are 
not encountered by heterosexuals, whose sexual identities are a 
taken-for-granted aspect of the major cultural sexual scenario. 
Yet, like the heterosexual scenario, the homosexual one can only 
be an approximation, what Simon and Gagnon term a "roadmap" for 
sexual conduct (and identity formation), loose enough to act as a 
template which fits the experiences of most gay men. It replaces 
the heterosexual scenario which, until a gay man has had 
sufficiently prolonged and intense contact with the gay subculture, 
is the only collection of sexual prescriptions that is freely 
available as a framework within which to consider his sexuality. 
This subcultural scenario may be retrospectively applied to enable 
individuals to make sense of their past experiences in the light 
of their present positions, while also creating expectations of 
what might happen in the future. 
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Another concept which may be applied to autobiographical 
reconstruction is that of the "script" (Abelson, 1976; Schank and 
Abelson, 1977), which has been defined as "a type of schema in 
which the related elements are social objects and events involving 
the individual as actor or observer" (Nisbett and Ross, 1980, p 
34). Scripts generally take the form of sequences of events over 
time, arranged in a loosely causal manner so that an earlier event 
causes or at least facilitates a later one. Nisbett and Ross 
compare a script to a cartoon strip with a sequence of scenes, each 
one summarising some basic actions, or alternatively to a computer 
program with a set of tracks, variables, relationships, operations, 
subroutines, loops, etc., which are accorded particular values for 
certain applications of the script. 
It is possible to conceive of scripts which are different yet refer 
to the same phenomenon or which have many different paths within 
them, and also of scripts which are subculturally specific. The 
series of rationalisations which Kitzinger (1987) cites for certain 
group-specific patterns of behaviour may therefore be analysed in 
script terms, for example the accounts provided by dealers in 
stolen goods which are designed to minimise their blameworthiness 
(Henry, 1976) ; and the standard accounts produced by former members 
of the Unification Church (Moonies) of their metaphysical journey 
within the church (Beckford, 1983). Thus, a script may be 
additionally seen as a cognitive framework or template which has 
been socially negotiated within a subculture and which is made 
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available to members of the subculture through social interactions 
so that it becomes a part of commonsense everyday subcultural 
knowledge. This view is in line with the basic principles of the 
domain of the sociology of knowledge, which holds that beliefs 
espoused by individuals are determined by the social groups to 
which they belong, and the same social groups constitute the 
environment in which these beliefs are acquired (cf. Mannheim, 
1952). The script concept also forms part of what various authors 
have termed "the social construction of the self" (e. g., Ponse, 
1978) and accords with Berger and Luckmann's (1967) basic tenet 
that reality is socially constructed and with their insistence that 
"the organism and, even more, the self cannot be adequately 
understood apart from the particular social context in which they 
were shaped" (p 68). Subculture members may use this socially 
constructed framework as an organisational principle by imposing 
it upon their experiences to impart meaning, coherence and 
causality to them. 
In this way, these frameworks may also come within the ambit of 
Mills' (1940) "vocabularies of motive", and, as they are socially 
constructed motivations, accord with his (1952) call for a 
rejection of the concept of motivation residing within the 
individual. He instead believes that "(m)otives are 
words ...... programs of 
language related to situated actions in 
response to questions". These "programs of language" or 
"vocabularies of motive" are held to be social resources, which 
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differ in their availability across individuals and social systems. 
Applying this to the present study, some gay subcultures may have 
a more highly developed vocabulary of motive concerning the gay 
identity formation process than others, possibly because of a 
greater range and richness of gay identity formation experiences 
among those in the subculture who were the chief negotiators of the 
vocabulary. Individuals may vary in their levels of access to 
vocabularies in terms of the degree to which those who espouse the 
vocabularies form part of their social network. Lee (1977) 
outlines the mechanics whereby a new vocabulary of motive arose in 
the USA in the late 1960s concerning homosexuality, one which 
emphasised identity pride, rejected the medical model of 
homosexuality and subverted the vocabulary used by those who 
regarded homosexuality negatively. 
What has been likened to subcultural sexual scenarios, scripts and 
vocabularies of motive can also be conceived of in terms of 
narratives. However, unlike personal narratives which are 
constructed by individuals in order to organise and to render 
coherent, intelligible and purposeful their own experiences, these 
narratives are cultural or subcultural in nature, consisting of 
pre-formulated accounts of experiences that are common to the 
members of the culture or subculture in which they are found. Just 
as in the case of scripts, these (sub)cultural narratives, arising 
from discussion and negotiation around the experiential 
commonalities of members of the (sub)culture and perpetuated and 
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transmitted by them, can provide explanations and rationalisations 
as well as descriptions of experiences that are pertinent to 
(sub)culture members. Not only do they perform this function for 
the (sub)culture as a social entity but they may also be 
internalised by individuals within the (sub)culture, either in part 
or in whole, and used to describe and explain their relevant 
personal experiences. In this way, (sub)cultural narratives may 
influence personal narratives. These subcultural narratives can 
also be viewed in terms of social representations (Farr and 
Moscovici, 1984) with which they share many characteristics. 
Social representations are held to arise from extensive social 
interaction and to be constructions of reality that "reflect 
dominant systems of belief and value in presenting an acceptable 
interpretation of objects, persons or events" (Breakwell, 1986, p 
55), with the function of locating people within social categories 
that have distinctive characteristics, and of prescribing how these 
people's actions should be explained and interpreted. Subcultural 
narratives are also a product of social interaction but reflect 
systems of belief and value within a specific social context and 
for a specific audience, acting as wholly reflexive explicatory and 
interpretative agents, i. e., explaining and interpreting the 
experiences of those whose experiences helped to produce the 
narrative, rather than being created by one social group in order 
to describe and define another. Having said that, elements of the 
larger social representations of gay men and homosexuality must 
inevitably inform subcultural gay identity formation narratives, 
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at least to some extent and at some point in their evolution. 
Although it is necessary to acknowledge the origins of the concept 
in scripts, vocabularies of motive and social representations, for 
example, henceforth it will be referred to as a "subcultural 
narrative", firstly because it will be examined in relation to the 
gay subculture, and secondly because this term makes explicit the 
relationship between this social concept and the individual 
personal narrative in terms of which identity has been conceived 
in this study. 
The processes whereby a subcultural narrative comes into being may 
be elucidated by reference to Berger and Luckmann's treatment of 
how arbitrarily-formed routines become sedimented into 
institutions, or, as they put it, how the "'There we go 
again' .... becomes 
' This is how these things are done 111 (p 77) . The 
contents of subcultural narratives, derived from the experiential 
commonalities of a group, come to be accorded the status of 
persistent patterns of experience and the expectation arises that 
these patterns will be repeated in group neophytes. In line with 
the fundamental proposal of phenomenology concerning the genesis 
of routine knowledge, the knowledge which constitutes subcultural 
narratives is accrued in the social group over time and, in stable 
situations, is taken for granted by group members. Thus the 
experiences shared by the group are preserved in its history and 
shape its expectations. This proposal is not new. For example, 
Orr (1990) describes how technicians construct group-specific 
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narratives through relating in conversation their experiences of 
technical problems, creating meaning and coherence out of diverse 
items of information. 
However, the subcultural gay identity formation narratives proposed 
here may have a function which is more than organisational. By 
emphasising the commonalities in gay identity formation experiences 
they may validate the "realness" of those experiences for the 
individuals concerned. The existence of a subculturally specific 
type of language in which the narrative may be couched may further 
serve to emphasise this "realness" and distinctness from the 
heterosexual world in the same way as in Berger and Luckmann's 
(1967) example of linguistic differences serving to differentiate 
between and legitimise the worlds of the cavalry and the infantry 
in the army. Additionally, the subcultural narrative may amplify 
a sense of subcultural cohesion, allow individuals to see what 
options might be open to them and to predict how the development 
of their gay identity might proceed, as well as being an antidote 
to the fact, often reported in the pilot study for the present 
investigation, that when an individual realises that he is or might 
be gay, he believes he is the only one in the world who has ever 
experienced these feelings. If the individual has experienced the 
gay identity formation subcultural narrative through contact with 
other gay men, he may feel reassured that others have trodden his 
path and have survived. Whatever their function, the ontogenesis 
of the subcultural narratives proceeds from the incorporation of 
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common biographical experiences into a common stock of knowledge 
which is made generally available to and thus becomes transmissable 
by members of the subculture: these experiences are stripped of 
their idiosyncratic details in the process as they are more easily 
learned and transmitted in a formulaic form. The areas of overlap 
between subcultural narratives and personal narratives and the 
importance of one for the other are clear. They share the 
functions of imparting meaning, coherence and intelligibility onto 
a series of past events. Both can be conceived of as relating to 
past events and yet setting goals or providing blueprints for 
future action. If the personal narrative can be equated with 
identity, then the internalisation of subcultural narratives 
constitutes one of its most explicitly social aspects. 
Yarrow et al. 's (1970) study of child development points to the 
existence of something akin to a cultural narrative or 
organisational framework in attributing the accuracy of children's 
recollections of their own early years (as compared with records 
of events made during those years) to the children's gradual 
absorption of what they termed the "family folklore" about their 
own childhood and upbringing. This point emphasises that social 
constructions of events cannot be arbitrary: they must have a 
considerable degree of general veracity to be of use as an 
organisational framework. Exact isomorphism between subcultural 
narratives and the actual experiences of individuals is not 
important: the role of the narratives is simply to order and 
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structure experiences for which there are no generally available 
or acceptable means of interpretation in mainstream society. 
It is not posited that these subcultural narratives are universal, 
unitary or fixed once formed. Each subculture will promote those 
which have been found to have the greatest applicability to its 
members' experiences (there may exist more than one narrative 
within a subculture if that subculture must embrace a wide 
diversity of experiences) and important new subcultural experiences 
may need to be assimilated into the narratives if they are to 
remain maximally useful. One such new item which may have required 
existing subcultural narratives to accommodate to and assimilate it 
is the AIDS experience: some of the possible ramifications of the 
advent of AIDS for gay identity formation have already been 
outlined and are described in more detail in the next chapter. 
Nor is it suggested that these subcultural narratives are ever 
explicitly stated or that the choice of narrative is ever forced 
or even conscious: they are simply negotiated within the subtext 
of conversation, a medium which, according to Berger and Luckmann 
(1967), "ongoingly maintains, modifies and reconstructs" (p 172) 
an individual's subjective reality and whose role in organising, 
maintaining and modifying identities has been much overlooked. 
Conversation may organise and objectify as reality the themes of 
the subcultural gay identity formation narrative for the 
individual. The belief that such conversational sharing of gay 
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identity formation experiences actually occurs arises from a 
consideration of the nature of the subculture as a forum for the 
sharing of such commonalities and also from the concept of 
psychodynamic catharsis: intrinsic benefits may be derived from 
repeated relating of the experiences if they were to any extent 
traumatic, in that such retelling in a non-threatening supportive 
subcultural context helps divest them of their associated trauma. 
As a young lesbian woman put it when describing in an interview 
with an Irish newspaper her initial contact with the Dublin gay 
scene, "After an hour-and-a-half of telling my story I felt an 
awful lot better" ("Sunday World", Sept. 11th, 1988). It is simply 
Freud's "talking cure" applied to gay identity formation 
experiences. 
There may be a set of factors which give rise to individual 
differences in the extent to which subcultural gay identity 
formation narratives are adopted as experiential organising 
frameworks and in the form of narrative adopted, e. g., age, 
education, geographical factors such as the city versus provinces 
or urban versus rural distinction, proneness to conformity, and 
perceived similarity between one's experiences and the range and 
flexibility of subcultural narratives available. There may be 
further intra-subcultural differences across the various groupings 
that make up the gay subculture. 
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Drawing these elements together and applying them to the present 
study, it may be that what is being accessed is not purely the 
actual key elements in the process of gay identity formation, nor 
the personal retrospective reconstruction of those events, but also 
a subcultural social phenomenon. It may be the case that the gay 
subculture promotes a certain "party line", "script", "cognitive 
framework", "vocabulary of motive" or "subcultural narrative" 
concerning the processes and progress involved in gay identity 
formation. The existence of a subcultural gay identity formation 
narrative is directly posited by Simon and Gagnon (1987) in their 
assertion that gay men "are... constrained... where there is 
involvement within homosexual networks, to share an idea of common 
or collective identities and origins" (p 380). This narrative may 
be learned by the subcultural initiate through his interactions and 
his swapping of gay identity formation stories with other members 
of the subculture, so this social construction of the gay identity 
formation process provides a template which he may impose upon what 
might be a fragmented and disunited set of experiences in an 
exercise of autobiographical reconstruction. Such reconstruction 
falls into the category of "strong schema-based processes" which 
Brewer (1986) believes are responsible for producing nonveridical 
personal memories. 
It could be argued that a retrospective study which relies to a 
large extent on recognition - as does the present study - is even 
more subject to producing nonveridical personal memories than is 
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a study based on recall, as Barclay's (1986) work suggests that 
recognition is associated with a relatively high "false alarm" 
rate, i. e., people tend falsely to identify events as having 
occurred in their lives if presented with descriptions of events 
that were conceptually similar to what they would expect to have 
occurred. He posits that this "semantic similarity effect" at 
least partly accounts for many of the inaccuracies found in 
people's recognition of autobiographical information, but offers 
no hypothesis concerning the source of the expectations upon which 
the effect is founded. It may be the case that in the present 
study, respondents' beliefs about what is likely to happen during 
the course of gay identity formation are derived from the exchange 
of ideas with other gay men about their developmental sequences, 
out of which arises and is internalised a subcultural narrative 
relating to typical gay identity formation courses. Over time, the 
distinction between one's own experiences and the conceptually 
similar ones contained in the subcultural narrative becomes 
blurred: a dynamic interaction occurs between the two, with one 
amplifying and elaborating the other. Hence, respondents may 
identify as their own experiences which did not occur but which, 
because they form part of a subcultural gay identity formation 
narrative, could plausibly have occurred. Such recognition is 
false only to the extent that it does not correspond with the 
actualities of the person's experiences although it may accurately 
reflect their internal representations of their experiences. And 
as it is with these representations that the present study is 
239 
concerned, the possibility of "false" recognition, far from being 
a methodological problem, is instead a valuable source of data. 
As Thelen (1989) points out, "the important question is not how 
accurately a recollection fitted some piece of past reality, but 
why ..... actors constructed their memories in a particular way at 
a particular time". 
The attribution of "falsity" to such data may stem from a purely 
cognitive approach to the study of memory, but recently the social, 
collective and constructive aspects of memory, originally 
emphasised by Bartlett (1932), have made claims to at least equal 
consideration (Middleton and Edwards, 1990). For example, Shotter 
(1990) has conceived of memory as a constructive and selective 
process, the principles of selection of which issue from and are 
located within the social activities of everyday life, specifically 
in the frameworks provided by the social institutions into which 
individuals are socialised. The process of autobiographical 
reconstruction in terms of subcultural narratives may be viewed as 
part of the taking over of the world of others which Berger and 
Luckmann (1967) define as the essence of socialisation. In a 
process of secondary socialisation, the subcultural initiate 
internalises and personalises aspects of those to whom he attaches 
himself in the subculture, just as the child does in primary 
socialisation, with the focus here being on one specific 
internalised aspect of the significant others' experiences, i. e., 
the construction of gay identity formation experiences. And as 
240 
this construction must be selective in what it includes if it is 
to be easily transmissable, the approach to autobiographical memory 
adopted here accords with Shotter's general outlook, even if one 
might baulk at his apparently wholesale rejection of the cognitive 
model of memory. 
The interpersonal narration that occurs within the subculture, 
according to Simon and Gagnon (1987) serves to "lower uncertainty 
and heighten a sense of legitimacy for both the other or others as 
well as the actor" (p 365). By echoing an individual's 
autobiographical gay identity formation phases, the subcultural 
narrative legitimates each of those phases as a mode of being, 
which is "conducive to feelings of security and belonging" as the 
individual can view himself as "repeating a sequence that is given 
in the 'nature of things', or in his own 'nature'" (Berger and 
Luckmann, 1967, p 117). As the individual surveys his past life, 
his autobiography becomes intelligible to him in terms of the 
subcultural narrative. The existence of such narratives is 
acknowledged by Kitzinger (1987) who suggests that the overarching 
narrative or framework of radical feminist theory now provides a 
context within which lesbians who formerly defined themselves as 
heterosexual can reconstruct their autobiographies. The role of 
the internalisation of the beliefs and values commonly associated 
with homosexuality/lesbianism in determining the affective 
component of a homosexual/lesbian identity is also noted by 
Richardson (1981). If accounts of the gay identity formation 
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process are to be regarded as reflections of the interpretative 
frameworks employed by subjects to organise their experiences, then 
the various models of gay identity formation outlined in the 
previous chapter may be construed as reflecting the differing 
frameworks employed by the subcultures from which their subjects 
were drawn. 
In the studies of Coyle (1988), Dank (1971), Kooden et al. (1979), 
McDonald (1982) and Weinberg (1976), therefore, the three key 
events selected for study from the gay identity formation 
processes, i. e., suspecting, labelling and engaging, may be 
regarded as reflecting these writers' ideas about what constitutes 
the chief components of a gay subcultural narrative, framework or 
construction of the process. This may go some way towards 
explaining the facility with which Project SIGMA respondents 
generally recalled the ages at which these events occurred: through 
their exposure to the subcultural gay identity formation narrative, 
they had already been encouraged to structure their experiences in 
these terms. Thus with regard to the definite answers accorded to 
the question concerning the age at which a subject first suspected 
that he might be sexually different, it may be hypothesised that 
retrospective "sensitization" - to borrow Troiden's (1977) term - 
had occurred. That is to say, subjects had incorporated notions 
of what constituted childhood indicators of such difference from 
the general social sexual narrative or the subcultural narrative 
and had interpreted their childhood experiences in these terms. 
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It was an issue to which they had already given consideration and 
they were therefore able to reply with reasonable facility when 
questioned about it. 
Of course, the entire concept of subcultural narratives in gay 
identity formation must remain a theoretical speculation: the only 
means of rigorously investigating it would be by the examination 
of the gay identity formation stories of those who have not had the 
opportunity to be exposed to any interpretative frameworks within 
the gay subculture. To contact a substantial number of gay men 
before they have had any social contact with other gay men would 
be well nigh impossible, due to the subculture being the usual 
starting point for any gay-related research. Also, it is difficult 
to envisage men who may not yet be secure 
in their sexual identity 
(if we assume social contact with other gay men to be a major means 
of achieving that security) participating in research which may 
require them to address issues which they had dealt with perhaps 
only partly or not at all, thus risking upset in their cognitive 
balance of ideas about themselves and their sexuality. So the 
evidence supporting the existence of subcultural narratives for the 
gay identity formation process is, by necessity, inferential and 
piecemeal and will always be open to alternative explanations. For 
example, if a consistent similarity is observed across gay identity 
formation accounts, it may be cited as evidence either for the 
existence of a common framework for interpreting experiences or for 
the existence of an actual universality of experience among gay 
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men. 
To reiterate, what are being considered in the present study are 
gay men's reconstructed narrative accounts of their gay identity 
formation experiences, with all the bias, distortion and 
selectivity that autobiographical reconstruction implies. It may 
be argued that, if the reconstructive process is taken as a given, 
what is being studied says nothing about gay identity formation but 
rather looks at gay identity as it is now constituted, giving its 
own history of itself, and is therefore of limited value. One can 
agree with the basic propositions of this line of reasoning while 
rejecting utterly the conclusion. Reconstruction, like the concept 
of the subcultural narrative, must be taken as a given: as we do 
not have access to gay men's accounts of their gay identity 
formation experiences at the time they encountered them, we cannot 
compare their present gay identity formation narratives with these 
accounts, so the occurrence of reconstruction cannot be tested. 
What this chapter has attempted to do is to argue that 
reconstruction is an inevitable occurrence when people are required 
to render accounts of past experiences, and to provide a basis on 
which one can justify importing the concept of reconstruction as 
a given into the consideration and interpretation of retrospective 
data. Thus, it will henceforth be assumed that reconstruction will 
occur to some extent in all aspects of the accounts that gay men 
provide of their gay identity formation experiences. 
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Yet, as has been outlined, some writers have attempted to itemise 
the characteristics that may lead to certain past experiences being 
accurately recalled. Their chief criterion appears to be 
importance: it is believed that the greater the significance of an 
event for an individual, the more likely that individual is to 
recall the event veridically. But even if this idea were valid 
(and the work of Greenwald (1980), for example, suggests that there 
are grounds for supposing it is not) , information on the importance 
of gay identity formation-related events could not be used to 
decide which accounts could be treated as accurate reflections of 
events as they happened because the attributions of importance 
would be made retrospectively and may themselves be 
reconstructions, perhaps derived from what has been deemed 
important in subcultural narratives which outline typical courses 
of gay identity formation. Setting aside these substantial 
reservations about this approach for a moment, the notion that 
certain past events may be accurately recalled is not inimical with 
the claim that retrospective accounts are characterised chiefly by 
reconstruction: because gay identity formation narratives are 
regarded as reconstructed accounts, this does not mean that they 
are not contiguous with the actualities of the events enshrined 
within them at least at some points, although as accounts of the 
affective antecedents and consequences of these events must be 
regarded as reconstructions, and also possibly their positions 
within the narratives, they may be viewed as being surrounded by 
a web of reconstruction. 
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No attempt will be made to sift actuality from reconstruction in 
the present study, for one further reason: even if one were to 
accept some of the propositions of those who aim to describe the 
nature of past events that are subject to accurate recall, they 
fail to do so with sufficient precision for the generation of 
specific predictions about what will be recalled accurately. For 
example, Brewer (1986) does not say exactly how unique, unexpected, 
emotional and important events must be in order for them to be 
recalled accurately, nor does he suggest how these traits may be 
measured. In retrospective accounts, it is well nigh impossible 
to distinguish with certainty what is fact from what is filtering, 
although from the point of view of the individual holding an 
identity, all aspects of his narrative, including events which were 
actually experienced in the way in which they are described and 
experiences that have been elaborated through reconstruction, may 
be regarded as subjectively factual. The quest to sort "fact" from 
"fiction" is misplaced: it marks a failure to realise what are the 
really important data, i. e., not the actualities of past events 
with all their long-forgotten nuances and details, but rather 
present interpretations of past events which are the constituents 
of present identities and the foundation stones of future actions. 
Accounts of past gay identity formation experiences will therefore 
be subject to dual interpretations where possible, sometimes 
explicitly, when accounts of experiences will first be interpreted 
as accurate reflections of what actually happened to individuals 
and then as performing different roles as reconstructed aspects of 
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their larger gay identity formation narratives, and sometimes 
implicitly, when there is no obvious difference between the roles 
played by the events within gay identity formation narratives if 
the accounts of the events are regarded literally or as 
reconstructions. 
Efforts have also been made in this chapter to stress that although 
retrospective accounts do not permit access to the actualities of 
how gay identity is formed, they do allow a study of how gay 
identity is constructed. It is the construction of gay identity, 
the individual's present representation of his own gay identity 
formation to himself, that is the object of the present study. 
Some may regard the pursuing of such a line as an unnecessary 
complication in an area already replete with ill-defined terms and 
empirically untested concepts, but the similarities among accounts 
of gay identity formation experiences reported in the literature 
review are such that the idea of autobiographical reconstruction 
on an individual level and, through the internalisation of 
subcultural narratives, on the collective level, at least merits 
consideration and may prove to have much explanatory power as a 
meta-concept in this field of study. 
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3.4 Conclusion 
In sum then, it appears that the answer to the problem which 
prompted the consideration of autobiographical memory is that the 
data obtained by studies which require respondents to provide 
retrospective accounts of their gay identity formation experiences 
cannot be considered accurate accounts of the actualities of those 
experiences but, in the present study at least, are unlikely to 
have been deliberately falsified. Instead, the accounts upon which 
the empirical studies outlined in the previous chapter are based 
may be conceived of as reconstructions of past events, influenced 
by respondents' present self-conceptions and by the ideas that they 
have internalised about typical gay identity courses through 
talking with other gay men. The typical gay identity courses 
enshrined in models of gay identity formation undoubtedly have 
considerable basis in fact but they may also be social 
constructions, frameworks which have arisen from certain 
commonalities of experience within the gay subculture and which 
respondents can retrospectively impose upon their experiences to 
help render them coherent, meaningful and purposeful within the 
context of their over-arching personal narratives. This heretofore 
largely unconsidered possibility must be taken into account when 
evaluating retrospective data on gay identity formation, and the 
nature of the reconstructions should be recognised as a legitimate 
and valuable object of study. 
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CHAPTER FOUR 
THE PRESENT STUDY: INTENTIONS AND HYPOTHESES 
4.1 A General Policy Statement 
Having considered the literatures which are relevant to gay 
identity formation, the next step is to outline the ways in which 
it is proposed to build upon previous work and advance the study 
of gay identity construction in particular and identity in general. 
In this chapter, the arguments that will be evinced are designed 
to explain and to justify the structure and contents of the 
questionnaire that will be used to access present constructions of 
gay identity formation experiences among a sample of gay men. A 
number of innovations which the present study introduces to 
research on gay identity have already been outlined. Identity will 
be conceived as a personal narrative which can change through the 
processes of assimilation-accommodation and evaluation in order to 
enhance an individual's self-esteem or sense of continuity or 
distinctiveness. Gay identity will similarly be conceived as part 
of the personal narrative, although its centrality within that 
narrative may vary considerably. Sometimes it may suffuse 
virtually all the stories that people tell about themselves while 
at other times it may be a relatively subsidiary theme or but one 
discrete aspect of the entire story. Either way, it will be held 
to consist of an individual's construal of their sexual preference, 
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of their reactions to it and of experiences that involve it, and 
the changes that have occurred in their personal narrative and in 
their interpersonal environment because of it. The constructions 
that constitute the gay identity-relevant personal narrative take 
the form of autobiographical memories of gay identity-relevant past 
events. These memories are unlikely to be accurate representations 
of these events but may instead be interpretations of the past, 
rendered from the vantage point of the present and influenced by 
intervening events and experiences and by expectations of what 
typically occurs in gay identity formation, which are gleaned from 
subcultural narratives about the process, encountered through 
social interaction with other gay men. 
It is the intention of the present study to highlight the 
commonalities in the gay identity-relevant personal narratives of 
a group of London-based gay men. These commonalities of 
interpretations may be based upon commonalities of experience. It 
is also intended to predict the sequences of events and experiences 
that may feature in narratives relating to gay identity formation 
through a study of the most common experiential sequences reported 
by respondents. Again, these common sequences may be underscored 
by shared experiences or they may reflect the adoption of common 
retrospective organisational frameworks obtained through the 
internalisation of subcultural narratives. In the following 
discussion, hypotheses are outlined about the sort of gay identity 
formation experiences that are expected to be reported by 
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respondents in the present study and about how these experiences 
may relate to and influence each other. It must not be forgotten, 
however, that what is being considered are reports of experiences, 
recollections of the past, selected, edited, and fitted into a 
meaningful narrative by individual story tellers. The links 
postulated between experiences may reflect actual mechanisms of 
causation that operated at the time or may represent the unstated 
connections that exist in a reconstructed gay identity narrative 
which make it plausible and meaningful. 
4.2 Using Insights from the Study of Adult Development 
While employing the concepts of personal and subcultural naratives 
as overarching analytic frameworks, as has already been suggested, 
analysis of the experiences involved in gay identity formation may 
fruitfully employ conceptualisations that have been used in the 
study of adult development. For example, while recognising the 
deficiencies of Erikson's concept of identity formation and its 
non-universal applicability, it may yet be relevant to the present 
study. Even if it illuminates only the identity courses of 
"Western males in a surplus economy", as Slugoski and Ginsburg 
(1989) have claimed, this by no means invalidates the framework, 
especially in a study where most respondents are likely to be 
highly educated Western males with reasonable incomes - if the 
respondent profile of this study is similar to that of Project 
251 
SIGMA (Davies, Hunt, Macourt and Weatherburn, 1990) - which ought 
to increase the range and quality of the life course alternatives 
open to them. The concepts of an identity crisis in terms of 
decision-making tasks and the development of identity through 
active decision-making are most pertinent in the case of gay men. 
The course of gay identity formation may be interpreted or 
constructed within personal and/or subcultural narratives as a 
series of junctures at which the individual must make decisions 
that could affect the nature of his identity, i. e., he is faced 
with identity crises. Examples of these include constructions of 
the decision about when, how and to whom an individual will 
disclose his sexual preference; and the decision about how to 
interpret same-sex sexual feelings, although an individual may 
describe himself as having been impelled by his social environment 
to interpret them in a particular way, e. g., if he reports that he 
had already been labelled as gay/homosexual by his peers before he 
had accepted that label for himself. As the resultant decisions 
are translated into behaviour within narratives (or non-decisions 
into inaction), these may be described as having carried 
implications for the individual's identity course, with some 
decisions reported to have produced rewarding experiences which 
bound the individual more closely to a gay identity, while others 
prevented him from committing himself further to a gay identity. 
Another relevant idea is that of the developmental task, elaborated 
by Havighurst (1972) and used by Levinson et al. (1978) in their 
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consideration of adult development. Havighurst defines a 
developmental task as "a task which arises at or about a certain 
period in the life of the individual, successful achievement of 
which leads to his happiness and to success with later tasks, while 
failure leads to unhappiness in the individual, disapproval by the 
society, and difficulty with later tasks" (1972, p 2). This 
description may be applied to the constructions of many of the 
major developmental events and experiences in gay identity 
formation if it is modified slightly. Given the largely negative 
societal evaluation of homosexuals and homosexuality, failure at 
any of the developmental tasks in gay identity formation is 
unlikely to meet with disapproval from society at large, although 
social disapproval may be said to have been expressed by members 
of the gay subculture at an individual's failure to achieve what 
may have been regarded as prescribed developmental milestones 
enshrined within that subculture's gay identity formation 
narrative. Also, the successful achievement of some of the 
developmental tasks in gay identity formation may not lead to 
immediate happiness but may impel the individual to address other 
tasks which may eventually lead to happiness. For example, if an 
individual describes himself as having self-defined as 
gay/homosexual without having come into contact with the gay 
subculture, the resolution of the self-definitional task may be 
said to have left him feeling isolated and possibly with a 
negatively-evaluated identity. His narrative causal connection 
here may be that having self-defined as gay, he was unsure of what 
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to do next. It was only when he decided to force his development 
onwards and tackle another developmental task, such as making 
contact with other gay men, that he may report that he began to 
evaluate his identity more positively, to feel less isolated and 
generally to feel happier. The events and experiences of gay 
identity formation may also be conceptualised as developmental 
tasks in that they may be normatively linked to certain stages in 
the gay identity courses outlined in subcultural narratives. It 
may be expected that if an individual has achieved some milestones, 
then he will also have achieved others. For example, if he has 
established a gay relationship, is involved in the gay subculture, 
and has disclosed his sexual preference to friends and workmates, 
others may find it surprising or even reprehensible if he has not 
told his parents. 
A group's developmental tasks are held to arise from physical 
maturation, societal expectations and individual aspirations or 
values, either in combination or from one factor chiefly. They 
therefore have both organic and environmental aspects, and so 
accord with the psychosocial model of identity adopted in this 
study. Havighurst (1956) outlines three procedures for identifying 
developmental tasks: observation, questioning and introspection. 
The procedure relied upon primarily in the present study is 
questioning: by examining responses given in a pilot study, it was 
hoped to ascertain how the sample of gay men constructed what their 
chief developmental concerns had been. Havighurst's idea of 
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developmental tasks therefore appears to be applicable to the 
events and experiences of gay identity formation, but it can only 
be used to describe these events and experiences, not to explain 
them. For the specification of the factors which encourage or 
inhibit the motivation to address the various developmental tasks, 
it will be necessary to utilise the insights obtained from the 
review of the literature on gay identity formation and from the 
consideration of the process of autobiographical reconstruction. 
4.3 The Internalisation and Transmutation of Social Norms 
Regarding Homosexuals and Homosexuality 
From the review of the literature, two broad themes were discerned 
which characterise the contents and processes of the developmental 
tasks of gay identity formation, i. e., the internalisation and 
transmutation of social norms regarding homosexuals and 
homosexuality, and the disclosure of sexual preference. The former 
refers to the changes which occur in gay men's conceptions of what 
it means to be gay and of the social category of "gay man" and/or 
"homosexuality" from their first internalisations of the 
conceptions of others to their appreciation of the personal 
relevance of and their application of this conception to 
themselves, and the transformations in this conception engendered 
by their experiences en route and subsequently. 
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In the hypotheses that follow in relation to these themes, 
propositions will generally be described as if they refer to what 
actually happens to gay men during gay identity formation, but it 
must be remembered that they may also be regarded as relating to 
likely reconstructions of significant events in gay identity 
formation, with their concomitant attributions of causality and 
outcome. The dual rendering of these hypotheses is mostly not made 
explicit in this chapter for reasons of brevity, fluidity of 
language, and because it would often have involved the simple 
repetition of similar hypotheses, albeit with different formulaic 
addenda. Lest this policy be seen as misleading or as 
overemphasising the possibility of accurate recall rather than 
reconstructed accounts, the consideration of the construction and 
piloting of the questionnaire used in the present study (see 
Appendix D) will describe retrospective accounts of events mostly 
as if they were reconstructions and not subject to literal 
interpretation. Such an approach is more practical to adopt in 
relation to the subject matter of Appendix D, as fewer labrynthine 
accounts of possible attributions concerning the nature, 
antecedents and consequences of major developmental events in gay 
identity formation narratives are elaborated within it, so the 
necessity for a certain degree of circumlocution when describing 
reconstruction is less likely to lead to hypotheses couched in 
cumbersome terms and to cause confusion. 
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To begin, it is hypothesised that respondents will report that the 
initial information they received about homosexuality was 
predominantly stereotypical and negative in nature and that the 
information either condemned or ridiculed homosexuals. The reason 
for its posited negative tone is because the primary source of the 
information is hypothesised to be the people or media which act as 
filters for most of the other information which the child or 
adolescent receives about the world, i. e., parents, family, peer 
group and media. If, as was suggested in the consideration of the 
first stage of Cass's (1979) model, societal attitudes towards 
homosexuality are generally negative, then naturally the family 
milieu in which the child is socialised in the norms of his culture 
will promote a negative view of homosexuality. This view will be 
shared by peers who have been similarly socialised. And as for the 
final source of information, the media seldom portray homosexuality 
in a positive non-stereotypical fashion. The chances of 
respondents encountering positive views of homosexuality in their 
childhood or early adolescence (when it is felt that most people 
first encounter the concept) are therefore slim. Even if their 
parents were informed and non-judgemental or held a positive view 
of homosexuality, this may be tempered by the attitudes of the peer 
group and the media. Evidence in favour of this biased 
socialisation comes from a study of the first information that a 
group of students received about various sexual topics (Thornburg, 
1978). Retrospectively assessing its accuracy, they rated the 
information that they had received on homosexuality as having been 
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more inaccurate than the information they had received on any other 
sexual topic. 
It is to be expected therefore that when respondents were first 
learning about homosexuality, they will have internalised a 
stereotypical view of homosexuals/gay men which is likely to have 
been negative in tone and based on commonly-espoused myths 
concerning gay men, e. g., as child molestors, as high camp, 
effeminate figures of ridicule, as sexual degenerates, or as 
tragic, lonely, isolated characters. The promotion of such 
stereotypes through the socialisation process and through various 
communications media serves to protect non-homosexuals from the 
possibility that they may actually be or may become homosexual by 
making the "typical gay man" appear so bizarre, exotic and so far 
removed from the ordinary person that it would require a major and 
fundamental character change for the ordinary person to move into 
the "homosexual category". The possibility of an easy slippage 
from heterosexual to homosexual is thus rendered most unlikely. 
This distancing function of the homosexual category, role or label 
is elaborated by McIntosh (1981). By attaching an unremittingly 
negative judgement and tone to the "typical gay man" and to the 
whole concept of homosexuality, the socialisation process 
discourages young people from aspiring to or even considering the 
personal applicability of the homosexual category, which is 
rendered so negative and stigmatised that its adoption would be 
tantamount to an act of psychological self-assault. 
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The negative consequences of such socialisation experiences for an 
individual's sense of self-worth are eloquently elaborated by Clark 
(1987). He points out how gay people are socially "invisible" in 
their early years so that when family and friends promote negative 
images of homosexuality, they unknowingly damage the self-concept 
and self-esteem of those for whom homosexuality is personally 
relevant and for whom few positive role models are available to 
counteract this biased socialisation: 
"Almost every Gay person has been invisible 
for some years and some Gay people remain 
invisible all their lives ...... We know we have 
loving feelings for some people who share our 
gender and that we sometimes want to express 
those feelings sensuously and erotically. We 
see men and women set up as heterosexual role 
models for expressing those feelings to one 
another. We see it in the family, on the 
street, in magazines, movies, and on TV. Thus 
do we shape our idea of what is right, normal, 
natural, and good. Never do we see loving 
expressed by two men or two women. our inner 
truth is not validated visibly; we have no 
models. It is as if other people like us do 
not exist. We hear stories and see fictional 
portraits of deranged, depraved, and defective 
people who grotesquely act out our feelings, 
and we wonder if that is who we are ...... The homosexual is portrayed as an ugly man in 
rumpled, too-large overcoat who lurks under 
the pier hoping to attack delicious young boys 
who dare take a shortcut home from 
school ...... There 
is no way to identify with 
the person so presented on the screen and 
still maintain self-respect. 
Because we are not visible, we hear the 
pointed derogatory jokes and stories about 
people who share our feelings, and these 
hurtful messages issue from the mouths of 
fathers, mothers, aunts, uncles, brothers, 
sisters, teachers, counselors, and friends. 
Few would think of telling a story or joke 
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that is anti-black in the presence of a Black 
person or one that is anti-Jewish in the 
presence of a Jew. But if by chance the Black 
or Jew is exposed to such an insult, that 
person has the comfort of family and the inner 
community of relatives and friends. Not so 
for the Gay. She or he is invisible. Not 
only can we not turn to family or friends, it 
is these very people who insult and traumatize 
us throughout "the years of invisible 
development. 
The Gay person begins to think of himself or 
herself as wrong, bad or defective...... 
Privately we grow up during the invisible 
years suspecting that there must be many basic 
things wrong about us. Why else would loved 
ones say such things about people who share 
our feelings? And the seeds of self-doubt and 
self-hate grow and grow. " (pp 92-93). 
The process of socialisation in an anti-homosexual milieu is one 
reason why this initial information is hypothesised to be highly 
negative in tone. Another reason relates to the process of 
reconstruction. Whatever meaning respondents attach to the term 
"coming out" - and in the pilot study, respondents interpreted the 
term as relating to the disclosure of sexual preference and to 
self-acceptance as gay/homosexual - there may be a tendency to view 
it as a biographical watershed, as the major turning point in the 
history of one's gay identity formation, before which lies a period 
of concealment, guilt and falsehood and after which follows 
openness, pride and truth. In this way, two apparently discrepant 
halves of one's biography are linked by a major change-inducing 
event. An alternative means of resolving this discrepancy involves 
insisting that one has always been what one now is: it is simply 
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the level of self-awareness that has changed. Both these tactics 
are ways of making sense of one's biography and of the development 
of one's identity: in rendering logical what may to an outsider 
appear illogical, they promote an Eriksonian sense of 
"selfsameness" or continuity. If coming out, defined in terms of 
disclosure or self-acceptance, is viewed as a watershed, 
respondents may tend to emphasise its change-inducing role by 
accentuating the state of affairs before and after coming out so 
that the transition appears as an emergence from the darkness of 
pre-coming out negative attitudes to homosexuality and concealment 
of one's sexual preference into the light of post-coming out 
positive evaluations and openness. It may be likened to a 
religious conversion where the converts paint themselves as the 
ultimate sinner before their change-inducing encounter with God. 
This phenomenon may be expected to colour many of the responses to 
questions which inquire about various states of affairs pre- and 
post-coming out. In summary then, we would expect respondents to 
report an overwhelming negativity in pre-coming out (i. e., pre- 
disclosure or pre-self-acceptance) attitudes to homosexuality 
either because they were inculcated in respondents during the 
socialisation process or because of a reconstructive tendency to 
exaggerate the change involved in coming out or because of an 
interaction of both. 
Very often, an integral part of the socialisation process is the 
attempt to inculcate in the child or young person the values of the 
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parents and/or values which are current in larger society. If 
parents live by or espouse certain values which they hold dear, it 
is likely that they will wish to impart these to their children. 
And if these values are consistent with those that the larger 
society is held to cherish, then socialisation becomes a process 
whereby the social status quo perpetuates itself. If the 
individual has been socialised with and has internalised a value 
system in which homosexuality is regarded as evil, sinful or 
pathological, then he may experience conflict between his 
homosexuality or the values which he perceives as associated with 
homosexuality and the values which he holds dear. This possibility 
certainly merits study, together with the coping strategies that 
individuals evolve and implement to deal with these conflicts. If 
negative evaluations of homosexuals and homosexuality are enshrined 
in the value system that an individual inherits and wishes to 
retain in some form, then clearly considerable cognitive juggling 
will be required within that value system - possibly in the form 
of assimilation-accommodation and deletion - if he is to identify 
as gay/homosexual and ascribe a positive evaluation to that 
identity. 
of particular interest in this respect are the experiences of men 
who express a high degree of religiosity and/or those who are 
church members. Weinberg and Williams (1974) comment that 
"religious homosexuals may be more likely to experience a conflict 
between their sexual orientation and their religious beliefs" (p 
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252). The Judaeo-Christian tradition has been notably condemnatory 
of homosexuality through the ages (Boswell, 1980; Greenberg and 
Bystryn, 1982; Maret, 1984) and the recent pronouncements of the 
major established churches suggest that this attitude persists 
today (cf. Cardinal Ratzinger's text on "The Pastoral Care of 
Homosexuals" in "The Tablet", November 8th 1986, for the official 
Roman Catholic position; and "The Guardian", September 4th 1987 and 
"Capital Gay", November 13th 1987 for the Church of England's debate 
on the status of homosexuality. Also "Newsweek", February 23rd 1987 
on gay clergy in the USA). Such an officially sanctioned 
condemnation, if it forms part of one's value system, may be 
hypothesised to constitute a source of conflict, but Weinberg and 
Williams (1974), like Troiden (1977), did not find any significant 
differences by religion on various measures among their group of 
gay men but, in accordance with the findings of Kinsey et al. 
(1948), they did discover differences by religiosity. The crucial 
factor was not the church to which one belonged but the degree of 
one's religious devotion or, translated into psychological terms, 
the salience and centrality of the religious component within one's 
identity hierarchy or as a theme within one's personal narrative. 
The more religious gay men tended to be more concerned about the 
exposure of their homosexuality and about other people's opinions 
than those who were less religious. They were also less socially 
involved with other gay men and had had a more limited range of 
same-sex sexual experience. However, only those who expressed the 
opinion that homosexuality directly contravened their religious 
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beliefs exhibited psychological problems such as depression and an 
unstable self-concept. The more religious group was generally not 
characterised by a greater incidence of psychological problems than 
the less religious group, possibly because, Weinberg and Williams 
inferred, some sort of accommodation had been achieved between 
religious beliefs and sexual preference. Several such conflict- 
reducing strategies were outlined. The individual may attempt to 
repress and deny expression to his sexual preference. He may 
renounce his religion: Weinberg (1976) reported this to be the most 
common means of alleviating religiously-derived conflicts among his 
group. He may employ a compartmentalisation strategy whereby he 
does not think about religion when engaged in homosexual activity 
or vice versa. He may use a rationalisation strategy and may 
reinterpret the edicts of his religion in a way that neutralises 
its condemnnation of homosexuality. It may be the case that such 
strategies will also be reported by respondents in this study. 
The possibility of an incongruity between individuals' value 
systems and the values which they perceive as prevalent within or 
as characterising the gay community may also be a source of 
conflict for gay men. It must be remembered that the basic 
commonality which unites the diverse range of people within the gay 
community is a sexual preference shared to a greater or lesser 
degree by its members. The community may be said to be organised 
principally around sexuality, although this of course is not the 
sole organising principle. It is then easy to understand how 
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conceptions of the gay community as being obsessed with sex may 
arise. Such a preconception may make someone extremely wary about 
entering the gay community if they view sex negatively and consider 
an obsession with sexual activity - and its perceived correlates 
of promiscuity, predatoriness and an anti-relationship ambience - 
as the ultimate form of decadence and sinfulness. Indeed, such a 
preconception may deter an individual from ever making social 
contact with other gay men. Even if he is willing to test the 
validity of this preconception by entering the gay community or if 
the desire for contact with other gay men is so urgent that to 
fulfil it would deleteriously affect psychological well-being to 
a lesser extent than not to do so, the individual may yet find that 
his preconceptions are verified to some extent and hence may feel 
that the values which he perceives in the gay community conflict 
with his own values. The reason for this may be that as the gay 
community may be seen as organised around sexuality and as the 
sexual component is easily discernible, the subcultural initiate 
may view the community through a pre-judgemental construct cluster 
with its core constructs relating to an over-emphasis on sex. He 
may be more alert to the sexual aspects of interaction between gay 
men and may thus render his prophecy self-fulfilling. 
Other possible conflicts concern the person's career and his 
masculinity. Involvement in the gay subculture exposes one's gay 
identity to a relatively large number of people and the possibility 
of the disclosure of one's sexual preference by a third party to 
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individuals from whom one would prefer to conceal it is increased. 
Such undesired disclosure may have negative ramifications in terms 
of lost friendships, estranged family members and impeded career 
prospects. If an individual values friendships, family or career 
above the development of a gay identity and considers that the 
pursuit of the latter would jeopardise any of the former, he may 
experience stress and conflict in attempting to cultivate both and 
keep them separate. The most common type of conflict reported by 
Weinberg's (1976) respondents arose from the perceived 
incompatibility of being gay and being a man. The two cognitions 
were found difficult to reconcile because of the men's awareness 
of the most salient aspect of the prevailing cultural stereotype 
of gay men, i. e., that they are effeminate, they desire to be 
women, or they constitute some sort of third gender (cf. Havelock 
Ellis, 1936, for a classic exposition of the "third sex" theory). 
All of the possible conflicts outlined arise from an incongruity 
between a person's self-image and their awareness of negative 
aspects of homosexuality. This may be interpreted as McIntosh 
(1981) interpreted the concept of the homosexual role, i. e., as an 
instrument of social control, by which society, reified in the 
socialisation process, attempts to deter people from allying 
themselves with the homosexual category. 
As well as considering what respondents, conceptions of gay men 
were like when they were first learning about homosexuality, it may 
be interesting to compare them with their present conceptions of 
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what a gay man/homosexual is. Of course, there always exists the 
possibility that respondents will exaggerate the change which may 
have occured in their conceptions of gay men, albeit unconsciously. 
The motivation for such a self-presentation has already been 
examined in the consideration of why initial conceptions of gay men 
may have been highly negative in tone, i. e., in order to effect the 
appearance of a "darkness-to-light" transformation. Aside from 
this reconstructive possibility, it is probable that, given 
positive supportive disclosure and social and sexual experiences 
with other gay men, the individual's conception of what defines a 
gay man will now include fewer negative stereotypical descriptors 
of gay men and will be generally more positive or at least more 
neutral than when he was learning about homosexuality. 
Another possibility is that some respondents may have broken free 
from stereotypical thinking about gay men to such an extent that 
they may be unable to offer a description of a gay man. They may 
have moved from an assumption of homogeneity among gay men to a 
recognition of heterogeneity, and so may repudiate the validity of 
such a concept as a typical gay man. For those who do acknowledge 
the continued existence of a stereotype, it is expected that this 
stereotype will be based on first-hand observations of and 
experiences with gay men and will be altogether more informed than 
the stereotype which they originally reported, which is assumed to 
be based on societal myths regarding gay men. However, the 
possibility remains that for some respondents, their image of the 
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typical gay man will not have manifestly changed or will even have 
become more negative. The most likely cause underlying such a 
state of affairs may prove to be unsatisfactory and unenjoyable 
social and/or sexual contact or relationships with other gay men. 
Within the context of the developmental milestones in the 
transmutation of social norms about homosexuals and homosexuality, 
one may consider those studies which, from the array of complex 
cognitive, affective and behavioural changes which may be critical 
in gay identity formation, focus upon the awareness of sexual 
difference in terms of same-sex attractions, initial same-sex 
sexual activity, and labelling oneself as gay/homosexual (Coyle, 
1988; Dank, 1971; Kooden et al., 1979; McDonald, 1982; and 
Weinberg, 1976). The attempts to ascertain the relative 
frequencies of sequences of these three events, presumed to be 
developmental milestones, have been outlined in Chapter Two. While 
wishing to take account of and reproduce those studies which 
endeavour to trace the ages and sequences of occurrence of 
milestone events, it must be remembered that a conception of gay 
identity formation in terms of the manifestation of age-related 
milestone events is but a skeleton upon which to hang details of 
the cognitive restructuring, behavioural changes and changes in the 
person's social environment which form the flesh of the process. 
This approach delineates the end products of a series of steps but 
in the present study it is hoped that by framing questions which 
also concern the antecedents and consequences of and reasons for 
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the occurrence of these milestone events, respondents' 
interpretations and reconstructions of the intervening dynamics of 
these events may be outlined, they may be placed within the context 
of an overall gay identity formation process and narrative, and 
their relative importance within that process and narrative may be 
ascertained. 
The attempt at "fleshing out the process" might commence by 
inquiring as to which factors, perceived as indicators of 
homosexuality, were regarded as so personally relevant by 
respondents that they sparked suspicions concerning the possible 
personal applicability of the homosexual label. one interesting 
point here is the degree to which the factors identified converge 
with the characteristics attributed to a typical gay man. If a 
substantial degree of convergence occurs and the stereotype is 
negative in tone, it may be hypothesised that this could prove to 
be a source of conflict for the person as they attempt to reconcile 
themselves to a negative self-categorisation, and that this in turn 
could give rise to low self-esteem and a negative self-conception. 
It is also worth examining the factors which confirmed the initial 
self-suspicion as homosexual and which led to self-definition in 
order to ascertain the extent to which these overlap with the 
factors identified as having provoked self-suspicion. Elucidation 
of the ways in which experimentation with roles, labels and/or 
behaviours is drawn to a conclusion is sought, with one of the main 
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areas of interest concerning whether the conclusion is said to 
result from a confirmatory event (or from an event which disproved 
a heterosexual identity) or whether it is seen as the culmination 
of a process of increasing self-suspicion. However, the chances 
of obtaining responses which accurately reflect cognitions at self- 
suspicion and self-definition must be regarded as remote because 
respondents are effectively required to provide recollections of 
past reconstructions. At the time of self-definition, they may 
have selected from their autobiographies experiences which they 
interpreted as indicators of homosexuality in order to project 
their new self-definition into the past, provide it with a history 
and thus promote a sense of personal continuity. The self- 
suspicion stage may therefore itself be an artefact of the 
reconstructive process, marking an attempt to portray one's self- 
definition as gay/homosexual as the culmination of a continuous 
process of development. The construction of a history of self- 
definition may also have been informed by the internalisation of 
relevant aspects of gay identity formation narratives encountered 
through contact with other gay men. Inquiries about the nature of 
the self-definitional process may therefore be regarded more as 
ways of accessing both personal and subcultural constructions of 
this aspect of respondents' gay identity formation narratives 
rather than as carrying any real implications for the uncovering 
of the actual events and cognitions of that time. 
270 
The issue of self-definition as gay/homosexual deserves a more 
thorough treatment than simply the delineation of the ages at which 
it occurred and the factors that facilitated it. The psychological 
ramifications of such self-definition may be considerable. It may 
represent a joyous self-acceptance and the germination of a new 
self-conception that is harmonious with one's feelings and desires; 
or it may reflect a grudging surrender, a resignation to the 
inevitable. The nature of the evaluation placed upon the self in 
the light of this new identity content may depend upon a number of 
factors. One might posit that a major influential variable would 
be respondents' reports of their reactions when they first 
suspected that they were gay/homosexual. If self-suspicion led to 
the self being negatively evaluated - perhaps because one learned 
during socialisation that homosexuality is sick, depraved or sinful 
and at self-suspicion, the self was similarly evaluated - this 
appraisal may have persisted up to and possibly beyond the point 
of self -definition. Other gay identity-relevant experiences which 
led individuals to feel negatively about themselves may similarly 
be hypothesised to have had an enduring effect so that negative 
self-appraisals following self-definition may represent cumulative 
self-evaluations, incorporating residues of earlier negative self- 
appraisals. Examples of such experiences might include the 
internalisation of negative stereotypical information about 
homosexuals and homosexuality during socialisation and reports of 
feeling negatively about oneself while passing as heterosexual or 
when disguising one's homosexuality. Although it may appear 
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logically improbable that the latter experience could influence 
one's evaluation of oneself following self-definition as 
gay/homosexual, since one cannot disguise one's homosexuality 
before one has adopted "homosexual" as a self-descriptor, these 
events may well relate to the same period in a person's gay 
identity formation narrative, so what is being reported is the 
general affective tone of that time rather than the affective 
outcome of any single experience. Thus reports of negative self- 
appraisals in relation to one developmental task may be predictive 
of negative self-appraisals in relation to other developmental 
tasks in gay identity formation. 
The third of the milestone events traditionally examined is that 
of initial same-sex sexual experience. When one considers that gay 
identity formation is founded upon a statistically atypical sexual 
preference, it is surprising that the role of sexual activity in 
the gay identity formation process has not been accorded more 
thorough treatment. The constructions that respondents place upon 
their initial same-sex sexual experience and the implications that 
this event had for their conceptions of themselves and their 
sexuality will be specifically examined in the present study, 
beginning with an examination of the meanings that they attributed 
to this experience. Some will undoubtedly have construed it as a 
homosexual experience either at the time or in retrospect, but, as 
was noted earlier, several writers have outlined ways in which 
participants in same-sex sexual activity may avoid attributing a 
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homosexual meaning to it and/or a homosexual label to themselves 
(Cass, 1979; Hencken, 1984; Lewis, 1984; Troiden, 1977; and 
Weinberg, 1976). 
With regard to the effects which initial same-sex sexual 
experiences may have on attitudes towards the self, any number of 
possible effects may be postulated, ranging from extreme guilt as 
the wrath of the person's value system is incurred, to relief if 
the experience proves pleasurable and provides confirmatory 
evidence that one really is gay/homosexual, thus terminating a 
period of doubt and uncertainty. It may be possible to establish 
a relationship between a respondent's willingness to label his 
experience and/or himself as gay/homosexual and the effects which 
the experience had on his attitudes to gay men. For example, if 
he was unwilling to label the experience as gay/homosexual, this 
was presumably because homosexuality held distinctly negative 
connotations for him, which are unlikely to have been altered even 
if the activity was physically pleasurable, as the activity was not 
viewed as having homosexual implications. The only situation in 
which sexual experience may have altered a respondent's attitudes 
towards gay men would occur when the other participant(s) in the 
sexual activity identified himself/themselves as gay/homosexual. 
In this case, the evaluation of gay men may be determined by the 
evaluation of the sexual experience. If the experience was 
positively evaluated, so might the evaluation of gay men change in 
a positive direction: this could equally be a function of simple 
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stereotype-reducing contact with a gay man. Similarly, if the 
sexual experience was negative, the person may find their 
stereotypes of gay men reinforced and their attitudes towards gay 
men becoming more negative. 
Possibly the most important factor in determining to what extent 
an individual is able to attribute a positive evaluation to his gay 
identity is the nature of his interaction with other gay men. For 
some men, their initial social contact with other gay men may have 
been in some way negative, unenjoyable or unfulfilling and this 
may have infused their developing gay identity with a negative 
affective tone. However, as the vast majority of respondents in 
the present study will lay claim to a gay or homosexual identity 
(as they will be self-selected), it is presumed that somewhere in 
their identity histories, they will have experienced positive 
social contact with other gay men which has helped foster their 
identities through these other gay men regarding the respondents' 
burgeoning gay identities as something positive, to be nurtured and 
developed and providing reference group support for them. The 
major outcome of involvement in the gay subculture, reported by 
both Troiden (1977) and Weinberg (1976), appears to be a diminution 
in the influence of internalised negative stereotypes about gay men 
on subjects' thinking, which results from the provision of positive 
images of gay men acquired through social contact with them. 
Weinberg specified that as a result of subcultural involvement, his 
subjects' definitions of homosexuality broadened to include 
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emotional as well as sexual elements. The impact of these changes 
upon the self and the emerging gay identity may be easily inferred. 
The lessening of the hold of negative stereotypes and the 
realisation that one can find commonalities with gay men reduces 
the perceived disparity between the self and the category of "gay 
man/homosexual". Previously, the dominant line of reasoning may 
have run something like "all gay men are bad/sinful/sick/ 
effeminate; I am not or do not feel bad/sinful/sick/effeminate; 
therefore I am not a gay man". With the first part of the 
syllogism now proven erroneous, there may be a greater willingness 
to self-identify as gay/homosexual. 
Linked to the subject of identity-enhancing contact with other gay 
men is the possibility, mentioned by Weinberg (1976), that one or 
more individuals may be encountered in the subculture who enter 
into mentor or "gay coach" relationships with neophytes, advising 
them, sharing experiences, acting as role models, and possibly as 
vehicles for the transmission of subcultural narratives about gay 
identity formation courses. The extent to which this type of 
relationship is experienced by respondents in the present study 
merits consideration, together with the broader issue of what sort 
of people most influenced respondents' thinking when they were 
coming to terms with their sexuality and the difference that these 
people made to their thinking. The possibilities here are many and 
varied but it is expected that those named as having been most 
influential will be nominated because they played key roles in 
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helping respondents negotiate the major developmental tasks of gay 
identity formation. For example, they may have offered support or 
practical advice or generally reacted positively at various 
junctures, most probably after the respondent made a disclosure of 
sexual preference to them. Gay icons or role models, either well- 
known public figures or individuals personally known to respondents 
who acted as "gay coaches", may also be cited because of their role 
in decreasing respondents' sense of isolation or in diminishing the 
hold of negative stereotypes concerning gay men and/or 
homosexuality. 
One of the goals towards which those who are engaged in developing 
a gay identity may be seen as moving is the establishment of a 
relatively stable and positively-evaluated gay identity. That is 
not to say that a definite end point is posited to the process. 
It simply means that the individual works towards the creation of 
an identity which provides a satisfactory framework through which 
to view himself and with which to structure his world, an identity 
which he is happy to adopt on a long-term basis. The individual 
does not question the foundations of such an identity: it is 
stable, although it may remain open to further development along 
an already chosen path. It may be worth investigating individuals' 
perceptions of the stability of one fundamental which underlies 
their gay identities, i. e., their sexual preference. This issue 
may be related to the literature which examines the fluidity or 
fixity of sexual preference during the lifetime. Those who propose 
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a view of sexual preference as malleable, e. g., Klein, Sepekoff and 
Wolf (1985), draw on the work of Kinsey et al. (1948,1953) and 
regard sexual preference as a continuum along which one may range 
during one's lifetime. Those who see sexual preference as fixed, 
e. g., Altshuler (1984) and Harry (1984), tend to view it as a 
homosexual-heterosexual dichotomy, with one's polarity determined 
in childhood. According to Altshuler, claims of sexual preference 
which do not occupy either end of the dichotomy simply represent 
attempts at saving social status and denying sexual conflict. 
However, the question of whether or not sexual preference is open 
to change is not the main concern. The real issue is whether 
respondents perceive their sexual preference to be open to change 
so that they experience doubts about the nature of it. This 
perception may of course be informed by their acquaintance with 
theories concerning the lability of sexual preference, but other 
factors may be equally influential, e. g., the nature of and their 
reactions to their sexual experiences and the degree to which a gay 
identity is personally satisfying and assimilable into their life 
circumstances. 
The motivation which renders stability and the establishment of a 
positive evaluation of one's gay identity a common goal in identity 
formation may be regarded as twofold. Firstly, identity stability 
is an inherently desirable state of affairs because, with the major 
identity-related issues resolved and relatively settled, it reduces 
the range and cognitive complexity of the identity tasks to which 
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one must attend. In this sense, identity stability may be equated 
with identity positivity. Secondly, once a gay identity has been 
adopted and integrated to any extent with other aspects of a 
person's concept of self, i. e., when it has become interwoven with 
one's overall personal narrative, there may be little motivation 
to change. The reasons for this include the difficulty of undoing 
a self-labelling which may have involved a considerable public 
dimension. Even if it were reversible, one would be faced with 
having to rebuild an interpersonal network which may well have been 
founded on one's gay identity (Plummer, 1975). Having undergone 
the processes of self-labelling and establishing a supportive 
social network once already in gay identity formation, the prospect 
of having to undergo it all again may be sufficient to discourage 
doubting of or further experimentation with one's sexual identity. 
Troiden (1977) also points to the nature of the identity 
transformation involved in gay identity formation and to the 
mystification of homosexual experience in the gay subculture as 
reasons why further substantial change in sexual identity is 
unlikely to be considered by gay men. By the latter, he means the 
belief which he located among his group that being gay is an 
essential and fundamental rather than a constructed aspect of the 
self, one which closes other sexual options. This belief may be 
internalised by the subcultural initiate as part of the process of 
replacing previously-held negative attitudes and stereotypes about 
gay men with attitudes based on or derived from actual interaction 
with them, i. e., as part of the internalisation of a subcultural 
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narrative. Not only may change be deemed impossible - and hence 
the process of doubting the authenticity of the sexual preference 
fruitless - but support among members of the subculture for an 
individual's attempt to explore the possibility of such change is 
unlikely to be forthcoming and may be viewed as a form of betrayal. 
The experience of doubt or instability in relation to one's gay 
identity may be correlated with other variables, the chief and most 
general one being the length of time which has elapsed since the 
respondent first began the gay identity formation process, a 
juncture which is arbitrarily designated, as was seen in the 
consideration of the various starting points of different models 
of gay identity formation. Whatever his point of departure, the 
longer a person has been working through his gay identity, the more 
likely it is that he will have had doubt-reducing and stability- 
inducing experiences such as the diminution of the impact of 
negative stereotypes of gay men through subcultural involvement. 
One correlate of the drive towards stability or equilibrium within 
the gay identity formation process may be the desire for a 
reduction in the cognitive complexity of the identity tasks to 
which one must attend. It is expected that respondents will mostly 
define themselves in terms of those categories which take into 
account their sexual preferences and activities and which most 
commonly occur in everyday parlance, i. e., "gay" or "homosexual". 
Few are expected to define themselves in terms of other categories 
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or to offer their own idiosyncratic self-definitions. Of course, 
it cannot be assumed that because a majority of respondents select 
a particular category to define their sexual identity, that 
category represents a uniformity of identity meaning and 
evaluation. But there must exist some commonality of experience 
and meaning underlying the category for it to be found a useful 
self-identifier by many people. And part of its utility lies in 
its capacity to simplify, whether it is adopted as a shorthand for 
what is seen as a personal conception of one's sexuality or as a 
set of behavioural and/or cognitive guidelines for how a gay man 
should act, i. e., as a role, or as a combination of both. 
Social contact with other gay men can be seen as increasing 
individuals' willingness and ability to attribute positive 
evaluations to their gay identity. It may be possible to access 
this evaluative dimension of identity by assessing the extent to 
which individuals regard being gay as being personally 
advantageous. Examples of advantages that one may expect to be 
cited include the opportunity to develop a personally-tailored 
value system and framework for living rather than simply adopting 
the one in which one is socialised or which prevails in the 
culture; the formation of a capacity to tolerate being different 
and to value difference; the development of an empathic response 
to other socially devalued groups; and a general strengthening of 
character. To these Clark (1987) adds the sharing of subculturally 
specific humour; the sharing of tenderness and compassion with 
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another man, an experience largely denied to heterosexual men; the 
capacity for relating equally and genuinely to women in 
relationships that are not influenced by sexual undercurrents; and 
the potential for transcending gender-bound roles and consequently 
for enjoying a broad range of experiences. Among the disadvantages 
which it was felt might be mentioned are problems of disclosure and 
non-disclosure insofar as these may force one to relate dishonestly 
or falsely to others; perceived difficulties in establishing and 
maintaining gay relationships; the possibility that a drive towards 
generativity may go unfulfilled; and the continuous awareness of 
or risk of societal censure. It may be further hypothesised that 
the advantages named by any individual will outweigh the 
disadvantages that he nominates. For an individual to have 
persevered in the establishment of a gay identity, the benefits of 
the process must have outweighed the costs. Of course, such an 
hypothesis is untestable unless an index can be obtained of the 
respondent's evaluation of the advantages and disadvantages cited 
and the relative weight he attaches to each. A simple comparison 
of the sum of each would not suffice: only one advantage may be 
nominated as opposed to several disadvantages but that advantage 
may be perceived by respondents as so important that it outweighs 
the aggregate negative component represented by the disadvantages. 
Linked to the evaluations that gay men place upon their gay 
identities is the issue of the effects which the advent of AIDS has 
had upon respondents' thoughts and feelings about themselves, gay 
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men and homosexuality. No study of gay men today would be complete 
without an examination of this issue which may have radically 
altered certain aspects of the pre-AIDS gay identity formation 
processes outlined in studies from that era. Given its potential 
for influencing identity, it is surprising to find that few 
psychological studies of AIDS examine this issue, concentrating 
instead on its psychological implications for people who are HIV 
positive or who have AIDS rather than for the gay community in 
general (Chodoff, 1987; Hirsch and Enlow, 1984; Morin and 
Batchelor, 1984; Morin, Charles and Malyon, 1984). However, the 
AIDS situation stands as a most apposite example of how changes in 
social circumstances may demand or be responded to by changes in 
identity, thereby highlighting the arbitrary nature of end points 
in models of gay identity formation and emphasising the futility 
of positing unilinear models that cannot accommodate such social 
change. The possible effects of the advent of AIDS on gay identity 
formation and construction have already been briefly considered in 
relation to Cass's (1979) model of gay identity formation. At this 
point, it is appropriate to examine them in greater detail. 
From initial self-suspicion as gay/homosexual onwards, AIDS may be 
hypothesised to have rendered the gay identity formation process 
more difficult and problematic at every juncture. Those at the 
self-suspicion stage now find themselves confronted with a 
homosexual category suffused with connotations of sickness and 
death. The "sickness" connotation has always featured in the 
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stereotypical conception of the homosexual category but as 
psychopathology rather than as organic pathology. The salience of 
the element of psychopathology in popular conceptions of 
homosexuality may have been diminished by the American Psychiatric 
Association's decision in 1974 to remove homosexuality from its 
list of disorders and by the gradual increase in public tolerance 
as homosexuality became a high profile media and social issue in 
the 1970s, but now the pathological connotations have returned in 
a much more concrete form. Media images of gaunt and wizened young 
gay men, wasted by the syndrome, and talk of divine retribution and 
of gay men as a "high risk group" for AIDS has inextricably linked 
homosexuality with disease, sickness and sin once again. And the 
popular press are not alone in this regard. Academic publications 
have also been at fault. For example, when Ruse (1988) in his 
philosophical inquiry into homosexuality uses the AIDS situation 
to attribute sickness to homosexuality, he attributes the 
prevalence of HIV (which he outdatedly refers to as "HTLV III") 
among gay men to promiscuity per se, thus unforgivably obfuscating 
the virus' precise mode of transmission while at the same time 
perpetuating the worst myths about HIV/AIDS. It is therefore clear 
that there exists a considerable potential for conflict within an 
individual as he considers the meaning and repercussions of his 
assuming a gay identity if he has internalised aspects of the 
coverage of AIDS issues in the popular press and elsewhere and to 
some extent regards the adoption of a gay identity as allying 
himself with a disease-ridden plague-carrying group or as possibly 
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exposing himself to the syndrome with all the suffering that 
entails. 
Disclosure of sexual preference may be rendered more problematic 
in that friends and/or family may assume that all gay men carry or 
at least are highly susceptible to HIV and so may give the 
discloser a wide berth. Less extreme disclosure consequences may 
involve an increased likelihood of a negative reaction following 
disclosure if those to whom disclosure is made acquiesce in the 
negative, sickness-related societal conceptions of gay men which 
have proliferated via the media in recent years (cf Armstrong, 
1984-85). Even if the AIDS situation only has the effect of making 
family and friends over-solicitous about the individual's health, 
this may also convey subtle messages to him that his sexuality is 
considered a health risk, which hardly encourages him to evaluate 
it positively. For those men who had long since worked through the 
major milestones and processes of gay identity formation and who 
had attained a stable and positively-evaluated gay identity, the 
advent of AIDS may have forced that identity into flux again. 
There may be a necessity to revisit and recast one's ideas about 
one's sexuality. For example, the multiple partner and anal-erotic 
aspects of gay sexual behaviour have been discouraged in various 
health education campaigns, thus undermining what many may regard 
as an integral component of being gay, i. e., freedom from 
heterosexual mores (Joseph et al., 1984). There may also be a 
reassessment of one's fellow gay men, positively or negatively, 
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depending on how one views their response to the AIDS crisis. 
It may be argued that what the examination of the internalisation 
and transmutation of social norms regarding homosexuals and 
homosexuality is in essence concerned with is the delineation of 
the factors which lead to an increase in the positivity of gay 
men's attitudes towards themselves during the gay identity 
formation process. In this respect, it may be worth considering 
those studies which attempt to identify factors which determine 
one's attitude to homosexuality, e. g., age, race, social class, 
religion, religiosity and political sympathy (Glassner and Owen, 
1976; Glenn and Weaver, 1979; Irwin and Thompson, 1977; Istvan, 
1983; McDonald and Moore, 1978; Nyberg and Alston, 1976; San Miguel 
and Millham, 1976; Stephan and McMullin, 1982; West, 1977b; Yarber 
and Yee, 1983; Young and Whertvine, 1982). Although these studies 
tend to address themselves to the attitudes of heterosexuals to 
homosexuality - McDonald and Moore (1978) who examine gay men's 
attitudes to their homosexuality being the exception - there is no 
reason to suppose that the same factors would not also influence 
the attitudes of homosexuals to their own sexuality, albeit perhaps 
in a different way. For example, on the age dimension, those who 
were forming their gay identities after the 1967 Sexual Offences 
Act, which legalised homosexual acts between consenting adults over 
21 years of age in private, may report different experiences from 
those who were doing so before that date (cf Baker, 1987). 
Likewise, those who were forming their gay identities before the 
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advent of AIDS in the 1980s with its attendant upsurge in anti- 
homosexual sentiments (cf Altman, 1986) may similarly prove to be 
a group with an ontogenesis distinct from those who are forming 
their gay identities in the era of AIDS, although as this era has 
only recently commenced, the delineation of its precise effects is 
best left to future research. 
Such demographic variables have been related at length to a range 
of lifestyle and adjustment variables among gay men in studies 
undertaken by Bell and Weinberg (1978) and by Weinberg and Williams 
(1974). For example, the latter investigators reported that their 
older respondents were less involved in the gay world, had sexual 
contact with other men less frequently and were more likely to be 
living alone than were younger men. They were, however, no worse 
off than younger respondents on various dimensions of psychological 
adjustment, and on some dimensions they actually fared better. 
This Weinberg and Williams regarded as reflecting a trend found in 
the general population rather than as something specific to gay 
men: as people become older, they tend to lower their aspirations 
and their expectations of life as they adapt to and accept the 
realistic possibilities of their life situation or they simply 
resign themselves to their life circumstances. In short, they are 
more easily satisfied. Another demographic variable which produced 
interesting results on analysis was occupation: Weinberg and 
Williams found that gay men in higher status occupations tended to 
have disclosed their sexual preference less, to be more worried 
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about exposure, more concerned with passing and less involved in 
the gay subculture than were men in lower status occupations; they 
also reported more social involvement with heterosexuals and 
identified more with higher class heterosexuals than with lower 
class homosexuals. These authors attributed this to the fact that 
those in higher status occupations had much to lose if their sexual 
preference became generally known. In terms of psychological well- 
being, those in higher status occupations were more self-accepting 
and had more faith in others, which was held to reflect the 
increased self-esteem and other social psychological advantages 
that accrue from a high-status occupation. It is intended to 
examine the effects that demographic variables such as age and 
occupation have upon major variables implicated in gay identity 
formation in the present study. 
Another reason for desiring demographic information is so that the 
heterogeneity of the group of gay men under study might be 
ascertained, the aim being to comply with Davies' (1986) 
recommendation that when studying gay men, as heterogeneous a group 
as possible should be sought. The reason for this is that the 
parameters of the population under study - i. e., those men in 
London who have adopted or are in the process of adopting a gay 
identity - are unknown because, as Davies (1986) points out, the 
visible, commercial and easily accessible gay scene does not 
encompass all those who might be included in the study population. 
As the parameters of the population are unknown, it is impossible 
287 
to draw a representative sample from that population. One 
alternative approach is to endeavour to obtain as heterogeneous a 
sample as possible in terms of the variables which may influence 
the major dependent variable(s) under study. The issue of 
sampling is treated in more detail elsewhere. 
4.4 The Disclosure of Sexual Preference 
The second broad area which it is proposed to examine in the 
present study is the disclosure of sexual preference, following 
closely the issues identified in the treatment of this topic by 
writers such as Clark (1987) and Weinberg (1976), and motivated by 
its frequent appearance in models of gay identity formation and by 
its being hypothesised as playing a structural as well as a content 
role within gay identity formation narratives. The questions which 
Clark and Weinberg held to be central to the process of disclosure 
concern whom to tell, why they should be told, what they should be 
told, expected responses, strategies for dealing with negative 
responses, and general strategies of disclosure. These issues will 
be incorporated in questions relating to disclosure and will 
provide the disclosure section of the study with its structure. 
Other topics which may yield valuable insights will also be 
included. For example, the relatively untreated subject of 
involuntary disclosure merits attention, i. e., when the respondent 
is not the person who makes the disclosure about his sexual 
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preference. The importance of this topic lies in the lack of 
control which the respondent has over the disclosure process. 
Unless he has explicitly or implicitly instructed another person 
to disclose on his behalf and has outlined how the disclosure is 
to be carried out, he cannot make the sort of pre-disclosure 
preparations both within himself and in relation to those to whom 
he intends to disclose which the literature suggests are commonly 
made. The likelihood of the elicitation of unexpected and untoward 
reactions from those to whom the disclosure is made is therefore 
greater than in the case of disclosure by the respondent himself. 
The possibility of disclosure by a third party being prompted by 
malice or vindictiveness and the allied possibility that it may not 
be conducted with tact or discretion increases the likelihood of 
an unfavourable reaction. Involuntary disclosure may therefore 
generate considerable interpersonal problems and affect the 
progression towards the attainment of a stable and positively 
evaluated gay identity. On the other hand, it may represent a 
deliberate disclosure strategy in that one may circumvent the 
possible difficulties of the personal disclosure situation by 
disclosing to someone and explicitly or implicitly requesting or 
granting permission to the person to tell others or by disclosing 
to someone whom one knows will almost certainly tell others. Such 
a tactic may result in the gay man having to deal with the 
considered reactions of others rather than their immediate 
reactions. If the disclosure by proxy initiated a shocked or 
hostile reaction, this may have abated or may have been replaced 
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by a less negative reaction by the time the gay man encounters 
those to whom disclosure was made. 
The issue of disclosure to family members merits separate treatment 
because of the possibility of their playing a vital role in 
facilitating or impeding the progression towards the assumption of 
a stable and positively evaluated gay identity. Weinberg's (1976) 
findings suggest that the major way in which familial reactions 
influence gay identity formation is in determining whether or not 
the individual attributes a positive or negative evaluation to his 
identity. In terms of Breakwell's (1986) model, it is the 
evaluative dimension which is chiely affected. Family members have 
greater potential than other people for influencing the gay 
identity formation process. The individual may determinedly set 
his face against those who react negatively to his homosexuality 
and may adopt the axiom that "those who matter won't mind and those 
who mind don't matter", but this stance may prove easier to 
maintain in relation to friends than family. If any of one's 
friends react negatively and persist in their negative evaluation, 
they may be downgraded in one's friendship hierarchy or jettisoned 
from it entirely and their position accorded to someone who shows 
greater acceptance, but it may be more difficult to do the same 
with family members. One may reject a father or mother because of 
their refusal to accept or evaluate positively one's sexual 
preference but with what does one replace them? Surrogate 
relatives or "families of choice" may provide the necessary 
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acceptance and support but cannot offer the parental or kinship tie 
which one might argue is intrinsically binding. The familial 
scenario may act as a source of incalculable support or as a 
continuous hindrance for the individual who is trying to work 
through the gay identity formation process. Indeed in that family 
members may react differently, it may prove to be both 
simultaneously. It is a situation in which diverse coping 
strategies may be mobilised on both sides to various ends. For 
example, the gay man may wish to preserve his family ties and 
foster a positively evaluated gay identity; family members may wish 
to maintain a relationship with their son/brother while coping with 
an aspect of sexuality about which they may know little, which may 
contravene their value system or ideas of morality, and which may 
stigmatise the family if it became public knowledge. It is these 
types of problems and the coping strategies which were employed to 
deal with them that it may be interesting to consider. 
The opposite side of the disclosure coin is what Goffman (1963) 
terms "passing", i. e., the concealment of potentially discrediting 
aspects of the self, in this case one's homosexuality. The most 
obvious means of achieving this is to pass as heterosexual either 
by manifesting what Weinberg (1976) calls the "indexical 
particulars" of heterosexuality, i. e., those characteristics which 
are most commonly regarded as constituting the essence of what it 
is to be heterosexual, or by avoiding situations in which attention 
is focussed upon one's sexuality in the hope that, through the 
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operation of the "heterosexual assumption" (cf Ponse, 1978), the 
attribution of heterosexuality will be made. Such strategies 
involve information control and deliberate manipulation of the 
social environment. The person must have a grasp of commonsense 
psychology in order to control the social cues which he transmits 
and to predict how others will interpret and react to them. The 
adoption of strategies to disguise one's homosexuality may engender 
anxiety in that if a facade has been purposefully created, it may 
slip, or even if such a front has not been created, one's true 
sexuality may somehow reveal itself in a moment of decreased 
vigilance (although, as has already been pointed out, Goffman 
appears to doubt whether the relationship between passing and 
anxiety is necessary or even commonplace). The passer may also 
feel hypocritical because of his awareness of the deliberate 
deception or may feel his loyalties divided as he denies membership 
of a group or category which he perceives - however dimly - as 
holding personal relevance for him. It is therefore not sufficient 
simply to examine the range of passing strategies most commonly 
employed or the people in relation to whom these strategies were 
most often adopted. Of equal importance are the feelings 
engendered in the passer while these strategies are being 
implemented. Both these areas will be addressed in the present 
study, although it is most unlikely that reports of feelings 
associated with passing accurately describe actual feelings at the 
time, if Hindley's (1979) assessment of the degree to which reports 
of past feelings are reconstructed is valid. The possibility of 
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changes in or the abandonment of passing strategies may be examined 
by comparing the ways in which respondents concealed their 
homosexuality before any disclosure of sexual preference was made 
with present tactics of concealment. It may be the case that 
whereas before, passing as heterosexual was a policy adopted in 
relation to everyone, now it may be restricted to certain people 
or classes of people perhaps because their relation to the 
respondent does not merit disclosure or perhaps because disclosure 
to them would have seriously injurious consequences either for the 
respondent's relationship with them and/or for the respondent 
himself. Then again, passing may be abandoned altogether for a 
variety of reasons, e. g., one may evaluate one's homosexuality 
positively and hence cease to regard it as something to be hidden. 
The exploration of temporally-based developmental changes in the 
disclosure process - and hence by association in the gay identity 
formation process - may be extended by examining current disclosure 
strategies, which may be compared with the strategies employed in 
initial disclosures. It may be that disclosure ceases to be a 
policy or even a conscious issue in relation to those with whom 
respondents come into contact. A disclosure etiquette may have 
been constructed and become routinised through the person's 
previous disclosure experiences. The disclosure process may become 
more subtle: cues to the respondent's homosexuality may be 
strategically placed in social interaction for the audience's 
consumption or there may simply be a cessation of active attempts 
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at concealment. Alternatively, a sort of "homosexual assumption" 
may be adopted in relation to the self, whereby one presumes that 
everyone knows of one's homosexuality and one then acts in 
accordance with this. Of course, it is likely that different 
approaches will be adopted in different situations and with 
different people. 
It may be hypothesised that responses given to questions on the 
disclosure of sexual preference will lend themselves to literal 
interpretation to a greater degree than will responses to questions 
on the internalisation and transmutation of social norms regarding 
homosexuality, i. e., they are more likely to reflect the 
actualities of the relevant experiences. The reason for this is 
that questions on topics such as the people to whom disclosures 
were made, the nature of the disclosures and the reactions they 
elicited seek factual rather than attitudinal information and 
relate to specific events, while the questions on the re-evaluation 
of the homosexual category tend to concentrate upon processes that 
may have occurred over a considerable period of time, such as the 
internalisation of negative ideas about homosexuality during 
socialisation, the development of suspicions that one might be 
homosexual, and the awareness of conflicts between aspects of one's 
value system and one's homosexuality. It may be hypothesised that 
it is more difficult to provide accurate recall on such topics as 
they may well not be tied to one specific event or to one point in 
time. 
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The likelihood that accurate responses (accurate in the sense of 
reflecting the actualities of original experiences) will be 
obtained from questions relating to past feelings, evaluations and 
motivations on both topic areas must be judged to be quite slim. 
However, data on reconstructed feelings are valuable in that they 
may provide insights on how the affective tone of accounts of gay 
identity formation is determined. It may be that, in line with a 
"darkness-to-light" reconstruction, pre-disclosure or pre-self- 
acceptance experiences will be tinged with a negative affective 
tone while experiences following disclosure or self-acceptance will 
be suffused with a positive affect. Equally it may be argued that 
responses to questions which ask for present assessments of aspects 
of gay identity formation may reflect respondents' actual opinions 
- leaving aside the question of the ontogenesis of such opinions - 
regardless of the subject matter. Examples of such questions are 
those concerning respondents' assessments of the advantages and 
drawbacks of the gay subculture and the advantages and 
disadvantages of being gay. Yet in the end, as has been mentioned 
before, in analysing and evaluating responses it is well nigh 
impossible to determine with certainty the relative contributions 
of the actualities of past experiences, reconstructions of those 
past experiences in the light of an individual's present self- 
conception, an individual's implicit personal theories of 
covariation and causation, and subcultural narratives which inform 
expectations of what has happened and what will happen in gay 
identity formation. The possibility that all of these sources may 
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be influential to a greater or lesser degree must be borne in mind 
when analysing data from a study such as this. 
Following the elaboration of the foregoing hypotheses, a basic 
open-ended questionnaire (see Appendix B) was constructed which 
addresssed the issues outlined. A full account of the construction 
and piloting of this questionnaire is provided in Appendix D, 
together with a description of the final version of the 
questionnaire (see Appendix A) that was compiled on the basis of 
the outcome of the pilot work. It is, however, worth noting here 
that in the final questionnaire, a multiple-choice format was 
chosen for most questions, and that the questionnaire was completed 
by respondents themselves, which marks a significant departure from 
the approach adopted in most previous studies of gay identity 
formation/ construction, i. e., in-depth, free-response, face-to-face 
interviews. The dominance of this method of study may be due to 
the assumption that (the construction of) gay identity formation 
involves complex processes that cannot be charted by a structured 
questionnaire. It may be contended, though, that part of this 
apparent complexity is due not to the nature of the processes but 
to the methodology frequently used in examining them. The free 
response approach often yields lengthy accounts of gay identity 
formation experiences that, with their anecdotal delineation of 
events, experiences and interpretations, serve to obscure broad 
generalities of experience and construction which a more sharply- 
focussed approach may uncover in a more economical manner. 
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Structure need not sacrifice scope as the chief concerns of 
previous studies of gay identity formation/ construction are all 
encompassed within the final version of the questionnaire used in 
the present study. The economy of the questionnaire lies in its 
utilising previous studies and pilot research to pinpoint the exact 
nature of the information required from respondents and to 
determine the optimal format for questions designed to elicit that 
information. 
4.5 Psychological Well-Being Among Gay Men 
One of the disadvantages of studying a phenomenon such as gay 
identity formation which is specific to one social group is that 
it may be difficult to relate findings within that group directly 
to any existing body of research in "mainstream" psychology. In 
order to help overcome this problem, it was decided to explore 
whether or not any variables hypothesised to be influential in gay 
identity formation could be measured using standardised 
psychometric instruments that have been used in many other 
settings. In this way, the group under study could be compared 
with other groups in terms of certain aspects of their 
psychological profiles. 
As has already been mentioned, numerous studies have been 
undertaken, mostly prompted by the adoption of a medical model of 
297 
homosexuality, to examine the extent of psychopathology among gay/ 
homosexual men. The assumption underlying the majority of these 
studies appears to be that homosexuality is a manifestation of 
psychopathology and is therefore associated with other indicators 
of psychopathology. The validity of many of these studies has been 
questioned as the tendency, at least in the past, has been to 
examine patient groups of homosexual men undergoing treatment for 
psychiatric problems, making it difficult to ascertain whether any 
psychiatric disturbance that was identified was a result of, a 
precursor of, or totally unrelated to their homosexuality (Turner 
et al., 1974; West, 1977a). In a review of studies of 
psychological well-being among gay/homosexual men, Hart et al. 
(1978) criticise them on conceptual and methodological grounds and 
conclude that it has not been satisfactorily demonstrated that gay 
men are any less psychologically adjusted than heterosexuals. A 
number of studies suggest that gay men may be less well adjusted 
than heterosexual men on certain dimensions. Compared with 
heterosexual men, gay men have been reported to exhibit higher 
levels of neuroticism (Van Den Aardweg, 1985); higher levels of 
hostility, but lower levels of guilt (Rizzo, Fehr, McMahon and 
Stamps, 1981); greater emotional vulnerability with more fears and 
aversions (Williams, 1981); a more pathological Adlerian 
"lifestyle", which encompasses self-identity, dependency and social 
interest (Friedberg, 1975); significantly poorer general 
psychological adjustment during adolescence (Prytula, Wellford and 
DeMonbreun, 1979); and lower self-esteem, attributed to alienation 
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from and a lack of openness to the general community, as opposed 
to the gay subculture (Jacobs and Tedford, 1980). However, other 
studies which have examined such factors as neuroticism, 
extraversion-introversion, ego development, self-esteem, sex guilt 
and sexual discord have reported no significant differences between 
homosexuals and heterosexuals (Hooberman, 1979; Nurius, 1983; Weis, 
1977; and Weis and Dain, 1979). Others have reported similar 
findings but with certain provisos. Dank (1973) found that the 
longer individuals had adopted a homosexual identity, the better 
was their psychological adjustment in terms of frequency of 
psychiatric or psychological consultations, suicide attempts, 
feelings of guilt concerning homosexuality and feelings of 
loneliness. Evans (1970) administered the 16PF to homosexual and 
heterosexual non-patient samples and concluded that the homosexual 
males were "mildly neurotic at most" but that the major factor 
which differentiated the groups appeared to be sexual orientation 
rather than level of psychological adjustment. In support of those 
who believe that passing carries a burden of psychological strain, 
Pinka (1977) found that those who attempted to feign 
heterosexuality before their parents showed a lower level of 
psychological adjustment than those who either disclosed their 
homosexuality to their parents or who adopted a neutral position. 
Findings of higher levels of psychological well-being among 
homosexuals than among heterosexuals have also been reported: 
Skrapec and MacKenzie (1981) found that homosexual men exhibited 
higher levels of self-esteem than heterosexual men or transsexuals. 
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So what is one to make of these conflicting and inconclusive 
findings? What can be stated is that even if a link is shown to 
exist between homosexuality and low levels of psychological well- 
being, the question of causation remains. It may be hypothesised 
that low levels of psychological well-being may not be due to 
factors inherent in a homosexual preference but rather to 
difficulties in facing and accepting that preference and in 
building upon it a fulfilling, positively-evaluated gay identity, 
which can be shared with others and which can help order and render 
meaningful one's psychosocial world. The models of gay identity 
formation considered earlier outline various experiences that must 
be negotiated, decisions that must be made and conflicts that must 
be resolved on the way to the development of a fulfilling, 
positively-evaluated gay identity. A considerable degree of mental 
contortionism and social experimentation is required as an 
individual eschews the socially approved identity of heterosexual, 
which provides a sense of belonging to the majority in society and 
a clear blueprint for one's lifestyle, expectations and goals, and 
accepts the socially devalued and stigmatised identity of 
homosexual. For example, Cass's (1979) "Identity Confusion" stage 
sees the individual engaged in a process of questioning whether his 
behaviour, thoughts, emotional reactions, etc., indicate that he 
is homosexual. Cass comments that "(t)hese are powerful and 
emotionally shattering questions ...... The dramatic changes of 
thinking they bring about leave the individual lost and bewildered. 
Old assumptions and beliefs about the self no longer exist. Life 
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is just not predictable in the way it was before. The future looms 
forth as a frightening unknown" (1981, p 9). In her second stage 
of "Identity Comparison", the individual becomes aware of the 
difference between himself and others, with an attendant sense of 
"not belonging", of being alone and at odds with society. Cass 
remarks that "for some the sense of alienation from others becomes 
a source of intense anguish and desolation" (ibid. ). It is 
clear from this and from other models of gay identity formation 
that the initial stages of the development of a gay identity may 
be mentally tortuous and fraught with uncertainty and anxiety. It 
is not surprising then that gay men should exhibit such traits as 
guilt, fear, emotional vulnerability, low self-esteem, etc.. All 
may be accounted for in terms of the processes of questioning, 
uncertainty and change involved in the acquisition of a gay 
identity. Guilt and low self-esteem may arise from the adoption 
of a form of sexual expression which one's early socialisation and 
peer group, as well as the mass media, have labelled with a variety 
of pejorative terms ranging from "deviant" and "socially 
undesirable" to "perverse" and "disgusting". Fear may be 
associated with uncertainties about the future, which are implicit 
in any change, and about what to do next, if one is attempting to 
develop a gay identity in the absence of contact with other gay men 
and without the sort of guidance, reassurance and developmental 
blueprint that they may provide. Emotional vulnerability, 
uncertain self-identity and poor general adjustment may be regarded 
as understandable consequences of a period of such mental turmoil. 
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Due to the paucity of longitudinal studies in the area, it is 
difficult to determine whether indicators of poor psychological 
well-being persist indefinitely or whether they dissipate as the 
individual moves towards self-acceptance and the adoption of a 
rewarding, stable and positively-evaluated gay identity, although 
Dank's (1973) study suggests that the latter is the case. Of 
course, en route to the attainment of a fulfilling, stable and 
positively-evaluated gay identity, there exists the possibility of 
a cessation in identity development if the individual chooses not 
to pursue the development of a gay identity any further. While 
some individuals may remain eternally open to growth and 
development, others may opt not to engage in further identity 
exploration, either permanently or temporarily, perhaps because 
they have created a workable if not an optimal identity, or because 
they are halting a while to consolidate or evaluate their existing 
developmental achievements. This picture of the development of a 
gay identity may account for the conflicting results obtained in 
studies of psychological well-being among homosexual subjects. 
Those studies which reported no difference between homosexual and 
heterosexual samples may have employed homosexual samples which 
consisted largely of men who had moved beyond the initial stages 
of gay identity formation and hence beyond the most anxiety-ridden, 
mentally and emotionally-demanding periods. By the same token, 
those studies which found indicators of low levels of psychological 
well-being may have employed samples of homosexual men who were 
working their way through these stages or for whom the gay identity 
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formation process had halted therein. The discovery of 
"psychopathological traits" may simply be a developmental artefact, 
uncovering characteristics which may not persist if the development 
of a gay identity is permitted to proceed beyond its initial 
stages. 
Whatever the causative agents in determining levels of 
psychological well-being among gay men, it is clear that this issue 
has featured prominently in research on homosexuality. It was 
therefore decided to include standardised indices of psychological 
well-being in the present study in order to obtain some insight 
into the level of psychological well-being of the group of gay men 
under study and also to permit comparisons with results obtained 
with other groups. Such comparisons constitute ways of relating 
findings from the present study to an existing body of knowledge 
and the use of standardised instruments connects the present study 
to "mainstream" psychology. Even more importantly, psychological 
well-being requires consideration as, in the various 
conceptualisations of gay identity formation described previously, 
it is postulated as an antecedent or as an outcome of many of the 
events and experiences associated with the process. For example, 
social contact with other gay men may promote a positive evaluation 
of and a personal acceptance of a gay identity, which may increase 
psychological well-being; this in turn may render an individual 
more attractive to others and thus may increase the likelihood of 
his becoming involved in a sexual and emotional relationship with 
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another gay man. 
The standardised psychometric instruments selected for use in the 
present study were the 30-item General Health Questionnaire (GHQ- 
30) (Goldberg, 1978) and Rosenberg's Self-Esteem Scale (Rosenberg, 
1979). An account of the results that the GHQ yielded is provided 
in detail elsewhere (cf Appendix G). The GHQ is a self- 
administered test, designed to detect changes in psychological 
functioning in relation to four main areas among subjects in 
community settings and in non-psychiatric clinical settings. The 
four areas are depression, anxiety, objectively observable 
behaviour and hypochondriasis. Factor analytic studies of the GHQ 
have produced factors relating to general psychological well-being, 
depression, anxiety, somatic disturbances, social functioning and 
sometimes sleep disturbance, in line with the themes Goldberg had 
in mind when devising the instrument (Goldberg and Williams, 1988). 
Each of the 30 GHQ items consists of a question which asks whether 
the respondent has recently exhibited certain behaviours or 
experienced certain symptoms, followed by a four-point frequency 
scale ranging from "not at all" to "much more than usual". The 
even number of response categories eliminates errors of central 
tendency. 
The GHQ-30 appeared ideal for the purposes of the present study as 
it is a relatively short inventory which provides an index of 
psychological functioning in relation to several broad areas, 
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concentrates upon the hinterland between psychological health and 
psychological disturbance, is not excessively affected by the 
sociodemographic characteristics of the group to which it is 
applied, and is well documented in terms of its application and its 
relation to other instruments addressing the same or similar areas 
(Goldberg and Williams, 1988). One possible drawback is that it 
focusses upon disruptions in normal functioning rather than on 
lifelong or longstanding disorders: its directions to respondents 
state that it is interested in "how your health has been in 
general, over the past few weeks". Hence, it cannot provide an 
indication of the extent to which respondents' constructions of 
their gay identity formation experiences have had an enduring 
effect upon their general psychological well-being, although this 
(or, more likely, a reconstructed account of it) may be estimated 
from respondents' replies to the frequent questions concerning how 
they felt at various junctures in the gay identity formation 
process. It would be setting an impossible task to ask respondents 
to recall their feelings with regard to specific events at various 
points in what might be the distant past, for this is what would 
be involved in establishing an inventory-based profile of 
psychological functioning during the gay identity formation 
process. Even if respondents felt capable of answering such items, 
the validity of their responses would be open to question, given 
the tendency for autobiographical memories in general and those 
relating to affective states in particular to be retrospectively 
constructed. Instead, what the GHQ provides is an index of the 
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general level of psychological functioning among the group under 
study which can then be compared to the psychological profiles 
obtained by the GHQ as applied to other groups and which, moving 
from a consideration of individual here-and-now psychological 
functioning to the distribution of psychological functioning within 
the group, can be used as a group variable rather than as an 
individual variable in examining factors related to key events and 
experiences in constructions of gay identity formation. 
Psychological well-being may be regarded as either a group outcome 
of gay identity construction or as an antecedent, motivating a 
particular type of (reconstruction of) gay identity formation 
experiences. 
One minor drawback in using the GHQ-30 is that none of the studies 
of psychological well-being among gay men that were mentioned 
previously employed the GHQ and no studies which used the GHQ 
appear to have been conducted on a sample of gay men. This would 
seem to render problematic the comparison of findings from this 
study with those from other studies, but fortunately scores on the 
GHQ have been found to correlate with scores on other self-report 
measures of psychological well-being. The correlations cited by 
Goldberg and Williams (1988) between scores on the GHQ and scores 
on ten other measures range from +. 48 to +. 78. Also, the GHQ 
scores of respondents in the present study can be compared with the 
GHQ scores of, e. g., general male samples in other studies. 
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One important aspect of psychological well-being which is not 
addressed by the GHQ is self-esteem. It may be hypothesised that 
where psychological well-being is posited as an antecedent or as 
an outcome of certain events and experiences in gay identity 
formation, it will be accompanied by self-esteem. The importance 
of this variable has already been alluded to: the desire for self- 
esteem has been posited as a powerful motivator of identity change 
generally (Breakwell, 1986). In addition, a high level of self- 
esteem has been characterised as an important coping resource that 
can help individuals withstand threats posed by events in their 
social environment (Pearlin and Schooler, 1978). It may well be 
the case that, given generally negative societal reactions to 
homosexuals and homosexuality and hence the possible damage caused 
to self-esteem by suspecting that one belongs to the socially 
devalued category of "homosexual", one of the major projects in gay 
identity formation is the devising of strategies aimed at 
increasing one's self-esteem. The index selected to measure self- 
esteem in the present study was Rosenberg's Self-Esteem Scale 
(Rosenberg, 1979), which is designed to access two components of 
self-esteem, i. e., self-worth and self-efficacy. This index 
consists of ten items with which respondents are required to 
agree/disagree on a four-point scale. The Rosenberg Self-Esteem 
Scale provides a measure of respondents' present functioning but 
cannot indicate how their self-esteem may have fluctuated across 
the gay identity formation process, so the same provisos apply as 
in the case of the GHQ. 
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4.6 connecting and Predicting Events and Experiences in Gay 
Identity Formation Narratives 
In addition to exploring accounts of specific individual events and 
experiences considered critical within personal narratives of gay 
identity formation, it is also hoped to outline the reported 
antecedents and outcomes of these events and experiences. One way 
in which this may be achieved is through the framing of several 
questions relating to the same broad event so that constructions 
of the actualities of that event may be followed as they describe 
the unfolding of the event and the reactions that it provoked. For 
example, in the consideration of the initial disclosure of sexual 
preference, it is intended to ascertain, among other things, who 
were the first people to whom disclosure was made; why they were 
told; what they were told; and how they reacted to the disclosure. 
Yet, perhaps an even more interesting endeavour is the attempt to 
relate events and experiences which do not share the same foci, 
with the aim of uncovering what one might consider either common 
developmental courses or common constructions of typical 
developmental courses, acquired through social contact with other 
gay men. With such data, one might predict how an individual's gay 
identity formation might proceed if one is aware of the nature of 
his relevant experiences to date, or one might predict how a 
construction of what constitutes a common developmental course for 
gay identity might unfold if some salient parts of the construction 
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are available. A consideration of the literature on gay identity 
formation suggests certain key variables in the process the actual 
or constructed antecedents of which it may prove most insightful 
to study. For example, one variable which may be related to many 
of the variables examined in relation to the internalisation and 
transmutation of social norms regarding homosexuality is the extent 
to which individuals perceive being gay as being personally 
advantageous, which may be regarded as reflecting the evaluative 
dimension of the development of a personal gay identity formation 
narrative. It has already been suggested that the degree to which 
gay men espouse such a view may be related to the extent and nature 
of their contact with other gay men. If their experience of the 
gay subculture is positive, i. e., if they perceive it as being 
supportive of the development of a positive gay identity - whether 
that support be in the form of offering advice, providing mentor 
relationships, or generally countering the residues of earlier 
negative experiences and facilitating the attribution of a positive 
evaluation to the holding of a gay identity - then they may be more 
likely to perceive the holding of a gay identity as something that 
is personally advantageous. The extent of subcultural contact may 
also be important in that the more often an individual is exposed 
to experiences and accounts that affirm and attribute a positive 
evaluation to a gay identity, the more likely it is that he will 
internalise and maintain this evaluation. The negative experiences 
the effects of which subcultural contact may help dissipate may be 
hypothesised to include the internalisation of negative 
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stereotypical images of homosexuals and homosexuality during 
socialisation, and negative feelings about the self following self- 
definition as gay/homosexual. These factors may be independently 
related to the extent to which being gay is seen as personally 
advantageous - rather than solely through mediating variables 
concerning subcultural contact - in that if the relevant 
experiences were so negative that identity-supportive subcultural 
contact was unable to mitigate their effects substantially, or if 
subcultural experience was itself negative, then these experiences 
may decrease the extent to which individuals perceive being gay as 
advantageous. Self-esteem and psychological well-being may be 
influential too: one could posit that a high level of self-esteem 
and of psychological well-being would be associated with a 
respondent perceiving being gay as advantageous, although cause and 
effect may be difficult to untangle. It could be that as one feels 
positively about oneself, this includes one's sexuality. 
Alternatively one might feel positively about oneself as a result 
of a feeling of self-efficacy consequent upon having survived the 
rigours of the gay identity formation process and developed a 
positively-evaluated fulfilling identity for oneself that, despite 
negative societal evaluations, one can perceive as advantageous. 
Through the construction and testing of such models of the possible 
antecedents of what are construed as having been key developmental 
points in gay identity formation, it is intended that the present 
study will not only be descriptive but also predictive of the 
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events and experiences encountered during gay identity formation 
and of their ordering in personal narratives and subcultural 
narratives. By examining the responses given to relevant questions 
and by making informed inferences, it is hoped to gain some insight 
into the personal and subcultural theories of covariation and 
causation which link gay identity formation events and experiences 
and which constitute the mortar of personal and subcultural gay 
identity formation narratives. 
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CHAPTER FIVE 
THE SAMPLING PROCEDURE AND THE DISTRIBUTION OF THE QUESTIONNAIRE 
5.1 The History of Sampling Gay Men 
The procedure whereby a substantial number of men who laid claim 
to a gay or homosexual identity was selected for investigation 
requires basically a twofold consideration. As the vast majority 
of the 151 respondents who completed the final questionnaire on gay 
identity was drawn from the Project SIGMA sample, it is necessary 
to examine the SIGMA sampling strategy and then to consider the way 
in which a proportion of the SIGMA sample was selected (or the way 
these respondents selected themselves) for inclusion in the present 
study. A word should also be said about the small number (23) who 
were obtained through the Metropolitan Community Church (MCC) of 
North London, through MCC members who participated in the study and 
who recommended it to their friends, and through friends of the 
researcher. 
As Davies (1986) points out, the exercise of obtaining a sample of 
gay men is fraught with difficulties concerning the 
representativeness of any sample obtained. Kinsey et al. (1948) 
comment that "(s)atisfactory incidence figures on the homosexual 
cannot be obtained by any technique short of a carefully planned 
population survey" (p 618). Given that such an undertaking would 
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require enormous resources, studies of the experiences of gay men 
have contented themselves with examining selected groups of gay 
men. Until the 1960s, the groups selected for study were often 
composed of men who were imprisoned or undergoing treatment for 
their sexuality (for example, Bergler, 1956; Bieber et al., 1961; 
Schofield, 1965). These studies were criticised for having 
examined the experiences of a small number of homosexual men in 
atypical circumstances and then generalised their findings to all 
homosexual men. As a result, descriptions of more mainstream 
experiences began to appear by writers whom Davies (1986) 
characterises as "'self-confessed' homosexuals (Plummer, 1963; 
Cory, 1953; Cory and Leroy, 1963) or by concerned liberals (Magee, 
1966; Chesser, 1959; Westwood, 1960; Hauser, 1962)" (p 22). With 
the emergence of the Gay Liberation Movement and organised gay 
communities in the 1970s, there began a move towards survey-type 
studies which took their respondents from among the gay 
communities, specifically from gay social and political groups and 
by making appeals in the gay press (e. g., Saghir and Robins, 1973; 
Weinberg, 1976). This sampling strategy, however, led to a certain 
type of gay man being over-represented in these studies, namely men 
who willingly identified themselves as gay, joined gay social and 
political organisations, responded to published appeals and were 
articulate in describing their experiences. 
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5.2 The Sampling Strategy of Project SIGMA 
Perhaps one of the most thorough sampling procedures followed by 
any study to date is that adopted by Bell and Weinberg (1978), who 
in San Francisco drew a pool of potential respondents from appeals 
in the press, through gay bars and bath houses, gay organisations, 
gay "cruising" areas (outdoor places where gay men meet to have 
sex) and through personal contacts of those recruited. They then 
selected their respondents from this pool in a random way so that 
although the group that was eventually chosen may not have been 
characteristic of gay men in general, it was at least 
representative of the pool which had been drawn from a wide range 
of sources. The only problem with this strategy was that most of 
the men contacted in this way were actively involved in the gay 
subculture, and the degree to which this typified gay men in 
general in the San Francisco area could not be ascertained. This 
strategy of drawing respondents from as heterogeneous a range of 
sources as possible was adopted by Project SIGMA in its sampling 
procedure: respondents at its London site were obtained from 
September 1987 until August 1988 through appeals in the gay press, 
by distributing leaflets about the Project in gay pubs and clubs, 
by appealing to gay social groups and by asking respondents thus 
obtained to nominate friends whom they thought might be willing to 
take part, this last method constituting a tracing sampling or 
"snowballing" strategy. The main intention underlying this 
procedure was that by emphasising the lastmentioned approach a 
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substantial number of men could be contacted who either did not 
self-identify as gay/homosexual or who did so only unwillingly, or 
who were not actively involved in the organised and visible gay 
subculture. The reason underlying this approach was that SIGMA was 
interested primarily in men who engaged in same-sex sexual 
activity, rather than solely in men who self-defined as 
gay/homosexual, as the study's prime concern was with issues around 
the transmission of HIV. Most respondents, however, when asked to 
nominate friends, not surprisingly tended to suggest "like me" 
friends, i. e., those who were involved in the gay subculture to the 
same extent as themselves. Also, as in London it was relatively 
easy to obtain respondents from the sizeable number of gay men in 
the visible gay community, there was a temptation to opt for these 
men rather than to pursue more elusive covert gay men with the 
result that the final sample was not unlike that obtained by Bell 
and Weinberg (1978) in terms of subcultural involvement. 
The major problem in sampling a population such as gay men lies in 
the basic rationale of the sampling procedure, which attempts to 
estimate certain characteristics of a given population by examining 
the characteristics of a subset of that population. This subset 
or sample is usually selected in such a way that every member of 
the population has an equal chance of being included in the sample, 
a procedure known as random sampling. However, often in the human 
sciences the parameters of populations under study are 
unenumerable, for whatever reason, and random sampling is therefore 
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impossible. In this case, some form of purposive sampling may be 
used, most often quota sampling, and it must be accepted that the 
characteristics of such a sample cannot be generalised to the 
population from which it is drawn. Quota sampling involves the 
selection of a group on the basis of their exhibiting certain 
characteristics which are held to be major influences upon the 
variables under study. For example, in Project SIGMA, respondents' 
ages and relationship types were felt on the basis of pilot work 
to be major influences in determining the nature of their sexual 
behaviour (Coxon, 1985); three age groups and three relationship 
types were therefore defined and each respondent was allotted to 
a cell within the resultant three-by-three classification system 
on the basis of his age and relationship type. While such a 
procedure ensures heterogeneity of the sample, it is impossible to 
estimate the proportions of the population who belong in each cell 
of the classification system and to weigh the sample accordingly. 
5.3 A Description of the SIGMA Sample 
An analysis of the SIGMA data by Hunt (1989) reported that the 
application of these sampling strategies yielded 508 names and an 
eventual sample of 310 for the first wave of interviews, a response 
rate of 61%. Approximately one third were obtained through press 
appeals, one third through pubs, clubs and social groups, and one 
third from people nominated by respondents. The mean age of the 
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sample was 34 years, and ages ranged from 16 to 81. In terms of 
the three specified age groups, 11% of the cohort were aged 21 
years or under, 63% were between 22 and 39, and 26% were over 39. 
With regard to the three selected relationship types, 22% were in 
monogamous relationships, 34% had one or more regular partners, and 
44% had no regular partner. To this extent, it may be said that 
the sampling strategies failed to produce an even distribution of 
respondents across the classification system, particularly in 
relation to age. Without knowing the age distribution of the 
population from which the sample was drawn, it is difficult to 
ascertain whether this reflects a deficiency in the sampling 
procedures or whether there exists a preponderance of men aged 
between 22 and 39 in the London gay subculture. Certainly an 
examination of the age ranges obtained in British studies such as 
those of Coxon (1988) and McManus and McEvoy (1987) suggest that 
the latter is a real possibility. Coxon accounts for this in terms 
of the 1967 Sexual Offences Act, which decriminalised same-sex 
sexual activity between consenting male adults in private, and the 
rise of the Gay Liberation Movement in the 1970s. He posits that 
only after this period did men feel free to identify themselves as 
gay/homosexual and that older men who were having homosexual sex 
before 1967 may have found it much more difficult to adjust to the 
changed circumstances and to openly identify as gay/homosexual; 
hence, they are likely to be under-represented in present day 
studies of gay men. It may however also be the case that older gay 
men are less involved in the gay social scene, for whatever reason 
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- an hypothesis supported by the findings of Weinberg and Williams 
(1974) - and hence it is more difficult for researchers to gain 
access to them. As was stated earlier, the temptation may be to 
oversample among those groups which are easily accessible. Then 
again, this portrayal of older gay men as socially isolated may 
simply be a manifestation of the stereotype of the lonely old gay 
man which has repeatedly been shown to be fallacious (Bennett and 
Thompson, 1980; Berger, 1980; Kelly, 1977; Kimmel, 1979,1980). 
As for the relative paucity of gay men aged 21 and under in the gay 
subculture, Hunt (1989) believes this is "almost certainly a 
reflection of the difficulty young gays have of positively 
identifying with being gay in a largely heterosexist environment" 
(pp 5-6), which is fair comment given the sort of replies accorded 
to questions in the present study's pilot work concerning topics 
such as accounts of the reasons why respondents disguise(d) their 
sexual preference, the sort of information given to them about 
homosexuality, and the things that prevented them from deciding 
they were gay earlier than they did. Hunt's analysis could be 
regarded as a succinct description of the tone and themes which 
emerged from these questions. 
Other characteristics of the SIGMA cohort of interest to the 
present study include the fact that 95.4% accorded themselves a 
rating of five or six on Kinsey et al. 's (1948) seven-point sexual 
preference scale (exclusively or mainly homosexual) in terms of 
their sexual activity and 93.8% rated themselves as Kinsey five or 
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six in terms of their sexual feelings. Those with post O-level 
qualifications were heavily over-represented in the cohort, with 
45.4% having degrees and only 5.8% having no educational 
qualifications. Respondents' social class was determined by 
classifying their present occupation according to the Office of 
Population Censuses and Surveys's (1970) classification system: 57% 
were assigned to social classes 1 and 2; 20% to class 3; 9% to 
classes 4 and 5; and 10% were in full-time education. Eighty per 
cent claimed no religious affiliation and just over half described 
themselves as agnostic or atheist. Of the 20% who belonged to a 
church, the Anglican church was nominated by 8%, the Roman Catholic 
church by 4%, and other churches/faiths by 7%. 
5.4 The Distribution of the Questionnaire on Gay Identity 
Formation 
Of the 310 respondents who participated in the first wave of 
Project SIGMA interviews, 261 (84.2%) returned for interview in the 
second wave. Attrition was highest among the youngest age group, 
which was attributed to the greater geographical and occupational 
mobility of the younger men compared with the older men (Davies, 
Hunt, Macourt and Weatherburn, 1990). It was during the second 
wave that the distribution of the questionnaire on gay identity was 
implemented. 
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The aims of the study and the nature of the questionnaire were 
outlined to the Project interviewing team, who were requested to 
present the questionnaire to their interviewees, provided that 
their interviewees identified themselves as gay/homosexual. As the 
Project sought to recruit men who had sex with men rather than only 
men who self-identified as gay/homosexual, a small number of its 
respondents were men who self-identified as bisexual rather than 
as gay/homosexual. It was felt to be inappropriate to give the 
questionnaire to these respondents, as a bisexual identity has been 
described as involving a set of issues quite distinct from those 
involved in the formation of a gay identity (Zinik, 1985). 
One practical limitation was placed upon the number of 
questionnaires distributed when the second wave of Project SIGMA 
interviews began earlier than expected, in September 1988. The gay 
identity formation questionnaire was not ready for distribution 
until mid-December 1988, so quite a number of SIGMA interviews had 
already been conducted at that stage. The distribution of the 
questionnaire continued until the end of April 1989. Interviewees 
were presented with the questionnaire; a personalised covering 
letter which explained the aims of the study, outlined instructions 
for the completion of the questionnaire and contained assurances 
about confidentiality (see Appendix C); and a freepost envelope in 
which they could return the completed questionnaire. The main body 
of the questionnaire was prefaced by a detailed set of instructions 
concerning its completion, and each question was followed by 
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directions specifying its response format. 
Consideration was given to the issue of whether or not the 
questionnaires should be anonymous in order to promote the 
likelihood of honest reporting and to boost the response rate. It 
was decided that SIGMA respondents would be given questionnaires 
marked with their SIGMA respondent number. This meant that some 
demographic information could be excluded from the questionnaire 
on gay identity formation as it had already been obtained on the 
SIGMA questionnaire. The present study was granted access to this 
information by SIGMA's principal investigator at the Project's 
London site. It was felt that the use of SIGMA respondent numbers 
would not significantly affect respondents' willingness to complete 
the gay identity formation questionnaire as they had already been 
informed by SIGMA about how the use of respondent numbers would 
ensure that any information which they gave to the Project would 
remain confidential. Much more likely to affect the return rate 
was the length of the questionnaire, so the adoption of any measure 
which would allow it to be shortened was considered most advisable. 
The questionnaire was presented under the auspices of Project SIGMA 
in that it was given to respondents at the end of a SIGMA interview 
and along with a diary in which respondents were asked to record 
their sexual activity for a period of one month which constituted 
another SIGMA research undertaking. Perhaps because of this, it 
was possible to capitalise upon respondents' commitment to and 
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confidence in Project SIGMA, and a relatively high response rate 
was obtained: 151 of the 204 questionnaires distributed were 
returned, a response rate of 75%. 
5.5 Sampling through the Metropolitan Community Church 
Most of the 23 respondents who were not obtained through Project 
SIGMA were contacted through the Metropolitan Community Church 
(MCC) - specifically targetted because of the information they 
could yield about the role of religiosity and religious 
denomination in influencing gay identity formation - or were people 
to whom they recommended the study. Thirty five questionnaires 
were distributed in this way and 20 were returned. Seven 
questionnaires were given to friends and acquaintances of the 
researcher, three of which were returned. The non-SIGMA 
questionnaires were marked only with the date on which they were 
dispatched. 
The principle on which MCC was founded in Los Angeles in 1968 was 
that all people are equal in the sight of God, irrespective of 
their colour, class, creed or sexual preference. The church has 
reinterpreted those biblical passages which are traditionally 
regarded as referring to and condemning homosexual activity and, 
by extension, homosexuality and views them in two basic ways: 
either as condemnations by Jewish prophets of the rites of other 
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cults which featured same-sex sexual activity, so it was the cults 
rather than same-sex sexual activity per se that was being 
censured; or as misinterpretations or mistranslations of the 
original Hebrew or Greek in which the biblical passages were 
written. MCC thus concludes that the Bible offers no prohibitions 
against same-sex sexual activity and therefore a belief in God, the 
authority of the Bible and homosexuality/same-sex sexual activity 
are held to be entirely compatible (Perry with Lucas, 1987). 
The implications which this position holds for gay members of MCC 
centre on the provision of a means of reducing or eliminating any 
feelings of conflict or inconsistency which members might harbour 
about their religious beliefs and their sexual preference. Indeed, 
in its active acknowledgement of the legitimacy and value of 
homosexuality, e. g., by its willingness to conduct blessing and 
union ceremonies for lesbian and gay relationships, the church may 
help counteract the effects of condemnatory sources within a 
person's life and may foster an acceptance of, a positive 
evaluation of and a feeling of pride in a gay identity. It may 
therefore be expected that those in the group under study who 
professed to be members of MCC would report fewer religiously- 
derived conflicts than would those who belonged to a church which 
adopts a more censurious approach to homosexuality. A proviso must 
however be included. Firstly, if a church member has internalised 
MCC's ideology concerning the legitimacy of homosexuality and its 
compatibility with Christian beliefs only partly or not at all, 
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i. e., if his value system has not assimilated or accommodated to 
the ideology, then clearly the possibility of religiously-derived 
conflict remains. Secondly, MCC is an ecumenical church and 
members are permitted to retain membership of other churches. If 
as well as being a member of MCC, an individual were a member of 
a church which adopted a condemnatory attitude towards 
homosexuality, and if he accorded greater credibility to the 
teachings of that church (which would be expected if it were the 
church in which he was raised, the teachings of which had informed 
his value system since childhood, or if it were a long-established 
church with a long tradition of scriptural study lending weight to 
its proclamations) then the likelihood of the MCC ideology 
prevailing would be lessened, particularly when one considers that 
this positive ideology may be at odds not only with the teachings 
of other churches but also with a number of influential forces in 
the person's life, such as the socialisation process. 
5.6 The Inappropriateness of a Control Group 
The issue of the exclusion of the experiences of lesbian women from 
the present study's area of investigation has already been 
addressed, but not the question of the sexual identity formation 
experiences of heterosexuals. It may be suggested that a study of 
the construction of gay identity formation could regard sexual 
identity or identity based on sexual preference as the more global 
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phenomenon of which it is studying the construction of one 
particular manifestation. Such an approach, it could be argued, 
would open the way to the comparison of the constructions of sexual 
identity formation experiences of gay men and lesbian women with 
those of heterosexual men and women, who could be studied as a 
control group. Such an approach, however, is not valid as 
heterosexual identity formation is not simply an analogue of gay 
identity formation. It is not simply another manifestation of 
sexual identity. It is the manifestation of sexual identity, the 
socially accepted, valued and sanctioned sexual preference. 
The term "sexual preference" is more appropriate than "identity" 
when referring to heterosexuality, as "identity" may be viewed as 
connoting some degree of reflection on and/or awareness of the self 
and its history in relation to a particular social role or 
category. But as "heterosexual" is the dominant sexual preference 
in society, in terms of which societal sexual structures, mores and 
messages are framed, it operates largely as an unspoken assumption 
at both an individual and a societal level. This assumption that 
everyone is heterosexual unless proved otherwise can be exploited 
by a gay person who is attempting to disguise his homosexuality 
(Ponse, 1978). Because an individual is socialised to be 
heterosexual in a world structured upon the assumption of universal 
heterosexuality, there is no reason for heterosexual individuals 
to reflect upon their sexual preference or to use it as a basis for 
a subjectively important and meaningful identity. What Hite (1990) 
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says of the cultural imperatives which shape the prevailing social 
conception of masculinity may be applied equally to the operation 
of this assumption of universal heterosexuality: "many ...... seem 
to lose the ability to distinguish between their own feelings and 
this massively reinforced ideology that pervades the culture - in 
fact, dominates the culture; in fact, is the culture" (p xviii). 
Its ubiquitousness in the world in which most people are socialised 
leads to its being regarded as an immutable given, which may be 
what underpins the insistence sometimes voiced that heterosexuality 
is "natural", as opposed to homosexuality which is seen as 
"unnatural" (Smith, 1979), a term which in keeping with the present 
line of reasoning may be translated as "less visible" or "less 
frequently encountered". While gay men are led to question the 
assumption of universal heterosexuality because of an incongruence 
between this concept and their awareness of their same-sex sexual 
feelings, heterosexual men do not have their attention drawn to 
their sexual preference in a comparable way. As testimony to this, 
while there exists a plethora of studies on gay identity formation, 
there are few, if any, comparable studies of heterosexual identity 
formation as a distinct manifestation of sexual identity rather 
than as the only manifestation of sexual identity. The 
meaninglessness of the concept may be gauged by addressing the 
questions employed in the present study to heterosexuals. It is 
doubtful whether many people could give meaningful answers if asked 
whom they first told they were heterosexual; or whether they 
disguised their heterosexuality from anyone in particular; or at 
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what age they decided they were definitely heterosexual; or what 
the advantages and drawbacks of a heterosexual community or 
subculture are. 
Because a heterosexual person's attention is not drawn to their 
heterosexuality, it has little or no salience as a component in 
their personal narrative in much the same way as in western 
societies a white person's colour is a subjectively unimportant 
aspect of their narrative. For the gay person, however, sexuality 
and sexual preference are invariably more of an issue. Constantly 
reminded of their deviation from the sexual norms of the 
heterosexual world by which they are surrounded, they must actively 
work to construct a sexual identity that they can evaluate 
positively and from which they can derive fulfilment. Although 
Cass (1979) suggests that the importance of a gay identity in a 
person's identity hierarchy may decrease over time when these aims 
have been achieved to the person's satisfaction, there can be 
little doubt that at least until this stage is attained or re- 
attained, the gay person's sexual identity remains a central 
preoccupation. 
Nor is it valid to compare the identity formation experiences of 
gay men with those of other social minorities, except in the 
broadest sense. Although, for example, the processes involved in 
attributing a positive evaluation to an identity as a black person, 
outlined by Hall, Cross and Freedle (1975), may appear similar in 
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especially problematic. 
5.7 Preparation for Analysis 
The 151 gay identity questionnaires that were returned arrived on 
average three weeks (21.34 days) after being dispatched. The time 
taken by respondents to return the questionnaires ranged from two 
to 139 days, with the final one arriving in mid-June 1989. The 
data were then encoded and prepared for the analysis stage. A 
codebook for the questionnaire was devised, but most of the 
responses were precoded as respondents provided them in numerical 
form. Idiosyncratic answers given in the "other" section of many 
questions were recorded separately by the investigator and coding 
categories were constructed for these where possible. As it was 
intended to analyse the data using SPSS-X (Statistical Package for 
the Social Sciences) (Nie, Hull, Jenkins, Steinbrenner and Bent, 
1983), an SPSS system file was created using the questionnaire 
coding system. Everything was now in place for the analysis of the 
data. 
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many respects to the developmental tasks that a gay person 
negotiates in the construction of a positively-evaluated gay 
identity, the black person or the person who belongs to any 
stigmatised racial or religious minority has one major advantage 
over the gay person in facing this task: they are socialised within 
a family which shares their minority status. Black parents can 
communicate to their children what it means to be black through the 
transmission of a relevant familial narrative. They can help 
foster pride in a black identity and share with their children 
strategies for dealing with stigma. Within this context, black 
children have the opportunity of developing a sense of "we" versus 
"they", i. e., a sense of belonging and a group identity (Dank, 
1971; Hetrick and Martin, 1987). Not so with young people who 
become aware of their same-sex sexual attractions. Their parents 
are most likely not gay themselves and may convey to their children 
only stereotypical information and negative evaluations of what it 
means to be gay. Such young people lack an easily accessible 
source of alternative interpretations and evaluations of their 
socially devalued difference and an antidote to their isolation. 
Work on the content and value dimensions of their sexual identity 
must be conducted without the support of the most significant 
others in their social environment and they must eventually look 
elsewhere for a legitimising narrative. This lack of a support 
network in the early years is what crucially distinguishes the 
experiences of gay people from the experiences of other social 
minorities and renders their identity development and construction 
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